Complexity Aspects of Fundamental Questions in Polynomial Optimization by Zhang, Jeffrey
Complexity Aspects of Fundamental
Questions in Polynomial Optimization
Jeffrey Zhang
A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty
of Princeton University
in Candidacy for the Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
Recommended for Acceptance
by the Department of
Operations Research and Financial Engineering
Adviser: Amir Ali Ahmadi
September 2020
ar
X
iv
:2
00
8.
12
17
0v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
7 A
ug
 20
20
c© Copyright by Jeffrey Zhang, 2020.
All rights reserved.
Abstract
In this thesis, we settle the computational complexity of some fundamental questions in polyno-
mial optimization. These include the questions of (i) finding a local minimum, (ii) testing local
minimality of a candidate point, and (iii) deciding attainment of the optimal value. Our results
characterize the complexity of these three questions for all degrees of the defining polynomials left
open by prior literature.
Regarding questions (i) and (ii), we show that unless P=NP, there cannot be a polynomial-
time algorithm that finds a point within Euclidean distance cn (for any constant c) of a local
minimum of an n-variate quadratic function over a polytope. This result answers a question of
Pardalos and Vavasis that appeared in 1992 on a list of seven open problems in complexity theory
for numerical optimization. By contrast, through leveraging techniques from algebraic geometry,
we show that a local minimum of a cubic polynomial can be found efficiently by semidefinite
programming. Interestingly, we prove that second-order points of cubic polynomials admit an
efficient semidefinite representation, even though their critical points are NP-hard to find. We also
give an efficiently-checkable necessary and sufficient condition for local minimality of a point for a
cubic polynomial.
Regarding question (iii), we prove that testing whether a quadratically constrained quadratic
program with a finite optimal value has an optimal solution is NP-hard. We also show that
testing coercivity of the objective function, compactness of the feasible set, and the Archimedean
property associated with the description of the feasible set are all NP-hard. The latter property
is the assumption on which convergence of the Lasserre hierarchy relies. We also give a new
characterization of coercive polynomials that lends itself to a hierarchy of semidefinite programs.
In our final chapter, we present a semidefinite programming relaxation for the problem of finding
approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. We show that for a symmetric game, a 1/3-Nash
equilibrium can be efficiently recovered from any rank-2 solution to this relaxation. We also propose
semidefinite programming relaxations for NP-hard problems related to Nash equilibria, such as that
of finding the highest achievable welfare under any Nash equilibrium.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, we concern ourselves with polynomial optimization problems (POPs), i.e.,
problems of the type
inf
x∈Rn
p(x)
subject to qi(x) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(1.1)
where p, q1, . . . qm are polynomial functions. In Chapters 2-4, we address the complexity of
the following questions for a problem in the form of (1.1):
Q1: Is a given a point x a local minimum of (1.1)?
Q2: Does (1.1) have a local minimum (and if so, can one be found efficiently)?
Q3: If (1.1) has a finite optimal value, does it have an optimal solution?
Precise definitions and in-depth study of related problems can be found in their respective
chapters.
POPs have wide modeling capabilities and arise ubiquitously in applications, either as
exact models of objective functions or as approximations thereof. Perhaps the most well-
known special case of POPs is linear programming, but POPs have much richer expressive
power. For example, in full generality any decision problem in NP, a class of yes-no decision
problems with the property that any yes answer can be certified efficiently, can be posed as
1
a POP.1 An example of a POP we will see in this thesis is the search for Nash equilibria
in bimatrix games, but other examples arise from optimal power flow [51], the quadratic
assignment problem [65], robotics and control [6], and statistics and machine learning [106,
104]. Even when the goal is not to minimize a polynomial function, optimization algorithms
that involve minimizing Taylor expansions of functions solve POPs as a subroutine.
With such modeling power comes the price of computational intractability, and unfor-
tunately POPs become intractable to solve even when the degrees of the defining polyno-
mials are low. The study of local minima in Q1 and Q2 is in large part motivated by this
intractability of finding global minima in polynomial optimization. It is common for opti-
mization algorithms to instead search for local minima, with the hope that local minima are
easier to find. This notion is not new; for example [72] provides an explicit example of a
class of POP where global minima are hard to find but local minima are not. There has
also been renewed interest in finding local minima due to the growth of machine learning
applications, where local minima of highly nonconvex functions are sought for in practice
with simple first-order methods like gradient descent. Our goal in Chapters 2 and 3 of this
thesis is to more formally understand the complexity of finding local minima (as well as some
related questions).
We point out that a priori there are no complexity implications between questions Q1
and Q2 stated above. For example, there is no reason to expect that an efficient algorithm
for verifying that a given point is a local minimum would provide any guidance on how
one decide if a problem has a local minimum (this is in essence the dilemma of the famous
question “P = NP?”). Conversely, even if local minimality of a given point cannot always
be efficiently certified, that does not rule out the existence of algorithms that can efficiently
find particular local minima that are easy to certify; see e.g. Question 3 of [87]. Thus the
complexities of these two questions need to be studied separately.
1This follows straightforwardly from the fact that NP-complete problems can be formulated as POPs; see
for example Section 2.2, Section 3.2, or Section 4.2.
2
One of the first hardness results on local minima in the literature is due to Murty and
Kabadi [75], who show that the problems of deciding whether a given point is a local mini-
mum of a quadratic program or a local minimum of a quartic polynomial are NP-hard (see
Table 1.1). These were two of the first results indicating that local minima are not neces-
sarily “easier” than global minima. In regards to Q1, along with prior classical results, they
only leave open the complexity of deciding whether a given point is a local minimum of a
cubic polynomial. We show that this last case is polynomial-time solvable in Section 2.3 of
this thesis.
deg(p)
max deg(qi) ∅ 1 ≥2
1 P P NP-hard
2 P NP-hard NP-hard
[75],[85]
3 P NP-hard NP-hard
(Theorem 2.3.3)
≥4 NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard
[75]
Table 1.1: Complexity of deciding whether a point is a local minimum of a POP, based on
the degree of the objective p and the maximum degree of any constraint function qi. Entries
without a reference are either classical or implied by a stronger hardness result in the table.3
We next comment on Q2, the question of deciding whether a POP has a local minimum.
The complexity of Q2 based on the degrees of the defining polynomials is presented in
Table 1.2. This problem has not been as extensively studied in prior literature, though it
3The NP-hardness of the case of linear objective and quadratic constraints is implied by the NP-hardness
of the quadratic programming case. Indeed, minimizing a quadratic function p(x) over a polyhedron Ax = b
can be reduced to minimizing a variable γ over the set {(x, γ) | Ax = b, , p(x) = γ}.
3
is more closely related to the problem of searching for a local minimum as compared to
Q1. In fact, for the cases labeled “P” in Table 1.2, some natural algorithms that find local
minima implicitly check that they exist; see Section 2.1 for details in the unconstrained case.
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we show that this is also the case for cubic polynomials. In
particular, the problem of deciding if a cubic polynomial has a local minimum (and then
finding one) can be done by solving a polynomial number of polynomially-sized semidefinite
programs (SDPs), hence the label in Table 1.2. By contrast, we show that Q2 is intractable
in the same cases that Q1 is.
deg(p)
max deg(qi) ∅ 1 ≥2
1 P P NP-hard
2 P NP-hard NP-hard
(Theorem 3.2.5)
3 SDP NP-hard NP-hard
(Algorithm 2)
≥4 NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard
(Theorem 3.2.1)
Table 1.2: Complexity of deciding whether a POP has a local minimum, based on the degree
of the objective p and the maximum degree of any constraint function qi. Entries without a
reference are either classical or implied by a stronger hardness result in the table.
In many settings the existence of a local minimum in a POP is guaranteed; the focus is
then on finding a local minimum without needing to consider whether one exists. One way
this can be the case is when the feasible set is bounded, as is commonly the case in both
applications and POPs encoding classical combinatorial problems. For the specific case of
4
quadratic programs with bounded feasible sets, the question of the complexity of finding a
local minimum has appeared explicitly in the literature in [87]:
“What is the complexity of finding even a local minimizer for nonconvex quadratic
programming, assuming the feasible set is compact? Murty and Kabadi (1987)
and Pardalos and Schnitger (1988) have shown that it is NP-hard to test whether
a given point for such a problem is a local minimizer, but that does not rule out
the possibility that another point can be found that is easily verified as a local
minimzer.”
We settle this question in Chapter 3, where we show that unless P=NP, no polynomial-time
algorithm can even find a point within a Euclidean distance of cn (for any constant c ≥ 0)
of a local minimum.
The final complexity question we study for POPs is testing the existence of an optimal
solution when the optimal value of the problem is finite. This problem is in part motivated
by a question of Nie, Dummel, and Sturmfels [84], who provide an algorithm for solving an
unconstrained POP under the assumption that the optimal value is attained. The authors
remark
“This assumption is non-trivial, and we do not address (the important and diffi-
cult) question of how to verify that a given polynomial f(x) has this property.”
Most prior work on this question has focused on identifying cases where the existence of opti-
mal solutions is guaranteed. Perhaps the most classical example is the Bolzano-Weirstrauss
theorem for continuous functions over compact sets. Such theorems in the setting of POPs
are commonly referred to as Frank-Wolfe type theorems, due to the eponymous authors’
result that quadratic programs attain their optimal value when that value is finite [38]. For
POPs, this result was extended to cubic programs in [10], where it is shown that finite op-
timal values are always attained if the objective is at most cubic, and the constraints are
affine. However, we will show that these are the only cases where this is true, and that
5
deciding whether a POP attains its optimal value is NP-hard in the remaining cases (see
Table 1.3).
deg(p)
max deg(qi) ∅ 1 ≥2
1 YES YES NP-hard
(Theorem 4.2.2)
2 YES YES NP-hard
[38]
3 YES YES NP-hard
[10]
≥4 NP-hard NP-hard NP-hard
(Theorem 4.2.1)
Table 1.3: Complexity of deciding whether a POP with a finite optimal value has an optimal
solution, based on the degree of the objective p and the maximum degree of any constraint
function qi. Entries without a reference are either classical or implied by a stronger hardness
result in the table. Note that whenever the degree of the objective is at most three, and the
feasible set is a polyhedron, there is no algorithm required; the answer is simply ‘yes’.
In this thesis, we also study an application of POPs to the problem of finding Nash equi-
libria in bimatrix games. Nash equilibria are a fundamental concept in economics, but they
also arise frequently in disciplines such as biology and finance. Finding a Nash equilibrium
however, is computationally intractable [31]. In the final chapter of this thesis, we formulate
the problem of finding Nash equilibria in bimatrix games as a POP, and explore semidefi-
nite programming relaxations for finding approximate Nash equilibria. We also apply these
techinques to certain decision problems related to Nash equilibria.
6
1.1 Preliminaries
In this thesis, we will study the complexity of Q1-Q3 in the Turing model of computation.
Since polynomial functions of a given degree are finitely parameterized, they allow for a
convenient study of complexity questions in this setting. The size of a given instance is
determined by the number of bits required to write down the coefficients of the polynomial
(and, in the case of Q1, the entries of the point x), which are all taken to be rational numbers.
For the purposes of analyzing the complexity of these three questions for POPs, we consider
the relevant setting in applications where the degrees of any polynomials are fixed and the
number of variables in the POP increases. We are interested in the existence or non-existence
of efficient algorithms for solving Q1-Q3 in this setting, as established theory (e.g. quantifier
elimination theory [105, 100]) already yields exponential-time algorithms for them. We also
point out that our intractability results are in the strong sense, meaning that the problems
remain NP-hard even if the bitsize of all numerical data is O(log(n)), where n is the number
of variables in the problem. Unless P = NP, not even a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm
(an algorithm whose running time is polynomial in the magnitude of the numerical data, but
not their bitsize) can exist that solves a strongly NP-hard problem on all instances. This is in
contrast to problems such as knapsack [39], which can be solved tractably, e.g. by dynamic
programming, when the size of the numerical data is “small”. See [39] or [5, Section 2] for
more details on the distinction between weakly and strongly NP-hard problems.
A prevalent tool in this thesis will be sum of squares programming. More details will
be provided in each chapter as they are used, but we provide an introduction here. We say
that a polynomial p is a sum of squares (sos) if there exist polynomials q1, . . . , qr such that
p =
∑r
i=1 q
2
i . This is an algebraic sufficient condition for global nonnegativity of a polynomial
which is in general not necessary [49]. While deciding nonnegativity of a polynomial is in
general NP-hard (e.g., as a consequence of [75]), deciding whether a polynomial is sos can
be done via semidefinite programming. This is because a polynomial p of degree 2d in n
variables is a sum of squares if and only if there exists an
(
n+d
d
)× (n+d
d
)
positive semidefinite
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matrix Q satisfying the identity
p(x) = z(x)TQz(x), (1.2)
where z(x) denotes the vector of all monomials in x of degree less than or equal to d. Note
that because of this equivalence, one can also impose the constraint that a polynomial p with
unknown coefficients is sos by semidefinite programming (see, e.g., [88]). Given a rank-r psd
matrix Q that satisfies (1.2), one can write Q as
∑r
i=1 viv
T
i (e.g. via a Cholesky factorization),
and obtain an sos decomposition of p as p =
∑r
i=1(v
T
i z(x))
2.
Sum of squares polynomials have gained interest in the field of polynomial optimization
because the problem of finding the infimum of some polynomial p can be straightforwardly
reformulated into the problem
sup
γ∈R
γ
subject to p(x)− γ is a nonnegative polynomial.
(1.3)
This formulation has the interpretation of finding the largest lower bound on a polynomial.
Unfortunately, this problem cannot be efficiently solved, since testing whether a polynomial
of degree at least 4 is nonnegative is NP-hard and thus the constraint “p(x) − γ is a non-
negative polynomial” cannot be imposed in a tractable fashion. Therefore, to obtain what
is known as a “sum of squares relaxation”, this constraint is replaced by a sum of squares
constraint, which can be imposed tractably:
sup
γ∈R
γ
subject to p(x)− γ is sos.
(1.4)
Since the constraint “p(x) is sos” is a semidefinite constraint, (1.4) is an SDP. As any sos
polynomial is nonnegative, this gives a lower bound on the infimum of p(x).
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There are many extensions for constrained problems, with one of the more well-known
being based on Putinar’s Positivstellensatz [92]. Putinar’s Positivstellensatz states that if
the so-called Archimedean property is satisfied, then if a polynomial p is positive for all x in
the set {x ∈ Rn | qi(x) ≥ 0,∀i = 1, . . . ,m}, there exist sos polynomials σ0, . . . , σm such that
p(x) = σ0(x) +
m∑
i=1
σi(x)qi(x). (1.5)
The Archimedean property requires existence of a scalar R such that the polynomial
R−∑ni=1 x2i belongs to the quadratic module of q1, . . . , qm, i.e., the set of polynomials that
can be written as
τ0(x) +
m∑
i=1
τi(x)qi(x),
where τ0, . . . , τm are sum of squares polynomials. This is an algebraic notion of the com-
pactness of the set {x ∈ Rn | qi(x) ≥ 0, ∀i = 1, . . . ,m}, which is stronger than the geometric
notion. Similar to the construction of (1.4), for any positive integer d the following problem
gives a lower bound on the optimal value of (1.1):
γd := sup
γ∈R,σi
γ
subject to p(x)− γ = σ0(x) +
n∑
i=1
σi(x)qi(x),
σi is an sos polynomial of degree at most 2d,∀i = 0, . . . ,m.
(1.6)
Taking d = 1, 2, . . . defines a sequence of problems referred to as the Lasserre hierarchy [61].
There are two primary properties of the Lasserre hierarchy which are of interest. The first
is that for any fixed d, the d-th problem in this sequence is an SDP of size polynomial in n.
The second is that under the Archimedean property, lim
d→∞
γd = p∗, where p∗ is the optimal
value of the POP in (1.1). While this is a powerful property of the hierarchy, and in practice
the hierarchy is often exact at low levels, in general the level of the hierarchy needed can
be arbitrarily high, and the semidefinite programs involved become expensive very quickly.
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Additionally, the Archimedean property is NP-hard to check, as we show in Section 4.3 of
this thesis.
1.2 Outline of this thesis
Complexity Results in Polynomial Optimization Chapters 2-4 this thesis focus on fun-
damental problems in polynomial optimization from an algorithmic perspective. Chapter 2
concerns itself with the complexity of local minima and related notions in unconstrained poly-
nomial optimization. In particular, it establishes that local minima and second-order points
of cubic polynomials can be found by solving polynomially many semidefinite programs of
polynomial size. In the negative direction, it establishes that the problems of deciding if
quartic polynomials have second-order points and whether cubic polynomials have critical
points are NP-hard. Notably, our approach for finding local minima of cubic polynomials
relies on circumventing the search for critical points. Chapter 3 establishes our intractability
results related to local minima in quadratic programming. In particular, we show that unless
P=NP, no polynomial-time algorithm can find points within distance cn, for any constant
c ≥ 0, of a local minimum in an n-variate quadratic program with a bounded feasible set.
Chapter 4 focuses on the problem of testing attainment of optimal values, and settles the
complexity of deciding whether a POP with a finite optimal value has an optimal solution.
Semidefinite Relaxations for Bimatrix Games In the second part of this thesis, we
explore an application of semidefinite programming to game theory, in particular semidefinite
programming relaxations for finding Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. We show that for
a symmetric game, a symmetric 1/3-Nash equilibrium can be efficiently recovered from any
rank-2 solution to this relaxation. We also present semidefinite programming relaxations for
NP-hard decision problems related to Nash equilibria, such as that of finding the highest
achievable welfare under any Nash equilibrium.
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Chapter 2: Ahmadi, A. A., and Zhang, J. Complexity Aspects of Local Minima and
Related Notions. Available at arXiv:2008.06148.
Chapter 3: Ahmadi, A. A., and Zhang, J. On the Complexity of Finding a Local
Minimizer of a Quadratic Function over a Polytope. Available at arXiv:2008.05558.
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at arXiv:1803.07683.
Chapter 5: Ahmadi, A. A., and Zhang, J. Semidefinite Programming and Nash Equi-
libria in Bimatrix Games. To appear in INFORMS Journal on Computing. Available at
arXiv:1706.08550.
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Chapter 2
On Local Minima and Related
Notions in Unconstrained Polynomial
Optimization
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter of the thesis, we address the complexity of questions Q1 and Q2 from Chap-
ter 1, but more generally for the following four types of points for a given polynomial
p : Rn → R:
(i) a critical point, i.e., a point x where the gradient ∇p(x) is zero,
(ii) a second-order point, i.e., a point x where ∇p(x) = 0 and the Hessian ∇2p(x) is positive
semidefinite (psd), i.e. has nonnegative eigenvalues,
(iii) a local minimum, i.e., a point x for which there exists a scalar  > 0 such that
p(x) ≤ p(y) for all y with ‖y − x‖ ≤ ,
(iv) a strict local minimum, i.e., a point x for which there exists a scalar  > 0 such that
p(x) < p(y) for all y 6= x with ‖y − x‖ ≤ .
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We note the following straightforward implications between (i)-(iv):
strict local minimum ⇒ local minimum ⇒ second-order point ⇒ critical point.
Notions (i)-(iv) appear ubiquitously in nonconvex continuous optimization as surrogates
for global minima, since it is well understood that finding a global minimum of f is in general
an intractable problem. With regard to each of these four notions, we restate Q1 and Q2:
Q1*: Given a polynomial p : Rn → R and a point x ∈ Rn, is x of a given type (i)-(iv)?
Q2*: Given a polynomial p : Rn → R, does p have a point of a given type (i)-(iv) (and if
so, can one be found efficiently)?
As discussed in Chapter 1, a priori there are no complexity implications between these
two questions.
Let us first comment on the complexity of Q1* and Q2* for some simple and classical
cases. For Q1*, checking whether a given point is a critical point of a polynomial function
(of any degree) can trivially be done in polynomial time simply by evaluating the gradient at
that point. To check that a given point is a second-order point, one can additionally compute
the Hessian matrix at that point and check that it is positive semidefinite. This can be done
in polynomial time, e.g., by performing Gaussian pivot steps along the main diagonal of the
matrix [76, Section 1.3.1] or by computing its characteristic polynomial and checking that
the signs of its coefficients alternate [50, p. 403]. Since for affine or quadratic polynomials,
any second-order point is a local minimum, the only remaining case of Q1* for them is that of
strict local minima. Affine polynomials never have strict local minima, making the question
uninteresting. A point is a strict local minimum of a quadratic polynomial if and only if
it is a critical point and the associated Hessian matrix is positive definite (pd), i.e., has
positive eigenvalues. The latter property can be checked in polynomial time, for example
by computing the leading principal minors of the Hessian and checking that they are all
positive. As for Q2*, the affine case is again uninteresting since there is a critical point
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(which will also be a second-order point and a local minimum) if and only if the coefficients
of all degree-one monomials are zero. For quadratic polynomials, since the entries of the
gradient are affine, searching for critical points can be done in polynomial time by solving a
linear system. A candidate critcal point will be a second-order point (and a local minimum)
if and only if the Hessian is psd, and a strict local minimum if and only if the Hessian is pd.
Other than the aforementioned cases, the only prior result in the literature that we are
aware of is due to Murty and Kabadi [75], which settles the complexity of Q1* for degree-4
polynomials. Our contribution in this chapter is to settle the complexity of the remaining
cases for both Q1* and Q2*. A summary of the results is presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.
Entries denoted by “P” indicate that the problem can be solved in polynomial time. The
notation “SDP” indicates that the problem of interest can be reduced to solving either one
or polynomially-many semidefinite programs (SDP) whose sizes are polynomial in the size of
the input. (In fact, the reduction also goes in the other direction for second-order points and
local minima; see Theorems 2.5.3 and 2.5.4.) Finally, recall that a strong NP-hardness result
implies that the problem of interest remains NP-hard even if the size (i.e. bit length) of the
coefficients of the polynomial is O(log(n)), where n is the number of variables. Therefore,
unless P=NP, even a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm (i.e., an algorithm whose running
time is polynomial in the magnitude of the coefficients, but not necessarily their bit length)
cannot exist for the indicated problems in these tables.
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Q1*: property vs. degree 1 2 3 ≥ 4
Critical point P P P P
Second-order point P P P P
Local minimum P P P strongly NP-hard [75]1
(Theorem 2.3.3)
Strict local minimum P P P strongly NP-hard [75]1
(Corollary 2.3.5)
Table 2.1: Complexity of deciding whether a given point is of a certain type, based on the
degree of the polynomial. Entries without a reference are classical.
Q2*: property vs. degree 1 2 3 ≥ 4
Critical point P P strongly NP-hard strongly NP-hard
(Theorem 2.2.1) (Theorem 2.2.1)
Second-order point P P SDP strongly NP-hard
(Corollary 2.6.5) (Theorem 2.2.2)
Local minimum P P SDP strongly NP-hard
(Algorithm 2) (Theorem 3.2.1)
Strict local minimum P P SDP strongly NP-hard
(Algorithm 2, Remark 2.6.1) (Corollary 3.2.4)
Table 2.2: Complexity of deciding whether a polynomial has a point of a certain type, based
on the degree of the polynomial. Entries without a reference are classical.
1The proof in [75] is based on a reduction from the “matrix copositivity” problem. However, [75] only
shows that this problem (and thus deciding if a quartic polynomial has a local minimum) is weakly NP-
hard, since the reduction to matrix copositivity there is from the weakly NP-hard problem of Subset Sum.
Nonetheless, their result can be strengthened by observing that testing matrix copositivity is in fact strongly
NP-hard. This claim is implicit, e.g., in [35, Corollary 2.4]. The NP-hardness of testing whether a point is
a strict local minimum of a quartic polynomial is not explicitly stated in [75], though it follows in the weak
sense from the weak NP-hardness of Problem 8 of [75]. Again, with some work, this can be strengthened to
a strong NP-hardness result.
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The majority of the technical work in this chapter is spent on the case of cubic polyno-
mials. It is somewhat surprising that many of the problems of interest to us are tractable
for cubics, especially the search for local minima. This is in contrast to the intractability of
other interesting problems related to cubic polynomials, for example, minimizing them over
the unit sphere [79], or checking their convexity over a box [5]. It is also interesting to note
that second-order points of cubic polynomials are easier to find than their critical points,
despite being a more restrictive type of point. This shows that the right approach to finding
second-order points involves bypassing the search for critical points as an initial step.
2.1.1 Organization and Main Contributions of the Chapter
Section 2.2 covers the NP-hardness results from Table 2.2. The remainder of the chapter is
devoted to our results on cubic polynomials, which fills in the remaining entries of Tables 2.1
and 2.2. In Section 2.3, we give a characterization of local minima of cubic polynomials
(Theorem 2.3.1) and show that it can be checked in polynomial time (Theorem 2.3.3). In
Section 2.4, we give some geometric facts about local minima of cubic polynomials. For
example, we show that the set of local minima of a cubic polynomial p is convex (Theo-
rem 2.4.3), and we relate this set to the second-order points of p and to the set of minima
of p over points where ∇2p is positive semidefinite (Theorem 2.4.7 and Theorem 2.4.10). In
Section 2.4.4, we show that the interior of any spectrahedron is the projection of the local
minima of some cubic polynomial (Theorem 2.4.12). In Section 2.5, we use this result to
show that deciding if a cubic polynomial has a local minimum or a second-order point is at
least as hard as some semidefinite feasibility problems.
In Section 2.6, we start from a “sum of squares” approach to finding second-order points
of a cubic polynomial (Theorem 2.6.2 and Theorem 2.6.3), and build upon it (Section 2.6.3)
to arrive at an efficient semidefinite representation of these points (Corollary 2.6.5). This also
leads to an algorithm for finding local minima of cubic polynomials by solving polynomially-
many SDPs of polynomial size (Algorithm 2). In Section 2.7, we take preliminary steps
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towards some interesting future research directions, such as the design of an unregularized
third-order Newton method that would use as a subroutine our algorithm for finding local
minima of cubic polynomials (Section 2.7.2).
2.1.2 Preliminaries and Notation
We review some standard facts about local minina; more preliminaries specific to cubic poly-
nomials appear in Section 2.3.1. Three well-known optimality conditions in unconstrained
optimization are the first-order necessary condition (FONC), the second-order necessary
condition (SONC), and the second-order sufficient condition (SOSC). Respectively, they are
that the gradient at any local minimum is zero, the Hessian at any local minimum is psd,
and that any critical point at which the Hessian is positive definite is a strict local minimum.
A vector d ∈ Rn is said to be a descent direction for a function p : Rn → R at a point x¯ ∈ Rn
if there exists a scalar  > 0 such that p(x¯ + αd) < p(x¯) for all α ∈ (0, ). Existence of a
descent direction at a point clearly implies that the point is not a local minimum. However,
in general, the lack of a descent direction at a point does not imply that the point is a local
minimum (see, e.g., Example 2.3.2).
Next, we establish some basic notation which will be used throughout the chapter. We
denote the set of n × n real symmetric matrices by Sn×n. For a matrix M ∈ Sn×n, the
notation M  0 denotes that M is positive semidefinite, M  0 denotes that it is positive
definite, and Tr(M) denotes its trace, i.e. the sum of its diagonal entries. For a matrix M ,
the notation N (M) denotes its null space, and C(M) denotes its column space. All vectors
are taken to be column vectors. For two vectors x and y, the notation (x, y) denotes the
vector
x
y
. The notation 0n denotes the vector of length n containing only zeros. The
notation ei denotes the i-th coordinate vector, i.e., the vector with a one in its i-th entry
and zeros everywhere else.
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2.2 NP-hardness Results
In this section, we present reductions that show our NP-hardness results from Tables 2.1 and
2.2. For concreteness, we construct these reductions from the (simple) MAXCUT problem,
though our proof can work with any NP-hard problem that can be encoded by quadratic
equations with “small enough” coefficients. Recall that in the (simple) MAXCUT problem,
we are given as input an undirected and unweighted graph G on n vertices and an integer
k ≤ n. We are then asked whether there is a cut in G of size k, i.e. a partition of the
vertices into two sets S1 and S2 such that the number of edges with one endpoint in S1 and
one endpoint in S2 is equal to k. It is well known that the (simple) MAXCUT problem is
strongly NP-hard [39].
If we denote the adjacency matrix of G by E ∈ Sn×n, it is straightforward to see that G
has a cut of size k if and only if the following system of quadratic equations is feasible:
q0(x) :=
1
4
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Eij(1− xixj)− k = 0,
qi(x) := x
2
i − 1 = 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
(2.1)
Indeed, the second set of constraints enforces each variable xi to be −1 or 1, and any
x ∈ {−1, 1}n encodes a cut in G by assigning vertices with xi = 1 to one side of the
partition, and those with xi = −1 to the other. Observe that with this encoding, xixj equals
1 whenever the two vertices i and j are on the same side and −1 otherwise. The size of the
cut is therefore given by 1
4
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1Eij(1−xixj), noting that every edge is counted twice.
Theorem 2.2.1. It is strongly NP-hard to decide whether a polynomial p : Rn → R of degree
greater than or equal to three has a critical point.
Proof. Let d ≥ 3 be fixed. Given an instance of the (simple) MAXCUT problem with a
graph on n vertices, let the quadratic polynomials q0, . . . , qn be as in (2.1), and consider the
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following degree-d polynomial in 2n+ 2 variables (x1, . . . , xn, y0, y1, . . . , yn, z):
p(x, y, z) =
n∑
i=0
yiqi(x) + z
d.
Note that all coefficients of this polynomial take O(log(n)) bits to write down. We show that
p(x, y, z) has a critical point if and only if the quadratic system q0(x) = 0, . . . , qn(x) = 0 is
feasible. Observe that the gradient of p is given by

∂p
∂x
∂p
∂y
∂p
∂z

=

∑n
i=0 yi
∂qi
∂x1
(x)
...∑n
i=0 yi
∂qi
∂xn
(x)
q0(x)
...
qn(x)
dzd−1

.
If x¯ ∈ Rn is a solution to (2.1), then the point (x¯, 0n+1, 0) is a critical point of p. Con-
versely, if (x¯, y¯, z¯) is a critical point of p, then, since ∂p
∂y
(x¯, y¯, z¯) = 0, x¯ must be a solution to
(2.1).
Theorem 2.2.2. It is strongly NP-hard to decide whether a polynomial p : Rn → R of degree
greater than or equal to four has a second-order point.
Proof. Let d ≥ 4 be fixed. Given an instance of the (simple) MAXCUT problem with a
graph on n vertices, let the quadratic polynomials q0, . . . , qn be as in (2.1), and consider the
following degree-d polynomial in 3n+ 3 variables (x1, . . . , xn, y0, y1, . . . , yn, z0, z1, . . . , zn, w):
p(x, y, z, w) =
n∑
i=0
(
y2i qi(x)− z2i qi(x)
)
+ wd.
19
Note that all coefficients of this polynomial take O(log(n)) bits to write down. We
show that p(x, y, z, w) has a second-order point if and only if the quadratic system
q0(x) = 0, . . . , qn(x) = 0 is feasible.
Observe that ∂
2p
∂y2
is an (n + 1) × (n + 1) diagonal matrix with 2q0(x), . . . , 2qn(x) on its
diagonal. Similarly, ∂
2p
∂z2
is an (n + 1) × (n + 1) diagonal matrix with −2q0(x), . . . ,−2qn(x)
on its diagonal. Suppose first that (x¯, y¯, z¯, w¯) is a second-order point of p. Since
∇2p(x¯, y¯, z¯, w¯)  0, and since ∂2p
∂y2
and ∂
2p
∂z2
are both principal submatrices of ∇2p, it
must be that q0(x¯) = 0, . . . , qn(x¯) = 0.
Now suppose that x¯ ∈ Rn is a solution to (2.1). We show that (x¯, 0n+1, 0n+1, 0), is a
second-order point of p. Note that ∂p
∂x
is quadratic in y and z, ∂p
∂y
is linear in y, ∂p
∂z
is lin-
ear in z, and ∂p
∂w
= dwd−1. Thus (x¯, 0n+1, 0n+1, 0) is a critical point of p. Now observe
that the entries of ∂
2p
∂x2
are quadratic in y and z or are zero, the entries of ∂
2p
∂x∂y
are lin-
ear in y or are zero, the entries of ∂
2p
∂x∂z
are linear in z or are zero, ∂
2p
∂w2
= d(d − 1)wd−2,
∂2p
∂y2
(x¯, 0n+1, 0n+1, 0) and
∂2p
∂z2
(x¯, 0n+1, 0n+1, 0) are both zero, and all other entries of ∇2p are
zero. Thus ∇2p(x¯, 0n+1, 0n+1, 0) = 0, and we conclude that (x¯, 0n+1, 0n+1, 0) is a second-order
point of p.
The remaining two NP-hardness results from Table 2.2 are stated next, but proven in
Chapter 3, since a corollary of them is the main result of that chapter.
Theorem 2.2.3. It is strongly NP-hard to decide whether a polynomial p : Rn → R of degree
greater than or equal to four has a local minimum. The same statement holds for testing
existence of a strict local minimum.
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2.3 Checking Local Minimality of a Point for a Cubic
Polynomial
As the reader can observe from Tables 2.1 and 2.2 from Section 2.1, the remaining entries
all have to do with the case of cubic polynomials. To answer these questions about cubics,
we start in this section by showing that the problem of deciding if a given point is a local
minimum (or a strict local minimum) of a cubic polynomial is polynomial-time solvable.
This answers the remaining cases in Table 2.1. We first make certain observations about
cubic polynomials that will be used throughout the chapter.
2.3.1 Preliminaries on Cubic Polynomials
It is easy to observe that a univariate cubic polynomial has either no local minima, exactly
one local minimum (which is strict), or infinitely many non-strict local minima (in the case
that the polynomial is constant). Further observe that if a point x¯ ∈ Rn is a (strict) local
minimum of a function p : Rn → R, then for any fixed point y¯ ∈ Rn, the restriction of p to
the line going through x¯ and y¯ —i.e. the univariate function q(α) := p(x¯+α(y¯− x¯))—has a
(strict) local minimum at α = 0. Since the restriction of a multivariate cubic polynomial to
any line is a univariate polynomial of degree at most three, the previous two facts imply that
(i) if a cubic polynomial has a strict local minimum, then it must be the only local minimum
(strict or non-strict), and that (ii) if a cubic polynomial has multiple local minima, then the
polynomial must be constant on the line connecting any two of these (necessarily non-strict)
local minima.
Observe that for any cubic polynomial p, the error term of the second-order Taylor
expansion is given by the cubic homogeneous component of p. More formally, for any point
x¯ ∈ Rn and direction v ∈ Rn,
p(x¯+ λv) = p3(v)λ
3 +
1
2
vT∇2p(x¯)vλ2 +∇p(x¯)Tvλ+ p(x¯), (2.2)
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where p3 is the collection of terms of p of degree exactly 3.
Note that the Hessian of any cubic n-variate polynomial is an affine matrix of the form∑n
i=1 xiHi +Q, where Hi and Q are all n× n symmetric matrices and the Hi satisfy
(Hi)jk = (Hj)ik = (Hk)ij (2.3)
for any i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. This is because an n×n symmetric matrix A(x) := A(x1, . . . , xn)
is a valid Hessian matrix if and only if ∂
∂xi
Ajk(x) =
∂
∂xj
Aik(x) =
∂
∂xk
Aij(x) for all i, j, k ∈
{1, . . . , n}. If ∑ni=1 xiHi + Q is a valid Hessian matrix, then the cubic polynomial which
gives rise to it is of the form
1
6
n∑
i=1
xTxiHix+
1
2
xTQx+ bTx+ c. (2.4)
In this chapter, it is sometimes convenient for us to parametrize a cubic polynomial in the
above form. As the scalar term in (2.4) is irrelevant for deciding local minimality or finding
local minima, in the remainder of this chapter, we take c = 0 without loss of generality.
Observe that the gradient of the polynomial in (2.4) is 1
2
∑n
i=1 xiHix+Qx+b, or equivalently
a vector whose i-th entry is 1
2
xTHix+ e
T
i Qx+ bi.
2.3.2 Local Minimality of a Point for a Cubic Polynomial
In this section, we give a characterization of local minima of cubic polynomials and show that
this characterization can be checked in polynomial time. Recall that we use the notation
p3 to denote the cubic homogeneous component of a cubic polynomial p, and N (M) (resp.
C(M)) to denote the null space (resp. column space) of a matrix M .
Theorem 2.3.1. A point x¯ ∈ Rn is a local minimum of a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R if
and only if the following three conditions hold:
• ∇p(x¯) = 0,
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• ∇2p(x¯)  0,
• ∇p3(d) = 0,∀d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)).
Note that the first two conditions are the well-known FONC and SONC. Throughout the
chapter, we refer to the third condition as the third-order condition (TOC) for optimality.
This condition is requiring the gradient of the cubic homogeneous component of p to vanish
on the null space of the Hessian of p at x¯. We remark that the FONC, SONC, and TOC
together are in general neither sufficient nor necessary for a point to be a local minimum of
a polynomial of degree higher than three. The first claim is trivial (consider, e.g., p(x) = x5
at x = 0); for the second claim see Example 2.3.3.
Remark 2.3.1. It is straightforward to see that any local minimum x¯ of a cubic polynomial
p satisfies a condition similar to the TOC, that p3(d) = 0,∀d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)). Indeed, if x¯ is a
second-order point and d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)), then Equation (2.2) gives p(x¯+λd) = p3(d)λ3+p(x¯).
Hence, if p3(d) is nonzero, then either d or −d is a descent direction for p at x¯, and so x¯
cannot be a local minimum. This observation was made in [9] for three-times differentiable
functions, and is referred to as the “third-order necessary condition” (TONC) for optimality.
Note that because p3 is homogeneous of degree three, from Euler’s theorem for homogeneous
functions we have 3p3(x) = x
T∇p3(x). We can then see that ∇p3(d) = 0 ⇒ p3(d) = 0, and
therefore the TOC is a stronger condition than the TONC. Indeed, the FONC, SONC, and
TONC together are not sufficient for local optimality of a point for a cubic polynomial; see
Example 2.3.2. Intuitively, this is because the FONC, SONC, and TONC together avoid
existence of a descent direction for cubic polynomials, but as the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 will
show, existence of a “descent parabola” must also be avoided.
We will need the following fact from linear algebra for the proof of Theorem 2.3.1.
Lemma 2.3.2. Let M ∈ Sn×n be a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix and denote its
smallest positive eigenvalue by λ+. Then if z ∈ C(M) and ‖z‖ = 1, zTMz ≥ λ+.
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Proof. Suppose M has eigenvalues λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ · · · ≥ λk > λk+1 = · · · = λn = 0 (so λ+ = λk).
Let v1, . . . , vn be a set of corresponding mutually orthogonal unit-norm eigenvectors of M .
Observe that any z ∈ C(M) can be written as z = ∑ni=1 αivi, for some scalars αi with αi = 0
for i = k + 1, . . . , n. This is because the column space is orthogonal to the null space, and
the eigenvectors corresponding to zero eigenvalues span the null space.
Since v1, . . . , vk are mutually orthogonal unit vectors, we have
zTMz =
(
k∑
i=1
αivi
)T ( k∑
i=1
λiviv
T
i
)(
k∑
i=1
αivi
)
=
k∑
i=1
α2iλiv
T
i viv
T
i vi =
k∑
i=1
α2iλi,
and
1 = ‖z‖2 =
(
k∑
i=1
αivi
)T ( k∑
i=1
αivi
)
=
k∑
i=1
α2i v
T
i vi =
k∑
i=1
α2i .
These two equations combined imply that zTMz ≥ λk = λ+.
Proof (of Theorem 2.3.1). As any local minimum must satisfy the FONC and SONC, it
suffices to show that a second-order point is a local minimum for a cubic polynomial if and
only if it also satisfies the TOC.
We first observe that for any second-order point x¯, scalars α and β, and vectors d ∈
N (∇2p(x¯)) and z ∈ Rn, the following identity holds:
p(x¯+ αd+ βz) = p3(αd+ βz) +
1
2
(αd+ βz)T∇2p(x¯)(αd+ βz) + p(x¯)
= β3p3(z) +
β2
2
zT∇2p3(αd)z + β∇p3(αd)T z + p3(αd) + β
2
2
zT∇2p(x¯)z + p(x¯)
= β3p3(z) +
αβ2
2
zT∇2p3(d)z + α2β∇p3(d)T z + α3p3(d) + β
2
2
zT∇2p(x¯)z + p(x¯).
(2.5)
The first equality follows from (2.2) and the FONC. The second equality follows from the
Taylor expansion of p3(αd + βz) around αd and using the fact that d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)). The
last equality follows from homogeneity of p3.
(second-order point) + TOC ⇒ local minimum:
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Let x¯ be any second-order point at which the TOC holds. Note that any vector v ∈ Rn can
be written as αd + βz for some (unique) scalars α and β, and unit vectors d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯))
and z ∈ C(∇2p(x¯)). Since from the TOC we have ∇p3(d) = 0 (which also implies that
p3(d) = 0, as seen e.g. by Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions mentioned above), the
identity in (2.5) reduces to
p(x¯+ v)− p(x¯) = β2
(
βp3(z) +
α
2
zT∇2p3(d)z + 1
2
zT∇2p(x¯)z
)
. (2.6)
Let λ > 0 be the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of ∇2p(x¯). From Lemma 2.3.2 we have that
zT∇2p(x¯)z ≥ λ. Thus, if α and β satisfy
|α|+ |β| ≤ λ ·
(
max
‖z‖=1,‖d‖=1
max{zT∇2p3(d)z, 2p3(z)}
)−1
, (2.7)
the expression on the right-hand side of (2.6) is nonnegative. As the set {‖z‖ = 1} ∩ {‖d‖ = 1}
is compact and p3 is continuous and odd, the quantity
γ := max
‖z‖=1,‖d‖=1
max{zT∇2p3(d)z, 2p3(z)}
is finite and nonnegative, and thus λ/γ is positive (or potentially +∞). Finally, note that
for any v ∈ Rn such that ‖v‖ ≤ λ/γ, the corresponding α and β satisfy (2.7), and thus
p(x¯+ v)− p(x¯) ≥ 0 as desired.
Local minimum ⇒ TOC:
Note that if x¯ is a local minimum, then we must have p3(d) = 0 whenever d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯))
(see Remark 2.3.1). We also assume that p3 is not the zero polynomial, as then the TOC
would be automatically satisfied.
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Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a vector dˆ ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)) such
that ∇p3(dˆ) 6= 0. Consider the sequence of points given by
xˆi := x¯+ αidˆ+ βiz, (2.8)
where
z = − ∇p3(dˆ)‖∇p3(dˆ)‖
, αi =
1
i
√
zT∇2p(x¯)z
|∇p3(dˆ)T z|
, βi =
1
i2
.
Observe that xˆi → x¯ as i→∞. From (2.5), we have
p(x¯+ αidˆ+ βiz)− p(x¯) = p3(z)β3i +
1
2
zT∇2p3(dˆ)zαiβ2i +∇p3(dˆ)T zα2iβi +
1
2
zT∇2p(x¯)zβ2i .
Note that because αi ∝
√
βi, the third and fourth terms of the right-hand side of the above
expression will be the dominant terms as i → ∞. For our choices of αi and βi, the sum of
these two dominant terms simplifies to − 1
2i4
zT∇2p(x¯)z. Observe that for any w ∈ N (∇2p(x¯))
and any α ∈ R, p3(dˆ + αw) = 0. Since the gradient of p3 is orthogonal to its level sets, we
must then have ∇p3(dˆ)Tw = 0 for any w ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)). Thus, ∇p3(dˆ) is in the orthogonal
complement of N (∇2p(x¯)), i.e. in C(∇2p(x¯)), and hence zT∇2p(x¯)z > 0. Thus, for any
sufficiently large i, p(xˆi) < p(x¯), and so x¯ is not a local minimum.
Remark 2.3.2. Note that the points xˆi constructed in (2.8) trace a parabola as i ranges from
−∞ to +∞. Thus as a corollary of the proof of Theorem 2.3.1, we see that if a point x¯ ∈ Rn
is not a local minimum of a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R, then there must exist a “descent
parabola” that certifies that; i.e. a parabola q(t) : R→ Rn and a scalar α¯ satisfying q(0) = x¯
and p(q(α)) < p(x¯) for all α ∈ (0, α¯).
Theorem 2.3.1 gives rise to the following algorithmic result.
Theorem 2.3.3. Local minimality of a point x¯ ∈ Rn for a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R can
be checked in polynomial time.
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Proof. In view of Theorem 2.3.1, we show that the FONC, SONC, and TOC can be checked
in polynomial time (in the Turing model of computation). Checking that the gradient of p
vanishes at x¯ and that the Hessian at x¯ is positive semidefinite can be done in polynomial time
as explained in Section 2.1. We give the following polynomial-time algorithm for checking
the TOC:
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for checking the TOC.
1: Input: Coefficients of a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R, a point x¯ ∈ Rn
2: Compute ∇2p(x¯)
3: Compute a rational basis {v1, . . . , vk} for the null space of ∇2p(x¯)
4: Check if coefficients of g(λ) := ∇p3(
∑k
i=1 λivi) are all zero
5: if YES
6: x¯ is a local minimum of p
7: if NO
8: x¯ is a not local minimum of p
Note that the entries of the function g : Rk → Rn that appears in this algorithm are homo-
geneous quadratic polynomials in λ := (λ1, . . . , λk), where k is the dimension of N (∇2p(x¯)).
For the TOC to hold, g must be zero for all λ ∈ Rk, which happens if and only if all
coefficients of every entry of g are zero.
A rational basis for the null space of a symmetric matrix can be computed in polynomial
time, for example through the Bareiss algorithm [15]. For completeness, we give a less
efficient but also polynomial-time algorithm which solves a series of linear systems. The first
linear system finds a nonzero vector v1 ∈ Rn such that ∇2p(x¯)Tv1 = 0. The successive linear
systems solve for nonzero vectors vi ∈ Rn such that∇2p(x¯)Tvi = 0, vTj vi = 0,∀j = 1, . . . , i−1.
To ensure nonzero solutions, some entry of the vector is fixed to 1, and if the system is
infeasible, the next entry is fixed to 1 and the system is re-solved. Once the only feasible
vector is the zero vector, the basis is complete.
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The next step is to compute the coefficients of g. To do this, one can first compute the
coefficients of ∇p3. There are n×
(
n+1
2
)
coefficients to compute, and each is a coefficient of
p3, multiplied by 1, 2, or 3. If the m-th entry of ∇p3 is given by
∑n
i=1
∑n
j≥i cijxixj, then
the m-th entry of g is equal to gm(λ) =
∑n
a=1
∑n
b=1(
∑n
i=1
∑n
j≥i cij(va)i(vb)j)λaλb, where the
vectors {vi} are our rational basis forN (∇2p(x¯)). Observe that gm is a polynomial in λ whose
coefficients can be computed with a polynomial number of additions and multiplications over
polynomially-sized scalars, and thus checking if all these coefficients are zero for every m can
be done in polynomial time.
Let us end this subsection by also giving an efficient characterization of strict local minima
of cubic polynomials.
Corollary 2.3.4. A point x¯ ∈ Rn is a strict local minimum of a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R
if and only if
• ∇p(x¯) = 0,
• ∇2p(x¯)  0.
Proof. The fact that these two conditions are sufficient for local minimality is immediate
from the SOSC. To show the converse, in view of the FONC, we only need to show that
positive definiteness of the Hessian is necessary. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
for some nonzero vector d ∈ Rn, we have dT∇2p(x¯)d = 0 (note that in view of the SONC,
we cannot have dT∇2p(x¯)d < 0). From (2.2), we have p(x¯ + αd) = p(x¯) + p3(d)α3. Hence,
α = 0 is not a strict local minimum of the univariate polynomial p(x¯+ αd), and so x¯ is not
a strict local minimum of p.
Corollary 2.3.5. Strict local optimality of a point x¯ ∈ Rn for a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R
can be checked in polynomial time.
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Proof. This follows from the characterization in Corollary 2.3.4. Checking the FONC is
straightforward as before. As explained in Section 2.1, to check that ∇2p(x¯) is positive
definite, one can equivalently check that all n leading principal minors of ∇2p(x¯) are positive.
This procedure takes polynomial time since determinants can be computed in polynomial
time.
2.3.3 Examples
We give a few illustrative examples regarding the application and context of Theorem 2.3.1.
Figure 2.1: Contour plots of x21x2 (left) and x
2
2−x21x2 (right) from Examples 2.3.1 and 2.3.2.
The polynomials are zero on the black lines, positive on the gray regions, and negative on
the white regions. The dashed line in the right-side figure denotes a descent parabola at the
origin.
Example 2.3.1. A cubic polynomial with local minima
Consider the polynomial p(x1, x2) = x
2
1x2. By inspection (see Figure 2.1), one can see
that points of the type {(x1, x2) | x1 = 0, x2 > 0} are local minima of p, as p is nonnegative
when x2 > 0, zero whenever x1 = 0, and positive whenever x2 > 0 and x1 6= 0. As a sanity
check, we use Theorem 2.3.1 to verify that the point (0, 1) is a local minimum of p (the same
reasoning applies to all other local minima).
Through straightforward computation, we find
29
∇p(x) =
2x1x2
x21
 ,∇p3(x) =
2x1x2
x21
 ,∇2p(x) =
2x2 2x1
2x1 0
 .
We can see that the FONC and SONC are satisfied at (0, 1). The null space of ∇2p(0, 1) is
spanned by (0, 1). We have
∇p3
α
0
1

 =
2(0)(α)
(0)2
 = 0,
which shows that the TOC is satisfied, verifying that (0, 1) is a local minimum of p.
One can also verify that {(x1, x2) | x1 = 0, x2 > 0} are the only local minima. Indeed, the
critical points of p are those where x1 = 0, and the second-order points are those where x1 = 0
and x2 ≥ 0. To see that (0, 0) is not a local minimum, observe that (1, 1) ∈ N (∇2p(0, 0)),
but ∇p3(1, 1) = (2, 1) 6= 0, and thus the TOC is violated.
Example 2.3.2. A cubic polynomial with no local minima
We use Theorem 2.3.1 to show that the polynomial p(x1, x2) = x
2
2 − x21x2 has no local
minima. We have
∇p(x) =
−2x1x2
2x2 − x21
 ,∇p3(x) =
−2x1x2
−x21
 ,∇2p(x) =
−2x2 −2x1
−2x1 2
 .
Observe that (0, 0) is the only second-order point of p. The null space of ∇2p(0, 0) is spanned
by (1, 0). We have
∇p3
α
1
0

 =
−2(α)(0)
−(α)2
 =
 0
−α2
 6= 0,
which shows that the TOC is violated, and hence (0, 0) is not a local minimum. Note that
the TONC is in fact satisfied at (0, 0), since p3(α, 0) = 0 for any scalar α.
30
It is also interesting to observe that there are no descent directions for p at (0, 0) (this is
implied, e.g., by satisfaction of the TONC, along with the FONC and SONC). However, we
can use the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 to compute a descent parabola, thereby more explicitly
demonstrating that (0, 0) is not a local minimum. The column space of ∇2p(0, 0) is spanned
by (0, 1). Then, following the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 with z = (0, 1) and dˆ = (1, 0),
we have zT∇2p(0, 0)z = 2 and |∇p3(dˆ)T z| = 1. The parabola prescribed is then the set
{(x1, x2) | x2 = 12x21}. Indeed, one can now verify that except at (0, 0), p is negative on the
entire parabola; see the dashed line in Figure 2.1.
Example 2.3.3. A quartic polynomial with a local minimum that does not satisfy
the TOC
We show in this example that for polynomials of degree higher than three, the TOC
is not a necessary condition for local minimality. Consider the quartic polynomial given
by p(x1, x2) = 2x
4
1 + 2x
2
1x2 + x
2
2. The point (0, 0) is a local minimum, as p(0, 0) = 0 and
p(x1, x2) = x
4
1 + (x
2
1 + x2)
2 is nonnegative. However, the Hessian of p at (0, 0) is
∇2p(0, 0) =
0 0
0 2
 ,
which has a null space spanned by (1, 0). We observe that ∇p3(x1, x2) =
4x1x2
2x21
 does not
vanish on this null space, as it evaluates, for example, to (0, 2) at (1, 0).
2.4 On the Geometry of Local Minima of Cubic Poly-
nomials
We have shown that deciding local minimality of a given point for a cubic polynomial is a
polynomial-time solvable problem. We now turn our attention to the remaining unresolved
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entries in Table 2.2 from Section 2.1, which are on the problems of deciding whether a
cubic polynomial has a second-order point, a local minimum, or a strict local minimum. In
Sections 2.5 and 2.6, we will show that these problem can all be reduced to semidefinite
programs of tractable size. In the current section, we present a number of geometric results
about local minima and second-order points of cubic polynomials which are used in those
sections, but are possibly of independent interest. For the remainder of this chapter, we use
the notation SOp to denote the set of second-order points of a polynomial p, LMp to denote
the set of its local minima, and S¯ to denote the closure of a set S.
2.4.1 Convexity of the Set of Local Minima
We begin by showing that for any cubic polynomial p, the set LMp is convex. We go
through two lemmas; the first is a simple algebraic observation, and the second contains
information about some critical points. Recall that the Hessian of a cubic polynomial p
written in the form of (2.4) is given by
∑n
i=1 xiHi +Q. Furthermore, its gradient is given by
1
2
∑n
i=1 xiHix+Qx+ b, or equivalently a vector whose i-th entry is x
THix+ e
T
i Qx+ bi.
Lemma 2.4.1. Let H1, . . . , Hn ⊆ Sn×n satisfy (2.3). Then for any two vectors y, z ∈ Rn,
(
n∑
i=1
yiHi
)
z =
(
n∑
i=1
ziHi
)
y.
Proof. Observe that for any index k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
((
n∑
i=1
yiHi
)
z
)
k
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(Hi)kjyizj
=
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
(Hj)kiyizj
=
((
n∑
j=1
zjHj
)
y
)
k
,
where the second equality follows from (2.3).
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Lemma 2.4.2. Let x¯ ∈ Rn be a local minimum of a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R, and let
d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)). Then for any scalar α, x¯+ αd is a critical point of p.
Proof. Let p be given in our canonical form as 1
6
∑n
i=1 x
TxiHix+
1
2
xTQx+ bTx. We have
∇p(x¯+ αd) =
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi + αdiHi
)
(x¯+ αd) +Q(x¯+ αd) + b
=
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi
)
x¯+Qx¯+ b
+
1
2
n∑
i=1
αdiHix¯+
1
2
n∑
i=1
αx¯iHid+ αQd
+
α2
2
n∑
i=1
diHid
= ∇p(x¯) + α∇2p(x¯)d+ α2∇p3(d)
= 0 + 0 + 0 = 0,
where the third equality follows form Lemma 2.4.1, and the last follows from the FONC and
TOC.
Theorem 2.4.3. The set of local minima of any cubic polynomial is convex.
Proof. If for some cubic polynomial p, the set LMp of its local minima is empty or a singleton,
the claim is trivially established. Otherwise, let x¯, y¯ ∈ LMp with x¯ 6= y¯. Consider any convex
combination z := x¯+α(y¯− x¯), where α ∈ (0, 1). We show that z satisfies the FONC, SONC,
and TOC, and therefore by Theorem 2.3.1, z ∈ LMp.
Note from (2.2) that the restriction of p to the line passing through x¯ and y¯ is
p(x¯+ α(y¯ − x¯)) = p3(y¯ − x¯)α3 + 1
2
(y¯ − x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(y¯ − x¯)α2 +∇p(x¯)T (y¯ − x¯)α + p(x¯).
Since this univariate cubic polynomial has two local minima at α = 0 and α = 1, it must
be constant. In particular, the coefficient of α2 must be zero, and because ∇2p(x¯) is psd,
that implies y¯ − x¯ ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)). Hence, by Lemma 2.4.2, the FONC holds at z. To
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show the SONC and TOC at z, note that because ∇2p(x) is affine in x, ∇2p(z) can be
written as a convex combination of ∇2p(x¯) and ∇2p(y¯), both of which are psd. The SONC
is then immediate. To see why the TOC holds, recall that the null space of the sum of
two psd matrices is the intersection of the null spaces of the summand matrices. Thus
N (∇2p(z)) ⊆ N (∇2p(x¯)), and the TOC is satisfied.
As a demonstration of Theorem 2.4.3, Figure 2.2 shows the critical points and the local
minima of the cubic polynomial
x31 + 3x
2
1x2 + 3x1x
2
2 + x
3
2 − 3x1 − 3x2. (2.9)
Note that the critical points form a nonconvex set, while the local minima constitute a convex
subset of the critical points.
Figure 2.2: The critical points of the polynomial (2.9). One can verify that the set of critical
points is {(x1, x2) | (x1+x2)2 = 1}, and that the set of local minima is {(x1, x2) | x1+x2 = 1}.
The points on the dashed line are local maxima.
34
Unlike the above example, LMp (or even LMp as LMp is in general not closed) may not
be a polyhedral2 set for cubic polynomials. For instance, the polynomial
p(x1, x2, x3, x4) = −x1x23 + x1x24 + 2x2x3x4 + x23 + x24, (2.10)
has LMp = {x ∈ R4 | x21 + x22 < 1, x3 = x4 = 0} (see Figure 2.3). This is in contrast
to quadratic polynomials, whose local minima always form a polyhedral set. We show in
Theorem 2.4.5, however, that LMp is always a spectrahedron
3. We first need the following
lemma.
Figure 2.3: The projection of the set of local minima of the polynomial in (2.10) onto the
x1 and x2 variables. This example shows that LMp is not always a polyhedral set.
Lemma 2.4.4. For any cubic polynomial p : Rn → R, suppose x¯ ∈ Rn and y¯ ∈ Rn satisfy
• x¯ ∈ SOp,
• ∇2p(y¯)  0,
2Recall that a polyhedron is a set defined by finitely many affine inequalities.
3Recall that a spectrahedron is a set of the type S = {x ∈ Rn|A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi  0}, where A0, . . . An are
symmetric matrices of some size m×m [110].
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• p(x¯) = p(y¯).
Then p(x¯+ α(y¯ − x¯)) = p(x¯) for any scalar α, and y¯ − x¯ ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)).
Note in particular that this lemma applies if y¯ is simply a second-order point, since p
must take the same value at any two second-order points. This is because any non-constant
univariate cubic polynomial can have at most one second-order point.
Proof. Consider the Taylor expansion of p around x¯ in the direction y¯ − x¯ (see (2.2)):
q(α) := p(x¯+α(y¯− x¯)) = p3(y¯− x¯)α3 + 1
2
(y¯− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(y¯− x¯)α2 +∇p(x¯)T (y¯− x¯)α+ p(x¯).
Note that q is a univariate cubic polynomial which has a second-order point at α = 0. It is
straightforward to see that if a univariate cubic polynomial is not constant and has a second-
order point, then any other point which takes the same function value as the second-order
point must have a negative second derivative. As this is not the case for q (in view of α = 0
and α = 1), q must be constant, i.e., p(x¯+α(y¯− x¯)) = p(x¯) for any α. Now observe that for
p(x¯ + α(y¯ − x¯)) to be constant, we must have (y¯ − x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(y¯ − x¯) = 0. As ∇2p(x¯)  0,
we have y¯ − x¯ ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)).
Theorem 2.4.5. For a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R, LMp is a spectrahedron.
Proof. If LMp is empty, the claim is trivial. Otherwise, let x¯ ∈ LMp. We show that LMp is
given by the spectrahedron
M := {x ∈ Rn | ∇2p(x)  0,∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯) = 0}. (2.11)
First consider any y¯ ∈ LMp. From the SONC we know that ∇2p(y¯)  0 and from Lemma
2.4.4, we know that y¯ − x¯ ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)). Thus y¯ ∈ M . Since M is closed, we get that
LMp ⊆M .
Now consider any y¯ ∈M . By the definition of M , y¯ satisfies the SONC, and by Lemma
2.4.2, it also satisfies the FONC. Since for any scalar α ∈ (0, 1), ∇2p(x¯+α(y¯− x¯)) is a convex
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combination of the two psd matrices ∇2p(x¯) and ∇2p(y¯), N (∇2p(x¯ + α(y¯ − x¯))) ⊆ ∇2p(x¯)
and thus x¯+ α(y¯ − x¯) satisfies the TOC (since x¯ does). Thus y¯ can be written as the limit
of local minima of p (e.g. {x¯+ α(y¯ − x¯)} as α→ 1).
Remark 2.4.1. We will soon show that for a cubic polynomial p, if LMp is nonempty, then
LMp = SOp (see Theorem 2.4.7). In Section 2.6, we will give other representations of SOp,
which in contrast to the representation in (2.11), do not rely on access to or even existence
of a local minimum.
2.4.2 Local Minima and Solutions to a “Convex” Problem
In Section 2.6, we present an SDP-based approach for finding local minima of cubic polyno-
mials. (We note again that the SDP representation in (2.11) is useless for this purpose as it
already assumes access to a local minimum.) Many common approaches for computing local
minima of twice-differentiable functions involve first finding critical points of the function,
and then checking whether they satisfy second-order conditions. However, as discussed in the
introduction and in Section 2.2, such approaches are unlikely to be effective for cubic poly-
nomials as critical points of these functions are in fact NP-hard to find (see Theorem 2.2.1).
Interestingly, however, we show in Section 2.6 that by bypassing the search for critical points,
one can directly find second-order points and local minima of cubic polynomials by solving
semidefinite programs of tractable size. The key to our approach is to relate the problem of
finding a local minimum of a cubic polynomial p to the following optimization problem:
inf
x∈Rn
p(x)
subject to ∇2p(x)  0.
(2.12)
The connection between solutions of (2.12) and local minima of p is established by Theorem
2.4.7 below. The feasible set of (2.12) has interesting geometric properties (see, e.g., Corollary
2.4.12) and will be referred to with the following terminology in the remainder of the chapter.
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Definition 2.4.6. The convexity region of a polynomial p : Rn → R is the set
CRp := {x ∈ Rn | ∇2p(x)  0}.
Observe that for any cubic polynomial, its convexity region is a spectrahedron, and thus
a convex set. As p is a convex function when restricted to its convexity region, one can
consider (2.12) to be a convex problem in spirit.
Theorem 2.4.7. Let p be a cubic polynomial with a second-order point. Then the following
sets are equivalent:
(i) SOp
(ii) Minima of (2.12).
Furthermore, if p has a local minimum, then these two sets are equivalent to:
(iii) LMp.
Proof. (i) ⊆ (ii).
Let y¯ ∈ SOp and x¯ be any feasible point to (2.12). If we consider the univariate cubic
polynomial q(α) := p(x¯ + α(y¯ − x¯)), i.e., the restriction of p to the line passing through x¯
and y¯, we can see that α = 1 is a second-order point of q. Note that if any univariate cubic
polynomial has a second-order point, then that second-order point is a minimum of it over
its convexity region. In particular, because x¯ is feasible to (2.12) and thus α = 0 is in the
convexity region of q, we have p(y¯) = q(1) ≤ q(0) = p(x¯). As y¯ is feasible to (2.12) and has
objective value no higher than any other feasible point, it must be optimal to (2.12).
(ii) ⊆ (i)
Let y¯ be a minimum of (2.12) (we know that such a point exists because we have shown SOp
is a subset of the minima of (2.12), and SOp is nonempty by assumption). Let x¯ ∈ SOp and
d := y¯− x¯. Observe that p(y¯) = p(x¯), and so by Lemma 2.4.4, we must have d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)).
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It follows that ∇p(y¯) = ∇p3(d) (cf. the proof of Lemma 2.4.2). Now suppose for the sake of
contradiction that y¯ is not a second-order point. Since y¯ is feasible to (2.12), we must have
∇p(y¯) = ∇p3(d) 6= 0. As p(x¯) = p(x¯ + αd) for any scalar α due to Lemma 2.4.4, we must
have p3(d) =
1
6
dT∇2p3(d)d = 0 (see (2.2)). Thus we can write
(
d− α∇p3(d)
)T∇2p(y¯)(d− α∇p3(d)) =(d− α∇p3(d))T (∇2p(x¯) +∇2p3(d))(d− α∇p3(d))
=α2∇p3(d)T∇2p(x¯)∇p3(d)− 2α∇p3(d)T∇2p3(d)Td
+ α2∇p3(d)T∇2p3(d)∇p3(d)
=α2
(∇p3(d)T∇2p(x¯)∇p3(d) +∇p3(d)T∇2p3(d)T∇p3(d))
− 4α∇p3(d)T∇p3(d),
where the last equality follows from that ∇p3(d) = 12∇2p3(d)Td due to Euler’s theorem for
homogeneous functions. Note that the right-hand side of the above expression is negative
for sufficiently small α > 0, and so ∇2p(y¯) is not psd, which contradicts feasibility of y¯ to
(2.12).
For the second claim of the theorem, suppose that p has a local minimum. The following
arguments will show (i) = (ii) = (iii).
(iii) ⊆ (i)
Clearly any local minimum of p is a second-order point. Since the gradient and the Hessian
of p are continuous in x and as the cone of psd matrices is closed, the limit of any convergent
sequence of second-order points is a second-order point.
(ii) ⊆ (iii).
Let y¯ be any minimum of (2.12). Consider any local minimum x¯ of p and let zα := x¯+α(y¯−x¯).
As both ∇2p(y¯) and ∇2p(x¯) are psd, any point zα with α ∈ [0, 1) satisfies the SONC and
TOC, by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.4.3.
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Now note that since x¯ is a second-order point, it is also a minimum of (2.12) (as (i) ⊆ (ii))
and thus p(y¯) = p(x¯). From Lemma 2.4.4, we then have y¯ − x¯ ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)), and so from
Lemma 2.4.2, zα satisfies the FONC for any α. Thus, in view of Theorem 2.3.1, for any
α ∈ [0, 1), zα is a local minimum of p. Therefore y¯ can be written as the limit of a sequence
of local minima (i.e., {zα} as α→ 1), and hence y¯ ∈ LMp.
Remark 2.4.2. Note that as a consequence of Theorems 2.4.5 and 2.4.7, if a cubic polynomial
p has a local minimum, then SOp is a spectrahedron. In fact, SOp is a spectrahedron for
any cubic polynomial p; see Theorem 2.6.3. In that theorem, we will give a more useful
spectrahedral representation of SOp which does not rely on knowledge of a local minimum.
Corollary 2.4.8. Let p be a cubic polynomial with a second-order point. Then the optimal
value of (2.12) is the value that p takes at any of its second-order points (and in particular,
at any of its local minima if they exist).
Proof. This is immediate from the equivalence of (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2.4.7.
2.4.3 Distinction Between Local Minima and Second-Order Points
We have shown that the optimization problem in (2.12) gives an approach for finding second-
order points of a cubic polynomial p without computing its critical points. However, not all
second-order points are local minima, and so in this subsection, we characterize the difference
between the two notions more precisely. We first recall the concept of the relative interior
of a (convex) set (see, e.g., [97, Chap. 6]).
Definition 2.4.9. The relative interior of a nonempty convex set S ⊆ Rn is the set
ri(S) := {x ∈ S | ∀y ∈ S,∃λ > 1 s.t. λx+ (1− λ)y ∈ S}.
This definition generalizes the notion of interior to sets which do not have full dimension.
One can show that for a convex set S, ri(S) is convex, ri(S¯) = ri(S), and ri(S) = S¯ [97].
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In general, for a nonempty convex set S, we have ri(S¯) = ri(S) ⊆ S, but we may not have
ri(S¯) = S. (For example, let S be a line segment with one of its endpoints removed.) It
turns out, however, that for a cubic polynomial p with a local minimum, ri(LMp) = LMp.
Theorem 2.4.10. Let p : Rn → R be a cubic polynomial with a local minimum. Then the
following three sets are equivalent:
(i) LMp
(ii) ri(SOp)
(iii) Intersection of critical points of p with ri(CRp).
Proof. (ii) ⊆ (i)
Recall from Theorem 2.4.3 that LMp is convex, and from Theorem 2.4.7 that SOp = LMp.
Then we have ri(SOp) = ri(LMp) = ri(LMp) ⊆ LMp.
(i) ⊆ (ii)
We prove the contrapositive. Let x¯ be a point which is not in ri(SOp). If x¯ is not a second-
order point, then it clearly cannot be a local minimum. Suppose now that x¯ ∈ SOp\ri(SOp).
Then there is another second-order point y¯ such that y¯+λ(x¯− y¯) is not a second-order point
for any λ > 1. Note from Lemma 2.4.4 and the statement after it that p(y¯ + λ(x¯− y¯)) is a
constant univariate function of λ. Now for any  > 0, define the point z¯ := x¯+

2‖x¯−y¯‖(x¯− y¯).
Since z¯ is not a second-order point and thus not a local minimum, there is a point z satisfying
‖z¯ − z‖ < 2 and
p(z) < p(z¯) = p(

2‖x¯− y¯‖(x¯− y¯)) = p(x¯).
Furthermore, by the triangle inequality, z also satisfies ‖z − x¯‖ < . Thus, by considering
{z} as → 0, we can conclude that x¯ is not a local minimum.
(i) ⊆ (iii)
Consider any local minimum x¯ of p, which clearly must also be a critical point of p, and a
member of CRp. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that x¯ 6∈ ri(CRp). Then there exists
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y ∈ CRp such that for any scalar α > 0,∇2p(x¯+ α(x¯− y)) is not psd. In particular, for any
α > 0 there exists a unit vector zα ∈ Rn such that zTα∇2p(x¯+ α(x¯− y))zα < 0.
We now show that for any α, zα can be taken to be in C(∇2p(x¯)). This is because, as we
will show, if zα = d+ v, where d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)) and v ∈ C(∇2p(x¯)),
(d+ v)T∇2p(x¯+ α(x¯− y))(d+ v) = vT∇2p(x¯+ α(x¯− y))v. (2.13)
Observe that if p is written in the form (2.4), for any d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)), we have
dT∇2p(x¯+ α(x¯− y))d = dT
(
n∑
i=1
(x¯i + α(x¯i − yi))Hi +Q
)
d
= dT
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
d+ α
n∑
i=1
(dTHid)(x¯i − yi) = 0,
where the last equality follows from that d ∈ N (∇2p(x¯)), and the TOC, recalling that the
i-th entry of ∇p3(d) is 12dTHid. Note in particular that the expression above also holds for
α = −1, and so d ∈ N (∇2p(y)). Now observe that because we can write
∇2p(x¯+ α(x¯− y)) = (1 + α)∇2p(x¯)− α∇2p(y),
we have ∇2p(x¯ + α(x¯ − y))d = 0. Thus, we have shown (2.13), and we can take
zα ∈ C(∇2p(x¯)).
Note that if zα ∈ C(∇2p(x¯)), then by Lemma 2.3.2 we have zTα∇2p(x¯)zα ≥ λ, where
λ is the smallest nonzero eigenvalue of ∇2p(x¯). Thus, for small enough α, the quantity
zTα∇2p(x¯+ α(x¯− y))zα is positive and so we arrive at a contradiction.
(iii) ⊆ (i)
Let x¯ be a critical point which is in ri(CRp). Clearly x¯ ∈ SOp. Consider any local minimum
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y¯ of p, and observe that for any α 6= 0, we can write
x¯ =
1
α
(αx¯+ (1− α)y¯) + α− 1
α
y¯. (2.14)
As x¯ ∈ ri(CRp) and y¯ ∈ CRp, αx¯ + (1 − α)y¯ ∈ CRp for some α > 1. In particular, for
that α,∇2p(αx¯ + (1 − α)y¯)  0 and thus in view of (2.14), we can see that N (∇2p(x¯)) ⊆
N (∇2p(y¯)). Hence, because the TOC holds at y¯, it must also hold at x¯. Thus x¯ is a local
minimum.
Figure 2.4 demonstrates the relation between LMp and SOp for the polynomial
p(x1, x2) = x
2
1x2. For this example, SOp = {(x1, x2) | x1 = 0, x2 ≥ 0}, and LMp =
{(x1, x2) | x1 = 0, x2 > 0} (see Example 2.3.1).
Figure 2.4: The set of local minima (left) and second-order points (right) of the cubic
polynomial p(x1, x2) = x
2
1x2. Note that SOp is the closure of LMp (Theorem 2.4.7) and LMp
is the relative interior of SOp (Theorem 2.4.10).
Theorem 2.4.10 gives rise to the following interesting geometric fact about local minima
of cubic polynomials.
Corollary 2.4.11. Let x¯ and y¯ be two local minima of a cubic polynomial. Then
N (∇2p(x¯)) = N (∇2p(y¯)).
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Proof. It is known ([93, Corollary 1]) that for a spectrahedron {x ∈ Rn | A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi  0}
and any two points x and y in its relative interior, N (A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi) = N (A0 +
∑n
i=1 yiAi).
In view of the facts that for any cubic polynomial p, CRp is a spectrahedron and
LMp ⊆ ri(CRp) (from Theorem 2.4.10), the result is immediate.
2.4.4 Spectrahedra and Convexity Regions of Cubic Polynomials
We end this section with a result relating general spectrahedra and convexity regions of cubic
polynomials. Recall from the end of Section 2.3.1 that if S := {x ∈ Rn | A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi  0}
is a special spectrahedron, where A0, . . . , An are n× n symmetric matrices satisfying
(Ai)jk = (Aj)ik = (Ak)ij
for any i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then S is the convexity region of the cubic polynomial
p(x) =
1
6
n∑
i=1
xTxiAix+
1
2
xTA0x.
The following theorem shows that if the number of variables is allowed to increase, then
any spectrahedron can be represented by the convexity region of a cubic polynomial.
Theorem 2.4.12. Let a spectrahedron S ⊆ Rn be given by S := {x ∈ Rn | A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi  0},
where A0, . . . , An ∈ Sm×m. There exists a cubic polynomial p in at most m + n variables
such that S is a projection of its convexity region; i.e.,
S = {x ∈ Rn | ∃y ∈ Rm such that (x, y) ∈ CRp}.
Furthermore, the interior of S is a projection of the set of local minima of p.
Proof. Let A(x) := A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi. We first present a characterization of the interior of S
following the developments in Section 2.4 of [93]. Let NA := N (A0) ∩ . . . ∩ N (An), and V
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be a full-rank matrix whose columns span the orthogonal complement of NA. Suppose that
NA is (m− k)-dimensional. Then there exist matrices B0, . . . , Bn ∈ Sk×k with N (B0)∩ . . .∩
N (Bn) = {0k} such that
B(x) := B0 +
n∑
i=1
xiBi = V
TA(x)V.
In [93, Corollary 5], it is shown that B(x)
{x ∈ Rn | A(x)  0} = {x ∈ Rn | B(x)  0} (2.15)
and that the set {x ∈ Rn | B(x)  0} gives the interior of S. Now consider the following
cubic polynomial in n+ k variables:
p(x, y) := yTB(x)y. (2.16)
Observe that the partial derivative of p with respect to y is 2B(x)y, the partial derivative of
p with respect to xi is y
TBiy, and the Hessian of p is
∇2p(x, y) = 2
 0 C(y)T
C(y) B(x)
 ,
where C(y) is an k × n matrix whose i-th column equals Biy. One can then immediately
see that if (x¯, y¯) ∈ CRp, then we must have B(x¯)  0. Conversely, if B(x¯)  0, then
(x¯, 0k) ∈ CRp. Hence, in view of (2.15), we have shown that the spectrahedron S is the
projection of CRp onto the x variables.
We now show that LMp = {x ∈ Rn | B(x)  0} × {0k}. This would prove the second
claim of the theorem. First let x¯ be such that B(x¯)  0. Note that p(x¯, 0k) = 0 and that for
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any two vectors χ ∈ Rn and ψ ∈ Rk,
p(x¯+ χ, ψ) = ψT
(
B(x¯) +
n∑
i=1
Biχi
)
ψ.
Since B(x¯)  0, then for any χ of sufficiently small norm, B(x¯) +∑ni=1 Biχi is still positive
definite, and hence for any ψ, p(x¯+χ, ψ) ≥ 0 = p(x¯, 0k). Thus (x¯, 0k) is a local minimum of
p.
Now let (x¯, y¯) be a local minimum of p. From the SONC, we must have B(x¯)  0 and
C(y¯) = 0, which implies that Biy¯ = 0k,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Since
∂p
∂y
(x¯, y¯) = 2B(x¯)y¯ = 2
(
B0 +
n∑
i=1
x¯iBi
)
y¯ = 2B0y¯ + 2
n∑
i=1
x¯i(Biy¯),
it further follows from the FONC that B0y¯ = 0. As N (B0)∩ . . .∩N (Bn) = {0k} by construc-
tion, it follows that we must have y¯ = 0k. Next, observe thatN (∇2p(x¯, 0k)) = Rn×N (B(x¯)).
Let d ∈ N (B(x¯)), and note that for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (ei, d) ∈ N (∇2p(x¯, 0k)) and
∂p3
∂y
(ei, d) = Bid. Then from the TOC, we must have Bid = 0k,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Furthermore,
since d ∈ N (B(x¯)), it follows that B0d = 0k as well. Again, as N (B0)∩ . . .∩N (Bn) = {0k}
by construction, it follows that we must have d = 0k and thus B(x¯)  0.
2.5 Complexity Justifications for an Exact SDP Oracle
In the next section, we show that second-order points and local minima of cubic polynomials
can be found by solving polynomially-many semidefinite programs with a polynomial number
of variables and constraints. One caveat however is that the inputs and outputs of these
semidefinite programs can sometimes be algebraic but not necessarily rational numbers. As
a result, we cannot claim that second-order points and local minima of cubic polynomials
can be found in polynomial time in the Turing model of computation. In this subsection, we
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give evidence as to why establishing the complexity of these problems in the Turing model
is at the moment likely out of reach.
Definition 2.5.1. The SDP Feasibility Problem (SDPF) is the following decision question:
Given m×m symmetric matrices A0, . . . , An with rational entries, decide whether there exists
a vector x ∈ Rn such that A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi  0.
Definition 2.5.2. The SDP Strict Feasibility Problem (SDPSF) is the following decision
question: Given m×m symmetric matrices A0, . . . , An with rational entries, decide whether
there exists a vector x ∈ Rn such that A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi  0.
Even though semidefinite programs can be solved to arbitrary accuracy in polynomial
time [108], the complexities of the decision problems above remain as two of the outstand-
ing open problems in semidefinite programming. At the moment, it is not known if these
two decision problems even belong to the class NP [95, 90, 34]. We show next that the
complexities of these problems are a lower bound on the complexities of testing existence of
second-order points and local minima of cubic polynomials. (In Section 2.6, we accomplish
the more involved task of giving the reduction in the opposite direction.)
Theorem 2.5.3. If the problem of deciding whether a cubic polynomial has any second-order
points is in P (resp. NP), then SDPF is in P (resp. NP).
Proof. Given matrices A0, . . . , An ∈ Sm×m, let A(x) := A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi. By noting that the
cubic polynomial p(x, y) = yTA(x)y has as its Hessian
∇2p(x, y) = 2
 0 B(y)T
B(y) A(x)
 ,
where B(y) is an m×n matrix whose i-th column equals Aiy, we can see that if A(x¯)  0 for
some x¯ ∈ Rn, then ∇2p(x¯, 0k)  0. Since p is quadratic in the variables y, ∇p(x¯, 0k) = 0m+n,
and hence (x¯, 0k) is a second-order point of p. Conversely, if A(x) 6 0 for any x ∈ Rn, then
47
clearly ∇2p(x, y) 6 0 for any x ∈ Rn and y ∈ Rm, and thus p cannot have any second-order
points.
The above reduction shows that any polynomial-time algorithm (or polynomial-time
verifiable certificate) for existence of second-order points of cubic polynomials translates
into one for SDPF.
Theorem 2.5.4. If the problem of deciding whether a cubic polynomial has any local minima
is in P (resp. NP), then SDPSF is in P (resp. NP).
Proof. Given matrices A0, . . . , An ∈ Sm×m, let A(x) := A0 +
∑n
i=1 xiAi and consider the
set S := {x ∈ Rn | A(x)  0}. It is not difficult to see that there exists x¯ ∈ Rn such
that A(x¯)  0 if and only if S has a nonempty interior and NA := N (A0) ∩ N (A1) ∩
N (A2) . . . ∩ N (An) = {0m}.4 The latter condition can be checked in polynomial time by
solving linear systems. The former can be reduced—due to the second claim of Theorem
2.4.12—to deciding if the cubic polynomial constructed in (2.16) has a local minimum. Note
that the polynomial in (2.16) has coefficients polynomially sized in the entries of the matrices
Ai, since the matrix V in the proof of Theorem 2.4.12 can be taken to be the identity matrix
when NA = {0m}.
In addition to the difficulties alluded to in the above two theorems, the following three
examples point to concrete representation issues that one encounters in the Turing model
when dealing with local minima of cubic polynomials. The same complications are known
to arise for SDP feasibility problems [34].
Example 2.5.1. A cubic polynomial with only irrational local minima. Consider the
univariate cubic polynomial p(x) = x3 − 6x. One can easily verify that its unique local
minimum is at x =
√
2, which is irrational even though the coefficients of p are rational.
4The “only if” direction is straightforward and the “if” direction follows from [93, Corollary 5].
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Example 2.5.2. A cubic polynomial with an irrational convexity region. Consider
the quintary cubic polynomial p(x, y) = yTA(x)y, where
A(x) =

2 x 0 0
x 1 0 0
0 0 2x 2
0 0 2 x

.
One can easily verify that x =
√
2 is the only scalar satisfying A(x)  0. Since the matrix
2A(x) is a principal submatrix of ∇2p(x, y), any point in the convexity region of p must
satisfy x =
√
2 (even though the coefficients of p are rational).
Example 2.5.3. A family of cubic polynomials whose local minima have exponential
bitsize. Consider the family of cubic polynomials pn(x, y) = y
TAn(x)y in 3n variables, where
An(x) =

x1 2 0 0 · · · 0 0
2 1 0 0 · · · 0 0
0 0 x2 x1 · · · 0 0
0 0 x1 1 · · · 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · . . . · · · · · ·
0 0 0 0 · · · xn xn−1
0 0 0 0 · · · xn−1 1

.
We show that even though these polynomials have some rational local minima, it takes
exponential time to write them down. From the proof of Theorem 2.4.12, one can infer that
the set of local minima of pn is the set {x ∈ Rn | An(x)  0}×{02n}. However, observe that
to have An(x)  0 (or even An(x)  0), we must have
x1 ≥ 4, x2 ≥ 16, . . . , xn ≥ 22n .
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Hence, any local minimum of pn has bit length at least O(2
n) even though the bit length of
the coefficients of pn is O(n).
2.6 Finding Local Minima of Cubic Polynomials
In this section, we derive an SDP-based approach for finding second-order points and local
minima of cubic polynomials. This, along with the results established in Section 2.2, will
complete the entries of Table 2.2 from Section 2.1. We begin with some preliminaries that
are needed to present the theorems of this section.
2.6.1 Preliminaries from Semidefinite and Sum of Squares Opti-
mization
The Oracle E-SDP
Recall that a spectrahedron is a set of the type
{
x ∈ Rn | A0 +
n∑
i=1
xiAi  0
}
,
where A0, . . . , An are symmetric matrices of some size m×m. A semidefinite representable
set (also known as a spectrahedral shadow) is a set of the type
{
x ∈ Rn | ∃y ∈ Rk such that A0 +
n∑
i=1
xiAi +
k∑
i=1
yiBi  0
}
, (2.17)
for some integer k ≥ 0 and symmetric m×m matrices A0, A1, . . . , An, B1, . . . , Bk. These are
exactly sets which semidefinite programming can optimize over.
We show in Theorem 2.6.3 and Corollary 2.6.5 that the set of second-order points of any
cubic polynomial is a spectrahedron and describe how a description of this spectrahedron
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can be obtained from the coefficients of p only.5 Since relative interiors of semidefinite rep-
resentable sets (and in particular spectrahedra) are semidefinite representable [81, Theorem
3.8], it follows from our Theorem 2.4.10 that the set of local minima of any cubic polynomial
is semidefinite representable.
Due to the complexity results and representation issues presented in Section 2.5, we
assume in this section that we can do arithmetic over real numbers and have access to an
oracle which solves SDPs exactly. This oracle—which we call E-SDP—takes as input an
SDP with real data and outputs the optimal value as a real number if it is finite, or reports
that the SDP is infeasible, or that it is unbounded.6 The following lemma shows that E-
SDP can find a point in the relative interior of a semidefinite representable set. This will be
relevant for us later in this section when we search for local minima of cubic polynomials.
Lemma 2.6.1. Let S be a nonempty semidefinite representable set in Rn. Then a point in
ri(S) can be recovered in 2n calls to E-SDP.
Proof. Consider the following procedure. Let S1 = S, and for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} let
Si+1 = Si ∩ {x ∈ Rn | xi = x∗i },
where the scalar x∗i is chosen to be any “intermediate” value of xi on Si. More precisely, let
x¯i (resp. xi) be the supremum (resp. infimum) of xi over Si (these two values may or may
not be finite). If x¯i = xi, then set x
∗
i = x¯i. Otherwise, set x
∗
i to be any scalar satisfying
xi < x
∗
i < x¯i. Note that for each i, x
∗
i can be computed using 2 calls to E-SDP. Hence, after
2n calls to E-SDP, we arrive at a set Sn+1 which is a singleton by construction.
We next show, by induction, that the point in Sn+1 belongs to ri(S). First note that as
S is nonempty, ri(S) is nonempty [97, Theorem 6.2], which implies that S1 ∩ ri(S) = ri(S)
5Recall that the results of Section 2.4 by contrast established spectrahedrality of the set of second-
order points under the assumption of existence of a local minimum (see Remark 2.4.2). Furthermore, the
spectrahedral representation that we gave there (see Theorem 2.4.5) required knowledge of a local minimum.
6Though this will not be needed for our purposes, it is straightforward to show that for an SDP with n
scalar variables, the oracle E-SDP can be called twice to test attainment of the optimal value, and a total
of n+ 1 times to recover an optimal solution.
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is nonempty. Now suppose that Si ∩ ri(S) is nonempty for i ∈ {1, . . . , k}. We show that
Sk+1 ∩ ri(S) is nonempty.
First suppose that k is such that x¯k = x
∗
k = xk. In this case, because ∀x ∈ Sk, xk = x∗k,
Sk+1 ∩ ri(S) = Sk ∩ {x ∈ Rn | xk = x∗k} ∩ ri(S) = Sk ∩ ri(S) 6= ∅.
Now suppose that xk < x
∗
k < x¯k. By the definition of x¯k, there exists a sequence of points
{yj} ⊆ Sk such that (yj)k → x¯k. We recall that for any z ∈ ri(S), y ∈ S¯, and λ ∈ (0, 1],
λz+ (1− λ)y ∈ ri(S) [97, Theorem 6.1]. Now let z ∈ Sk ∩ ri(S). Since Sk is convex, for any
y ∈ Sk ∩ S¯ and λ ∈ (0, 1], λz + (1− λ)y ∈ Sk ∩ ri(S). In particular, since Sk ∩ S¯ = Sk, the
sequence {zj} := {1j z + j−1j yj} satisfies {zj} ⊆ Sk ∩ ri(S) and (zj)k → x¯k. Similarly, there
exists a sequence of points {wj} ⊆ Sk ∩ ri(S) such that (wj)k → xk. As Sk ∩ ri(S) is convex,
there must then be a point x ∈ Sk ∩ ri(S) satisfying xk = x∗k, and so
Sk+1 ∩ ri(S) = Sk ∩ {x ∈ Rn | xk = x∗k} ∩ ri(S)
is not empty.
Overview of Sum of Squares Polynomials
In order to describe our SDP-based approach for finding local minima of cubic polynomi-
als, we also need to briefly review the connection between sum of squares polynomials and
matrices to semidefinite programming. Approaches to finding local minima based on sum
of squares have been studied before, such as in [83]. The SDP approach in this chapter,
however, is based partially on finding critical points and does not formally study the case of
cubic polynomials.
Recall that a (multivariate) polynomial p : Rn → R is nonnegative if p(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Rn,
and that a polynomial p is said to be a sum of squares (sos) if p =
∑r
i=1 q
2
i for some
polynomials q1, . . . , qr. The notion of sum of squares also extends to polynomial matrices (i.e.,
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matrices whose entries are multivariate polynomials). We say that symmetric polynomial
matrix M(x) : Rn → Rm×Rm is an sos-matrix if it has a factorization as M(x) = R(x)TR(x)
for some r × m polynomial matrix R(x) [47]. Observe that if M is an sos-matrix, then
M(x)  0 for any x ∈ Rn. One can check that M(x) is an sos-matrix if and only if the scalar-
valued polynomial yTM(x)y in variables (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym) is sos. Indeed, the “only if”
direction is clear, the “if” direction is because when yTM(x)y =
∑r
i=1 q
2
i (x, y) for some
polynomials q1, . . . , qr, each qi must be linear in y and thus writable as qi(x) =
∑m
j=1 yjqij(x)
for some polynomials qij. Then if R(x) is the r ×m matrix where Rij(x) = qij(x), we will
have M(x) = RT (x)R(x).
2.6.2 A Sum of Squares Approach for Finding Second-Order
Points
We have shown in Theorem 2.4.7 that if a cubic polynomial p has a second-order point, the
solutions of the optimization problem in (2.12) exactly form the set SOp of its second-order
points. The same theorem further showed that if p has a local minimum, then the solutions
of (2.12) also coincide with LMp, i.e. the closure of the set of its local minima. Our goal in
this section is to develop a semidefinite representation of SOp which can be obtained directly
from the coefficients of p (Corollary 2.6.5). To arrive to this representation, we first present
an sos relaxation of problem (2.12), which we prove to be tight when SOp is nonempty
(Theorem 2.6.2). We then provide a more efficient representation of the SDP underlying
this sos relaxation in Section 2.6.3. This will lead to an algorithm (Algorithm 2) for finding
local minima of cubic polynomials which is presented in Section 2.6.3.
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Theorem 2.6.2. If a cubic polynomial p : Rn → R has a second-order point, the optimal
value of the following semidefinite program7 is attained and is equal to the value of p at all
second-order points:
sup
γ∈R,σ(x),S(x)
γ
subject to p(x)− γ = σ(x) + Tr(S(x)∇2p(x)),
σ(x) is a degree-2 sos polynomial,
S(x) is an n× n sos-matrix with degree-2 entries.
(2.18)
Proof. Let x¯ be a second-order point of p and γ∗ be the optimal value of (2.18). Consider
any feasible solution (γ, σ, S) to (2.18) (nonemptiness of the feasible set is established in the
next paragraph). Since ∇2p(x¯)  0 and S(x¯)  0, we have Tr(∇2p(x¯)S(x¯)) ≥ 0. Since
σ(x¯) ≥ 0 as well, it follows that p(x¯) ≥ γ. Hence, p(x¯) ≥ γ∗.
To show that p(x¯) ≤ γ∗ and that the value γ∗ = p(x¯) is attained, we establish that
(γ, σ, S) =
(
p(x¯),
1
3
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯), 1
6
(x− x¯)(x− x¯)T
)
is feasible to (2.18). Note that 1
3
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯) is an sos polynomial (as ∇2p(x¯) can
be factored into V TV ), and that 1
6
(x− x¯)(x− x¯)T is an sos-matrix by construction. To show
that the first constraint in (2.18) is satisfied, consider the Taylor expansion of p around x¯ in
the direction x− x¯ (see (2.2), noting that ∇p(x¯) = 0):
p(x¯+ (x− x¯)) = p(x¯) + 1
2
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯) + p3(x− x¯). (2.19)
7To clarify, x is not a decision variable in this problem. The decision variables are γ, the coefficients of
σ, and the coefficients of the entries of S. The identity in the first constraint must hold for all x, and this
can be enforced by matching the coefficient of each monomial on the left with the corresponding coefficient
on the right.
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Observe that if p is written in the form (2.4), then we have
p3(x− x¯) = 1
6
(x− x¯)T
(
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯i)Hi
)
(x− x¯)
=
1
6
(x− x¯)T
(
n∑
i=1
(xi − x¯i)Hi +Q−Q
)
(x− x¯)
=
1
6
(x− x¯)T
(
n∑
i=1
xiHi +Q−
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi −Q
)
(x− x¯)
=
1
6
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x)(x− x¯)− 1
6
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯).
Note further that due to the cyclic property of the trace, we have
1
6
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x)(x− x¯) = Tr
(
(
1
6
(x− x¯)(x− x¯)T )∇2p(x)
)
.
Hence, (2.19) reduces to the following identity
p(x)− p(x¯) = 1
3
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯) + Tr
(
(
1
6
(x− x¯)(x− x¯)T )∇2p(x)
)
, (2.20)
and thus the claim is established.
Since (2.18) is a tight sos relaxation of (2.12) when SOp is nonempty, it is interesting to
see how an optimal solution to (2.12) can be recovered from an optimal solution to (2.18).
This is shown in the next theorem, keeping in mind that optimal solutions to (2.12) are
second-order points of p (see Theorem 2.4.7).
Theorem 2.6.3. Let p : Rn → R be a cubic polynomial with a second-order point, and let
(γ∗, σ∗, S∗) be an optimal solution of (2.18) applied to p. Then, the set
Γ := {x ∈ Rn | ∇2p(x)  0, σ∗(x) = 0,Tr(S∗(x)∇2p(x)) = 0} (2.21)
is a spectrahedron, and Γ = SOp.
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Proof. We first show that Γ = SOp. Let x¯ be a second-order point of p. From Theorem 2.6.2
and the first constraint of (2.18) we have
0 = p(x¯)− p(x¯) = p(x¯)− γ∗ = σ∗(x¯) + Tr(S∗(x¯)∇2p(x¯)).
As σ∗(x¯) and Tr(S∗(x¯)∇2p(x¯)) are both nonnegative, the above equation implies they must
both be zero, and hence SOp ⊆ Γ. To see why Γ ⊆ SOp, let y¯ be a point in Γ and xˆ be
an arbitrary second-order point (which by the assumption of the theorem exists). Observe
from Theorem 2.6.2 and the first constraint of (2.18) that
p(y¯)− p(xˆ) = p(y¯)− γ∗ = σ∗(y¯) + Tr(S∗(y¯)∇2p(y¯)) = 0.
Additionally, because ∇2p(y¯)  0, it follows from Corollary 2.4.8 that y¯ is optimal to (2.12),
and thus is a second-order point by Theorem 2.4.7.
Now we show that Γ is a spectrahedron by “linearizing” the quadratic and cubic equations
that appear in (2.21). Since σ∗ is a quadratic sos polynomial, it can be written equivalently
as σ∗(x) =
∑m
i=1 q
2
i (x) for some affine polynomials q1, . . . , qm. Similarly, since S
∗ is an sos-
matrix with quadratic entries, it can be written as S∗(x) = R(x)TR(x) for some k×n matrix
R with affine entries. First note that as ∇2p(x) is affine in x and σ∗ is a sum of squares of
affine polynomials, the set
{x ∈ Rn | ∇2p(x)  0, σ∗(x) = 0} = {x ∈ Rn | ∇2p(x)  0, q1(x) = 0, . . . , qm(x) = 0}
is clearly a spectrahedron.
Now let y be any point in ri(CRp). Such a point exists because CRp is nonempty by
assumption, and relative interiors of nonempty convex sets are nonempty [97, Theorem 6.2].
Now let ri be the i-th column of the matrix R
T . We claim that Γ is equivalent to the
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following set:
{
x ∈ Rn | ∇2p(x)  0, q1(x) = 0, . . . , qm(x) = 0,∇2p(y)r1(x) = 0, . . . ,∇2p(y)rk(x) = 0
}
.
(2.22)
Note that this set is a spectrahedron, and that the final k equality constraints are enforcing
that each column of RT be in the null space of ∇2p(y).
To prove the claim, first let x be in (2.22). Note that N (∇2p(y)) ⊆ N (∇2p(x)), as
y ∈ ri(CRp) and so ∇2p(y) = λ∇2p(x) + (1 − λ)∇2p(z) for some z ∈ CRp and λ ∈ (0, 1).
Then,
Tr(S∗(x)∇2p(x)) =
k∑
i=1
rTi (x)∇2p(x)ri(x) = 0.
Hence (2.22) ⊆ (2.21).
To show the reverse inclusion, let x be a point in (2.21). It is easy to check that Tr(AB) =
0 for two psd matrices A = CTC and B if and only if the columns of CT belong to the null
space of B. Hence, we must have ri(x) ∈ N (∇2p(x)). Assume first that x ∈ ri(CRp). Then
we must have ri(x) ∈ N (∇2p(x)) = N (∇2p(y)) as CRp is a spectrahedron and any two
matrices in the relative interior of a spectrahedron have the same null space [93, Corollary 1].
To see why we must also have ri(x) ∈ N (∇2p(y)) for any x ∈ CRp\ri(CRp), observe that
N (∇2p(y)) is closed, the vector-valued functions ri are continuous in x, and the preimage of
a closed set under a continuous function is closed.
2.6.3 A Simplified Semidefinite Representation of Second-Order
Points and an Algorithm for Finding Local Minima
In this subsection, we derive a semidefinite representation of the set SOp, which will be given
in (2.31). In contrast to the semidefinite representation in (2.22), which requires first solving
(2.18) and then performing some matrix factorizations, the representation in (2.31) can be
immediately obtained from the coefficients of p. To find a second-order point of an n-variate
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cubic polynomial via the representation in (2.31), one needs to solve an SDP with (n+2)(n+1)
2
scalar variables and two semidefinite constraints of size (n+ 1)× (n+ 1). This is in contrast
to finding a second-order point via the representation in (2.22), which requires solving two
SDPs: (2.18) which has
(
n(n+1)
2
+ 1
)(
(n+2)(n+1)
2
)
+ 1 scalar variables and two semidefinite
constraints of sizes (n + 1) × (n + 1) and n(n + 1) × n(n + 1) (coming from the two sos
constraints), and then the SDP associated with (2.22), which has n scalar variables and a
semidefinite constraint of size n × n. Another purpose of this subsection is to present our
final result, which is an algorithm for testing for existence of a local minimum (Algorithm 2
in Section 2.6.3).
A Simplified Sos Relaxation
Recall from the proof of Theorem 2.6.2 that if p has a second-order point x¯, then there is an
optimal solution to (2.18) of the form
(γ, σ, S) =
(
p(x¯),
1
3
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯), 1
6
(x− x¯)(x− x¯)T
)
. (2.23)
In particular, for this solution, the coefficients of σ and S can both be written entirely in
terms of the entries of x¯ and the coefficients of p. In what follows, we attempt to optimize
over solutions to (2.18) which are of the form in (2.23). However, imposing this particu-
lar structure on the solution requires nonlinear equality constraints (in fact, it turns out
quadratic constraints suffice). Instead, we will impose an SDP relaxation of these nonlinear
constraints and show that the relaxation is exact. We follow a standard technique in deriving
SDP relaxations for quadratic programs, where the outer product xxT of some variable x is
replaced by a new matrix variable X satisfying X − xxT  0. The latter matrix inequality
that can be imposed as a semidefinite constraint via the Schur complement [22]. The variable
x¯ will be represented by a variable y ∈ Rn, and the symmetric matrix variable Y ∈ Sn×n will
represent yyT . In addition, we will need another scalar variable z.
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Assume p is given in the form (2.4), and let us expand σ in (2.23) (disregarding the factor
1
3
) as follows:
(x− x¯)T∇2p(x¯)(x− x¯) = xT
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x− 2x¯T
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x+ x¯T
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x¯
= xT
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x− 2
n∑
i=1
Tr(Hix¯x¯
T )xi − 2x¯TQx+ x¯T
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x¯,
where in the last equality we used Lemma 2.4.1. If we replace any occurrence of x¯ with y,
any occurrence of x¯x¯T with Y and any occurrence of x¯T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi + Q)x¯ with z, we can
rewrite the above expression as
σY,y,z(x) :=
n∑
j=1
n∑
k=1
(
n∑
i=1
(Hi)jkyi +Qjk
)
xjxk − 2
n∑
i=1
(Tr(HiY ) + e
T
i Qy)xi + z. (2.24)
Similarly, the matrix S in (2.23) can be written as xxT − xyT − yxT + Y (disregarding the
factor 1
6
). Note that if Y − yyT  0, then the matrix xxT − xyT − yxT + Y is an sos-matrix
(as a polynomial matrix in x). By making these replacements, we arrive at an SDP which
attempts to look for a solution to the sos program in (2.18) which is of the structure in
(2.23). This is the following SDP8:
sup
γ∈R,Y ∈Sn×n,y∈Rn,z∈R
γ
subject to p(x)− γ = 1
3
σY,y,z(x) +
1
6
Tr
(∇2p(x)(xxT − xyT − yxT + Y )) ,
σY,y,z is sos,Y y
yT 1
  0.
(2.25)
8Note that x is not a decision variable in this SDP as the first constraint needs to hold for all x.
59
Through straightforward algebra and matching coefficients, the first constraint (keeping
in mind that p is as in (2.4)) can be more explicitly written as:
bi = −eTi Qy −
1
2
Tr(HiY ), i = 1, . . . , n,
−γ = 1
6
Tr(QY ) +
z
3
.
These constraints reflect that the coefficients of the linear terms and the scalar coefficient
match on both sides; the cubic and quadratic coefficients are automatically the same. We
can rewrite (2.24) as
σY,y,z(x) =
x
1

T
T (Y, y, z)
x
1
 ,
where
T (Y, y, z) :=
 ∑ni=1 yiHi +Q ∑ni=1 Tr(HiY )ei +Qy
(
∑n
i=1 Tr(HiY )ei +Qy)
T z
 .
The constraint in (2.25) that σ be sos is the same as the matrix T being psd. Putting
everything together, the problem in (2.25) can be rewritten as the following SDP:9
inf
Y ∈Sn×n,y∈Rn,z∈R
1
6
Tr(QY ) +
z
3
subject to
1
2
Tr(HiY ) + e
T
i Qy + bi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
T (Y, y, z)  0,Y y
yT 1
  0.
(2.26)
It is interesting to observe that the first constraint is a relaxation of the quadratic con-
straint which would impose ∇p(y) = 0, and that the constraint T (Y, y, z)  0 in particular
9Recall that the data to this SDP is obtained from the representation of p in the form of (2.4).
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implies ∇2p(y)  0. One can think of (2.26) as another SDP relaxation of (2.12) which is
tight when p has a second-order point.
Combining the SDP in (2.26) with its Dual
In this subsection, we write down an SDP (given in (2.28)) whose optimal value can be
related to the existence of second-order points of a cubic polynomial. To arrive at this SDP,
we first take the dual of (2.26). It will turn out that the constraints in the dual follow a very
similar structure to those in the primal, and that any feasible solution of the primal yields
a feasible solution of the dual. We then combine the primal-dual pair of SDPs to arrive at
a single SDP, which is the one in (2.28). To this end, let us write down the dual of (2.26):
sup
R,S,r,s,λ,σ,ρ,γ
γ
subject to
1
6
Tr(QY ) +
z
3
− γ =
n∑
i=1
λi
(
1
2
Tr(HiY ) + e
T
i Qy + bi
)
+ Tr

Y y
yT 1

R r
rT ρ

+ Tr
T (Y, y, z)
 S s
sT σ

 , ∀(Y, y, z)
R r
rT ρ
 0,
 S s
sT σ
 0,
where R, S ∈ Sn×n, r, s, λ ∈ Rn, and σ, ρ, γ ∈ R. The right-hand side of the first constraint
simplifies to
bTλ+ρ+Tr(QS)+Tr
((
n∑
i=1
(
1
2
λi + 2si)Hi +R
)
Y
)
+
(
Q(λ+ 2s) +
n∑
i=1
Tr(HiS)ei + 2r
)T
y+σz.
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After matching coefficients, the dual problem can be rewritten as
sup
R,S,r,s,λ,ρ
− bTλ− ρ− Tr(QS)
subject to
n∑
i=1
(
1
2
λi + 2si)Hi +R =
1
6
Q,
Q(λ+ 2s) +
n∑
i=1
Tr(HiS)ei + 2r = 0,R r
rT ρ
  0,
 S s
sT 13
  0,
Substituting R and r using the first two constraints into the first psd constraint and then
multiplying by 6, we arrive at the problem
sup
S,s,λ,ρ
− bTλ− ρ− Tr(QS)
subject to
 ∑ni=1(−3λi − 12si)Hi +Q Q(−3λ− 6s)− 3∑ni=1 Tr(HiS)ei
(Q(−3λ− 6s)− 3∑ni=1 Tr(HiS)ei)T 6ρ
  0,
S s
sT 1
3
  0.
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Replacing S with 1
3
S, s with −1
3
s, and ρ with 1
6
ρ, we can reparameterize this problem
and arrive at our final form for the dual of (2.26):
sup
S,s,λ,ρ
− bTλ− 1
6
ρ− 1
3
Tr(QS)
subject to
 ∑ni=1(4si − 3λi)Hi +Q Q(2s− 3λ)−∑ni=1 Tr(HiS)ei
(Q(2s− 3λ)−∑ni=1 Tr(HiS)ei)T ρ
  0,
S s
sT 1
  0.
(2.27)
One can easily verify that if (Y, y, z) is feasible to (2.26), then (Y, y, y, z) is feasible to
(2.27). Replacing (S, s, λ, γ) with (Y, y, y, z) in (2.27) gives an SDP whose constraints are
the two psd constraints in (2.26) and whose objective function is −bTy − 1
6
z − 1
3
Tr(QY ).
We now create a new SDP, which has the same decision variables and constraints as (2.26),
but whose objective function is the difference between the objective function of (2.26) and
−bTy− 1
6
z− 1
3
Tr(QY ). The optimal value of this new SDP is an upper bound on the duality
gap of the primal-dual SDP pair (2.26) and (2.27). If our cubic polynomial p is written in
the form (2.4) and
T (Y, y, z) =
 ∑ni=1 yiHi +Q ∑ni=1 Tr(HiY )ei +Qy
(
∑n
i=1 Tr(HiY )ei +Qy)
T z

as before, the new SDP we just described can be written as
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inf
Y ∈Sn×n,y∈Rn,z∈R
1
2
Tr(QY ) + bTy +
z
2
subject to
1
2
Tr(HiY ) + e
T
i Qy + bi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
T (Y, y, z)  0,Y y
yT 1
  0.
(2.28)
The following theorem relates the optimal value of this SDP to the existence of second-order
points of p.
Theorem 2.6.4. For a cubic polynomial p given in the form (2.4), consider the SDP in
(2.28). For any feasible solution (Y, y, z) to (2.28), the objective value of (2.28) is nonnega-
tive. Furthermore, the optimal value of (2.28) is zero and is attained if and only if p has a
second-order point.
Proof. Suppose (Y, y, z) is a feasible solution to (2.28). Note that (Y, y, z) is feasible to (2.26)
and (Y, y, y, z) is feasible to (2.27), and so
1
2
Tr(QY ) + bTy +
z
2
=
1
6
Tr(QY ) +
z
3
−
(
−bTy − 1
6
z − 1
3
Tr(QY )
)
≥ 0
by weak duality applied to (2.26) and (2.27). Hence, the objective of (28) is nonnegative at
any feasible solution.
Now suppose that p has a second-order point x¯. We claim that the triplet
(
x¯x¯T , x¯, x¯T
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x¯
)
is feasible to (2.28) and achieves an objective value of zero. Indeed, the first constraint
of (2.28) is satisfied because its left-hand side reduces to ∇p(x¯), which is zero. The third
constraint is satisfied since the matrix (x¯, 1)(x¯, 1)T is clearly psd. The second constraint is
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satisfied since T (x¯x¯T , x¯, x¯T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi +Q)x¯) can be written as
 ∑ni=1 x¯iHi +Q (∑ni=1 x¯iHi +Q)x¯
x¯T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi +Q) x¯
T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi +Q)x¯
 =
 (∑ni=1 x¯iHi +Q) 12
x¯T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi +Q)
1
2

 (∑ni=1 x¯iHi +Q) 12
x¯T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi +Q)
1
2

T
.
The objective value at (x¯x¯T , x¯, x¯T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi +Q)x¯) is
1
2
Tr(Qx¯x¯T ) + bT x¯+
1
2
x¯T
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x¯
=
1
2
x¯TQx¯−
(
1
2
n∑
i=1
x¯iHix¯+Qx¯
)T
x¯+
1
2
x¯T
(
n∑
i=1
x¯iHi +Q
)
x¯
=0.
Since we have already shown that the objective function of (2.28) is nonnegative over its
feasible set, it follows that when p has a second-order point, the optimal value of (2.28) is
zero and is attained.
To prove the converse, suppose the optimal value of (2.28) is zero and is attained. Let
(Y ∗, y∗, z∗) be an optimal solution to (2.28). We will show that y∗ is a second-order point
for p. Clearly ∇2p(y∗) is psd, since T (Y ∗, y∗, z∗)  0. To show that ∇p(y∗) = 0, let us start
by letting D := Y ∗ − y∗y∗T , and d := ∑ni=1 Tr(HiD)ei. Note that
1
2
Tr(Hiy
∗y∗T ) +
1
2
Tr(HiD) + e
T
i Qy
∗ + bi = 0
(2.4)⇒ −2(∇p(y∗))i = Tr(HiD),
or equivalently d = −2∇p(y∗). In the remainder of the proof, we show that d = 0.
Since
∑n
i=1 y
∗
iHiy
∗ is the vector whose i-th entry is y∗THiy∗, we have that
n∑
i=1
Tr(HiY
∗)ei +Qy∗ =
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗ + d. (2.29)
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Then from the generalized10 Schur complement condition applied to T (Y ∗, y∗, z∗), we have
z∗ ≥
((
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗ + d
)T ( n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+(( n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗ + d
)
= y∗T
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗ + 2dT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+( n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗ + dT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+
d.
It is not difficult to verify that since T (Y ∗, y∗, z∗)  0, we have
n∑
i=1
Tr(HiY
∗)ei +Qy∗ ∈ C(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q),
and thus (2.29) implies d ∈ C(∑ni=1 y∗iHi +Q). Therefore, there exists a vector v ∈ Rn such
that d = (
∑n
i=1 y
∗
iHi +Q)v. We then have
dT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+( n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗
=vT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+( n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗
=vT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗
=dTy∗.
Now let
δ := z∗ − y∗T
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗ − 2dTy∗ − dT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+
d
and observe that δ ≥ 0. We can then write the objective value of (2.28) at (Y ∗, y∗, z∗) in
terms of D, d, and δ:
10Here, A+ refers to any pseudo-inverse of A, i.e. a matrix satisfying AA+A = A.
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12
Tr(QY ∗) + bTy∗ +
1
2
z∗
=
1
2
(
y∗TQy∗ + Tr(QD)
)
+
n∑
i=1
(
−eTi Qy∗ −
1
2
Tr(Hiy
∗y∗T )− 1
2
Tr(HiD)
)
y∗i
+
1
2
(
y∗T
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
y∗ + 2dTy∗ + dT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+
d+ δ
)
=
(
1
2
− 1 + 1
2
)
y∗TQy∗ +
(
−1
2
+
1
2
) n∑
i=1
y∗Ty∗iHiy
∗
+
1
2
Tr(QD) +
(
−1
2
+ 1
) n∑
i=1
Tr(HiD)y
∗
i +
1
2
dT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+
d+
δ
2
=
1
2
Tr
((
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)
D
)
+
1
2
dT
(
n∑
i=1
y∗iHi +Q
)+
d+
δ
2
≥ 0,
(2.30)
where in the last inequality we used the facts that D  0 and that the pseudo-inverse of a
psd matrix is psd.
Since the left-hand side of the above equation is zero by assumption, and since all three
terms on the right-hand side are nonnegative, it follows that (
∑n
i=1 y
∗
iHi+Q)
+d = 0. As the
null space of (
∑n
i=1 y
∗
iHi + Q)
+ is the same as the null space of (
∑n
i=1 y
∗
iHi + Q), we have
(
∑n
i=1 y
∗
iHi +Q)d = 0. However, because d ∈ C(
∑n
i=1 y
∗
iHi +Q), it must be that d = 0.
An Algorithm for Finding Local Minima
Theorem 2.6.4 leads to the following characterization of second-order points of a cubic poly-
nomial.
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Corollary 2.6.5. Let p : Rn → R be a cubic polynomial written in the form (2.4). Then the
set of its second-order points is equal to
{y ∈ Rn | ∃Y ∈ Sn×n, z ∈ R such that
1
2
Tr(QY ) + bTy +
z
2
= 0,
1
2
Tr(HiY ) + e
T
i Qy + bi = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n,
T (Y, y, z)  0,
Y y
yT 1
  0}.
(2.31)
Proof. Recall from the proof of Theorem 2.6.4 that if x¯ is a second-order point of p, then
the triplet (x¯x¯T , x¯, x¯T (
∑n
i=1 x¯iHi + Q)x¯) is feasible solution to (2.28) with objective value
zero. Hence any second-order point belongs to (2.31). Conversely, recall that if (Y, y, z) is
a feasible solution to (2.28) with objective value zero, then y is a second-order point of p.
Therefore any point in (2.31) is a second-order point of p.
In view of Theorem 2.4.7, we observe that if p has a local minimum, the set in (2.31) is
a semidefinite representation of LMp. This observation gives rise to the following algorithm
which tests if a cubic polynomial has a local minimum.
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm for finding a local minimum of a cubic polynomial using a polyno-
mial number of calls to E-SDP.
1: Input: A cubic polynomial p : Rn → R in the form (2.4)
2: TEST1 test using E-SDP if (2.31) is empty
3: if YES
4: return NO LOCAL MINIMUM
5: if NO
6: Find (via Lemma 2.6.1) a point x∗ in the relative interior of (2.31)
7: TEST2 test (via Theorem 2.3.3) if x∗ is a local minimum
8: if YES
9: return x∗
10: if NO
11: return NO LOCAL MINIMUM
Complexity and correctness of Algorithm 2. By design, if p has no local minimum,
Algorithm 2 will return NO LOCAL MINIMUM since TEST2 answers NO for every point. If p has
a local minimum, then SOp is nonempty. Since SOp is given by (2.31) due to Corollary 2.6.5,
TEST1 answers YES. Then, by Theorem 2.4.10, any point in the relative interior of (2.31) is
a local minimum. Hence x∗ will pass TEST2. Note that this algorithm makes 2n+ 1 calls to
E-SDP, and then runs Algorithm 1.11
Remark 2.6.1. Finding strict local minima. If we are specifically interested in searching
for a strict local minimum of a cubic polynomial, we can simply check if the point x∗ returned
by Algorithm 2 satisfies ∇2p(x∗)  0. If the answer is yes, we return x∗; if the answer is
no, we declare that p has no strict local minimum. Clearly, if a local minimum x∗ satisfies
∇2p(x∗)  0, it must be a strict local minimum due to the SOSC. Furthermore, recall from
11In fact, the number of calls to E-SDP can be reduced to 2n if the very first call to E-SDP uses x1 as the
objective function.
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Section 2.3.1 that if p has a strict local minimum, then it has a unique local minimum, and
thus that must be the output of Algorithm 2.
2.7 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this chapter, we considered the notions of (i) critical points, (ii) second-order points,
(iii) local minima, and (iv) strict local minima for multivariate polynomials. For each type
of point, and as a function of the degree of the polynomial, we studied the complexity of
deciding (1) if a given point is of that type, and (2) if a polynomial has a point of that
type. See Tables 2.1 and 2.2 in Section 2.1 for a summary of how our results complement
prior literature. The majority of our work was dedicated to the case of cubic polynomials,
where some new tractable cases were revealed based in part on connections with semidefinite
programming. In this final section, we outline two future research directions which also have
to do with cubic polynomials.
2.7.1 Approximate Local Minima
In Sections 2.5 and 2.6, we established polynomial-time equivalence of finding local min-
ima and second-order points of cubic polynomials and some SDP feasibility problems (see
Corollary 2.6.5, Algorithm 2, Theorem 2.5.3, Theorem 2.5.4). Unless some well-known open
problems around the complexity of SDP feasibility are resolved (see Section 2.5), one cannot
expect to make claims about finding local minima of cubic polynomials in polynomial time
in the Turing model of computation. Nonetheless, it is known that under some assump-
tions, one can solve semidefinite programs to arbitrary accuracy in polynomial time (see,
e.g. [94, 8, 108, 90, 80, 46]). It is therefore reasonable to ask if one can find local minima
of cubic polynomials to arbitrary accuracy in polynomial time. This is a question we would
like to study more rigorously in future work. We present a partial result in this direction in
Theorem 2.7.1 below.
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Recall from Section 2.6.2 that our ability to find local minima of a cubic polynomial p
depended on our ability to minimize p over its convexity region CRp. We show next that we
can find an -minimizer of p over CRp by approximately solving a semideifnite program.
Theorem 2.7.1. For a cubic polynomial p given in the form (2.4), consider the SDP in
(2.28). If the objective value at a feasible point (Y, y, z) is  ≥ 0, then p(y) ≤ p(x) + 2
3
,
∀x ∈ CRp.
Proof. Consider a feasible solution (Y, y, z) to (2.28). Let γ∗ be the infimum of p over CRp.
Observe that
−1
6
Tr(QY )− z
3
≤ γ∗.
This is because the SDPs in (2.28) and (2.26) have the same constraints, and the opti-
mal value of (2.26) is the negative of the optimal value of (2.25), which by construction
is a lower bound on γ∗. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 2.6.4, let D := Y − yyT ,
d :=
∑n
i=1 Tr(HiD)ei, and
δ := z − yT
(
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)
y − 2dTy − dT
(
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)+
d.
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We can then write:
1
6
Tr(QY ) +
z
3
=
1
6
Tr(QY ) +
z
3
−
n∑
i=1
(
1
2
Tr(HiY ) + e
T
i Qy + bi
)
yi
=
1
6
(
Tr(QyyT ) + Tr(QD)
)
+
1
3
(
yT
(
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)
y + 2dTy + dT
(
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)+
d+ δ
)
− 1
2
(
Tr
(
n∑
i=1
yiHiyy
T
)
+ Tr
(
n∑
i=1
yiHiD
))
− yTQy − bTy
= −1
6
n∑
i=1
yTyiHiy − 1
2
yTQy − bTy
+
1
6
Tr
((
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)
D
)
+
1
3
(
dT
(
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)+
d
)
+
δ
3
= −p(y) + 1
6
Tr
((
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)
D
)
+
1
3
(
dT
(
n∑
i=1
yiHi +Q
)+
d
)
+
δ
3
≤ −p(y) + 2
3
,
where the first equality is due to the first constraint in (2.28), and the last inequality follows
from the last equation of (2.30) with (Y ∗, y∗, z∗) replaced by (Y, y, z) and the fact that∑n
i=1 yiHi +Q and D are both psd matrices. We therefore conclude that
p(y)− 2
3
 ≤ −1
6
Tr(QY )− z
3
≤ γ∗.
We then have that p(y) ≤ p(x) + 2
3
,∀x ∈ CRp as desired.
2.7.2 Unregularized Third-Order Newton Methods
We end our chapter with an interesting application of the problem of finding a local minimum
of a cubic polynomial. Recall that Newton’s method for minimizing a twice-differentiable
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function proceeds by approximating the function with its second-order Taylor expansion at
the current iterate, and then moving to a critical point12 of this quadratic approximation. It is
natural to ask whether one can lower the iteration complexity of Newton’s method for three-
times-differentiable functions by using third-order information. An immediate difficulty,
however, is that the third-order Taylor expansion of a function around any point will not
be bounded below (unless the coefficients of all its cubic terms are zero). In previous work
(see, e.g. [78]), authors have gotten around this issue by adding a regularization term to the
third-order Taylor expansion. In future work, we aim to study an unregularized third-order
Newton method which in each iteration moves to a local minimum of the third-order Taylor
approximation by applying Algorithm 2. We would like to explore the convergence properties
of this algorithm and conditions under which the algorithm is well defined at every iteration.
As a first step, let us consider the univariate case. For a function f : R → R, the
iterations of (classical) Newton’s method read
xk+1 = xk − f
′(xk)
f ′′(xk)
. (2.32)
The update rule of a third-order Newton method, which in each iteration moves to the local
minimum of the third-order Taylor approximation, is given by
xk+1 = xk − f
′′(xk)−
√
f ′′(xk)2 − 2f ′(xk)f ′′′(xk)
f ′′′(xk)
. (2.33)
We have already observed that in some settings, these iterations can outperform the classical
Newton iterations. For example, consider the univariate function
f(x) = 20x arctan(x)− 10 log(1 + x2) + x2, (2.34)
12If the function to be minimized is convex, this critical point will be a global minimum of the quadratic
approximation.
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which is strongly convex and has a (unique) global minimum at x = 0, where f(x) = 0; see
Figure 2.5. The first three derivatives of this function are
f ′(x) = 20 arctan(x) + 2x,
f ′′(x) = 2 +
20
1 + x2
,
f ′′′(x) =
−40x
(1 + x2)2
.
One can show that the basin of attraction of the global minimum of f under the classical New-
ton iterations in (2.32) is approximately [−1.7121, 1.7121]. Starting Newton’s method with
|x0| ≥ 1.7122 results in the iterates eventually oscillating between ±13.4942. In contrast,
the iterates of our proposed third-order Newton method in (2.33) are globally convergent
to the global minimum of f . The iterations of both methods starting at x0 = 1.5 are com-
pared in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.5, showing faster convergence to the global minimum for the
third-order approach.
k xk f(xk)
0 1.5 19.9473
1 -.2327 .5910
2 -.0030 1.0014e-4
3 -8.3227e-9 1.4546e-15
4 2.3490e-9 1.1587e-16
k xk f(xk)
0 1.5 19.9473
1 -1.2786 15.1411
2 .8795 7.7329
3 -.3396 1.2477
4 .0230 .0058
Table 2.3: Iterations of the third-order Newton method (left) and the classical Newton
method (right) on the function f in (2.34) starting at x0 = 1.5.
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Figure 2.5: The plots of the function f in (2.34) and its second and third-order Taylor
expansions around x0 = 1.5. One can see that one iteration of the third-order Newton
method in (2.33) brings us closer the global minimum of f compared to one iteration of the
Newton method in (2.32).
In addition to potential benefits regarding convergence, we have also observed that the
behavior of the algorithm can be less sensitive to the initial condition when compared to
Newton’s method. As an example, we used Newton’s method to find the critical points
{1,−1, i,−i} of f(x) = x5 − 5x on the complex plane, using the iterates (2.32), (2.33), and
iterates given by
xk+1 = xk − f
′′(xk) +
√
f ′′(xk)2 − 2f ′(xk)f ′′′(xk)
f ′′′(xk)
, (2.35)
which can be interpreted as the iterates for moving to the local maximum of a third-order
approximation of f . For each of the three iterations, the plots below demonstrate which
initial conditions converge to the same critical point. As can be seen, sensitivity of Newton’s
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method to the initial condition demonstrates fractal behavior, while the third-order iterates
do not.
Figure 2.6: Sensitivity of the limits of the iterates (2.32), (2.33), and (2.35) respectively to
initial conditions. Regions with the same color denote initial conditions which converge to
the same critical point.
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Chapter 3
On the Complexity of Finding a Local
Minimizer of a Quadratic Function
over a Polytope
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter of the thesis, we consider quadratic programs, which are polynomial optimiza-
tion problems of the form (1.1) where the objective function p is quadratic and all constraint
functions qi are affine. Recall that a local minimum of a function f : Rn → R over a set
Ω ⊆ Rn is a point x¯ ∈ Ω for which there exists a scalar  > 0 such that p(x¯) ≤ p(x) for
all x ∈ Ω with ‖x − x¯‖ ≤ . In the case where p and all the constraint functions qi are
affine (i.e., linear programming), it is well known that a local minimum (which also has to
be a global minimum) can be found in polynomial time in the Turing model of computa-
tion [56, 57]. Perhaps the next simplest constrained optimization problems to consider are
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quadratic programs, which can be written as
min
x∈Rn
xTQx+ cTx
subject to aTi x ≤ bi,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(3.1)
where Q ∈ Rn×n, c, a1, . . . , am ∈ Rn, and b1, . . . , bm ∈ R. The matrix Q is taken without
loss of generality to be symmetric. When complexity questions about quadratic programs
are studied in the Turing model of computation, all these data are rational and the input
size is the total number of bits required to write them down. It is well known that finding
a global minimum of a quadratic program is NP-hard, even when the matrix Q has a single
negative eigenvalue [86]. It is therefore natural to ask whether one can instead find a local
minimum of a quadratic program efficiently. In fact, this precise question appeared in 1992
on a list of seven open problems in complexity theory for numerical optimization [87]:
“What is the complexity of finding even a local minimizer for nonconvex quadratic
programming, assuming the feasible set is compact? Murty and Kabadi (1987,
[75]) and Pardalos and Schnitger (1988, [85]) have shown that it is NP-hard to
test whether a given point for such a problem is a local minimizer, but that does
not rule out the possibility that another point can be found that is easily verified
as a local minimizer.”
A few remarks on the phrasing of this problem are in order. First, note that in this ques-
tion, the feasible set of the quadratic program is assumed to be compact (i.e., a polytope).
Therefore, there is no need to focus on the related and often prerequisite problem of deciding
the existence of a local minimum (since any global minimum e.g. is a local minimum). The
latter question makes sense in the case where the feasible set of the quadratic program is
unbounded; the complexity of this question is also addressed in this chapter (Theorem 3.2.5).
Second, as the quote points out, the question of finding a local minimum is also separate from
a complexity viewpoint from that of testing if a given point is a local minimum. This related
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question has been studied more extensively and its complexity has already been settled for
optimization problems whose objective and constraints are given by polynomial functions of
any degree; see [75, 85, 7].
To point out some of the subtle differences between these variations of the problem more
specifically, we briefly review the reduction of Murty and Kabadi [75], which shows the NP-
hardness of deciding if a given point is a local minimum of a quadratic program. In [75],
the authors show that the problem of deciding if a symmetric matrix Q is copositive—i.e.
whether xTQx ≥ 0 for all vectors x in the nonnegative orthant—is NP-hard. From this, it
is straightforward to observe that the problem of testing whether a given point is a local
minimum of a quadratic function over a polyhedron is NP-hard: Indeed, the origin is a local
minimum of xTQx over the nonnegative orthant if and only if the matrix Q is copositive.
However, it is not true that xTQx has a local minimum over the nonnegative orthant if and
only if Q is copositive. Although the “if” direction holds, the “only if” direction does not.
For example, consider the matrix
Q =
0 1
1 −2
 ,
which is clearly not copositive, even though the point (1, 0)T is a local minimum of xTQx
over the nonnegative orthant.
Our main results in this chapter are as follows. We show that unless P=NP, no
polynomial-time algorithm can find a point within Euclidean distance cn (for any constant
c ≥ 0) of a local minimum of an n-variate quadratic program with a bounded feasible
set (Theorem 3.2.6). See also Corollaries 3.2.7 and 3.2.8. To prove this, we show as an
intermediate step that deciding whether a quartic polynomial or a quadratic program has
a local minimum is strongly NP-hard1 (Theorems 3.2.1 and 3.2.5). Finally, we show that
1This implies that these problems remain NP-hard even if the bitsize of all numerical data are O(log n),
where n is the number of variables. For a strongly NP-hard problem, even a pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm—i.e., an algorithm whose running time is polynomial in the magnitude of the numerical data of
the problem but not necessarily in their bitsize—cannot exist unless P=NP. See [39] or [5, Section 2] for
more details.
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unless P=NP, there cannot be a polynomial-time algorithm that decides if a quadratic
program with a bounded feasible set has a unique local minimum and if so returns this
minimum (Theorem 3.2.9).
Overall, our results suggest that without additional problem structure, questions related
to finding local minima of quadratic programs are not easier (at least from a complexity
viewpoint) than those related to finding global minima. It also suggests that any efficient
heuristic that aims to find a local minimum of a quadratic program must necessarily fail on a
“significant portion” of instances; see e.g. Corollary 2.2 of [48] for a more formal complexity
theoretic statement.
3.1.1 Notation and Basic Definitions
For a vector x ∈ Rn, the notation x2 denotes the vector in Rn whose i-th entry is x2i , and
diag(x) denotes the diagonal n × n matrix whose i-th diagonal entry is xi. The notation
x ≥ 0 denotes that the vector x belongs to the nonnegative orthant, and for such a vector,
√
x denotes the vector in Rn whose i-th entry is √xi. For two matrices X, Y ∈ Rm×n, we
denote by X · Y the matrix in Rm×n whose (i, j)-th entry is XijYij. For vectors x, y ∈ Rn,
the notation yx (sometimes (y)x if there is room for confusion with other indices) denotes
the vector containing the entries of y where xi is nonzero in the same order (the length of yx
is hence equal to the number of nonzero entries in x). Similarly, for a vector x ∈ Rn and a
matrix Y ∈ Rn×n, the notation Yx (sometimes (Y )x if there is room for confusion with other
indices) denotes the principal submatrix of Y consisting of rows and columns of Y whose
indices correspond to indices of nonzero entries of x. The notation I (resp. J) refers to
the identity matrix (resp. the matrix of all ones); the dimension will be clear from context.
For a symmetric matrix M ∈ Rn×n, the notation M  0 (resp. M  0) denotes that M is
positive semidefinite (resp. positive definite), i.e. that it has nonnegative (resp. positive)
eigenvalues. As mentioned already, we say that M is copositve if xTMx ≥ 0,∀x ≥ 0. The
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simplex in Rn is denoted by ∆n := {x ∈ Rn | x ≥ 0,
∑n
i=1 xi = 1}. Finally, for a scalar c,
the notation dce denotes the ceiling of c, i.e. the smallest integer greater than or equal to c.
We recall that a form is a homogeneous polynomial; i.e. a polynomial whose monomials
all have the same degree. A form p : Rn → R is said to be nonnegative if p(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈ Rn,
and positive definite if p(x) > 0,∀x 6= 0. A critical point of a differentiable function f :
Rn → R is a point x ∈ Rn at which the gradient ∇f(x) is zero. A second-order point of a
twice-differentiable function f : Rn → R is a critical point x at which the Hessian matrix
∇2f(x) is positive semidefinite.
All graphs in this chapter are undirected, unweighted, and have no self-loops. The
adjacency matrix of a graph G on n vertices is the n × n symmetric matrix whose (i, j)-th
entry equals one if vertices i and j share an edge in G and zero otherwise. The complement
of a graph G, denoted by G¯, is the graph with the same vertex set as G and such that two
distinct vertices are adjacent if and only if they are not adjacent in G. An induced subgraph
of G is a graph containing a subset of the vertices of G and all edges connecting pairs of
vertices in that subset.
3.2 The Main Result
3.2.1 Complexity of Deciding Existence of Local minima
To show that a polynomial-time algorithm for finding a local minimum of a quadratic function
over a polytope (i.e., a bounded polyhedron) implies P = NP, we show as an intermediate
step that it is NP-hard to decide whether a quadratic program with an unbounded feasible
set has a local minimum (Theorem 3.2.5). To achieve this intermediate step, we first establish
the following hardness result.
Theorem 3.2.1. It is strongly NP-hard to decide if a degree-4 polynomial has a local mini-
mum.
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We will prove this theorem by presenting a polynomial-time reduction from the STABLE-
SET problem, which is known to be (strongly) NP-hard [39]. Recall that in the STABLESET
problem, we are given as input a graph G on n vertices and a positive integer r ≤ n. We are
then asked to decide whether G has a stable set of size r, i.e. a set of r pairwise non-adjacent
vertices. We denote the size of the largest stable set in a graph G by the standard notation
α(G). We also recall that a clique in a graph G is a set of pairwise adjacent vertices. The
size of the largest clique in G is denoted by ω(G). The following theorem of Motzkin and
Straus [74] relates ω(G) to the optimal value of a quadratic program.
Theorem 3.2.2 ([74]). Let G be a graph on n vertices with adjacency matrix A and clique
number ω. The optimal value of the quadratic program
max
x∈Rn
xTAx
subject to x ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
(3.2)
is 1− 1
ω
.
For a scalar k and a symmetric matrix A (which will always be an adjacency matrix),
the following notation will be used repeatedly in our proofs:
MA,k := kA+ kI − J, (3.3)
qA,k(x) := x
TMA,kx, (3.4)
and
pA,k(x) := (x
2)TMA,kx
2. (3.5)
Note that nonnegativity of the quadratic form qA,k over the nonnegative orthant is equivalent
to (global) nonnegativity of the quartic form pA,k and to copositivity of the matrix MA,k.
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The following corollary of Theorem 3.2.2 will be of more direct relevance to our proofs.
The first statement in the corollary has been observed e.g. by de Klerk and Pashechnik [35],
but its proof is included here for completeness. The second statement, which will also be
needed in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, follows straightforwardly.
Corollary 3.2.3. For a scalar k > 0 and a graph G with adjacency matrix A, the matrix
MA,k in (3.3) is copositive if and only if α(G) ≤ k. Furthermore, if α(G) < k, the quartic
form pA,k in (3.5) is positive definite.
2
Proof. First observe that α(G) = ω(G¯), and that the adjacency matrix of G¯ is J − A − I.
Thus from Theorem 3.2.2, the maximum value of xT (J − A − I)x over ∆n is 1 − 1α(G) , and
hence the minimum value of xT (A+ I)x over ∆n is
1
α(G)
. Therefore, for any k > 0, α(G) ≤ k
if and only if xT (A+I)x ≥ 1
k
for all x ∈ ∆n, which holds if and only if xT (k(A+I)−J)x ≥ 0
for all x ∈ ∆n. The first statement of the corollary then follows from the homogeneity of
xT (k(A+ I)− J)x.
To show that pA,k is positive definite when α(G) < k, observe that
kA+ kI − J = (α(G)(A+ I)− J) + (k − α(G))(A+ I).
Considering the two terms on the right separately, we observe that (x2)T (α(G)(A+I)−J)x2
(i.e., pA,α(G)) is nonnegative since MA,α(G) is copositive, and that (x
2)T (k − α(G))(A+ I)x2
is positive definite. Therefore, their sum (x2)T (kA+ kI − J)x2 is positive definite.
We now present the proof of Theorem 3.2.1. While the statement of the theorem is
given for degree-4 polynomials, it is straightforward to extend the result to higher-degree
polynomials. We note that degree four is the smallest degree for which deciding existence of
local minima is intractable. For degree-3 polynomials, it turns out that this question can be
answered by solving semidefinite programs of polynomial size [7].
2The converse of this statement also holds, but we do not need it for the proof of Theorem 3.2.1.
83
Proof (of Theorem 3.2.1). We present a polynomial-time reduction from the STABLESET
problem. Let a graph G on n vertices with adjacency matrix A and a positive integer r ≤ n
be given. We show that G has a stable set of size r if and only if the quartic form pA,r−0.5
defined in (3.5) has no local minimum. This is a consequence of the following more general
fact that we prove below: For a noninteger scalar k, the quartic form pA,k has no local
minimum if and only if α(G) ≥ k.
We first observe that if α(G) < k, then pA,k has a local minimum. Indeed, recall from the
second claim of Corollary 3.2.3 that under this assumption, pA,k is positive definite. Since
pA,k vanishes at the origin, it follows that the origin is a local minimum. Suppose now that
α(G) ≥ k. Since k is noninteger, this implies that α(G) > k. We show that in this case, pA,k
has no local minimum by showing that the origin must be the only second-order point of
pA,k. Since any local minimum of a polynomial is a second-order point, only the origin can
be a candidate local minimum for pA,k. However, by the first claim of Corollary 3.2.3, the
matrix MA,k is not copositive and hence pA,k is not nonnegative. As pA,k is homoegenous,
this implies that pA,k takes negative values arbitrarily close to the origin, ruling out the
possibility of the origin being a local minimum.
To show that when α(G) > k, the origin is the only second-order point of pA,k, we
compute the gradient and Hessian of pA,k. We have
∇pA,k(x) = 4x ·MA,kx2,
and
∇2pA,k(x) = 8MA,k · xxT + 4diag(MA,kx2).
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that pA,k has a nonzero second-order point x¯. Since x¯
is a critical point, ∇pA,k(x¯) = 0 and thus (MA,kx¯2)x¯ = 0. It then follows that
(∇2pA,k(x¯))x¯ = 8(MA,k)x¯ · x¯x¯x¯Tx¯ .
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Because ∇2pA,k(x¯)  0 and thus all its principal submatrices are positive semidefinite, we
have 8(MA,k)x¯ · x¯x¯x¯Tx¯  0. Since
(MA,k)x¯ · x¯x¯x¯Tx¯ = diag(x¯x¯)(MA,k)x¯diag(x¯x¯),
and since diag(x¯x¯) is an invertible matrix, it follows that (MA,k)x¯  0.
We now consider the induced subgraph Gx¯ of G with vertices corresponding to the indices
of the nonzero entries of x¯. Note that the adjacency matrix of Gx¯ is Ax¯. Furthermore, observe
that MAx¯,k = (MA,k)x¯, and therefore MAx¯,k is positive semidefinite and thus copositive. We
conclude from the first claim of Corollary 3.2.3 that α(Gx¯) ≤ k. We now claim that
MAx¯,kx¯
2
x¯ = (MA,k)x¯x¯
2
x¯ = (MA,kx¯
2)x¯ = 0.
The first equality follows from that MAx¯,k = (MA,k)x¯, the second from that the indices of
the nonzero entries of x¯ are the same as those of x¯2, and the third from that ∇pA,k(x¯) = 0.
Hence, pAx¯,k(x¯x¯) = 0. Since x¯x¯ is nonzero, pAx¯,k is not positive definite. By the second claim
of Corollary 3.2.3, we must have α(Gx¯) ≥ k. Therefore, α(Gx¯) = k. However, because k was
assumed to be noninteger, we have a contradiction.
It turns out that the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 also shows that it is NP-hard to decide if
a quartic polynomial has a strict local minimum. Recall that a strict local minimzer of a
function f : Rn → R over a set Ω ⊆ Rn is a point x¯ ∈ Ω for which there exists a scalar  > 0
such that p(x¯) < p(x) for all x ∈ Ω\x¯ with ‖x− x¯‖ ≤ .
Corollary 3.2.4. It is strongly NP-hard to decide if a degree-4 polynomial has a strict local
minimum.
Proof. Observe from the proof of Theorem 3.2.1 that for a graph G and a noninteger scalar
k, the quartic form pA,k has a local minimum if and only if α(G) < k. In the case where
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pA,k does have a local minimum, we showed that pA,k is positive definite, and thus the local
minimum (the origin) must be a strict local minimum.
We now turn our attention to local minima of quadratic programs.
Theorem 3.2.5. It is strongly NP-hard to decide if a quadratic function has a local minimum
over a polyhedron. The same is true for deciding if a quadratic function has a strict local
minimum over a polyhedron.
Proof. We present a polynomial-time reduction from the STABLESET problem to the prob-
lem of deciding if a quadratic function has a local minimum over a polyhedron. The reader
can check that same reduction is valid for the case of strict local minima.
Let a graph G on n vertices with adjacency matrix A and a positive integer r ≤ n
be given. Let k = r − 0.5, qA,k be the quadratic form defined in (3.4), and consider the
optimization problem
min
x∈Rn
qA,k(x)
subject to x ≥ 0.
(3.6)
We show that a point x ∈ Rn is a local minimum of (3.6) if and only if √x is a local minimum
of the quartic form pA,k defined in (3.5). By the arguments in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1,
we would have that (3.6) has no local minimum if and only if G has a stable set of size r.
Indeed, if x is not a local minimum of (3.6), there exists a sequence {yj} ⊆ Rn with
yj → x and such that for all j, yj ≥ 0 and qA,k(yj) < qA,k(x). The sequence {√yj} would
then satisfy pA,k(
√
yj) < pA,k(
√
x) and
√
yj →
√
x, proving that
√
x is not a local minimum
of pA,k. Similarly, if x is not a local minimum of pA,k, there exists a sequence {zj} ⊆ Rn such
that zj → x and pA,k(zj) < pA,k(x) for all j. The sequence {z2j } would then prove that x2 is
not a local minimum of (3.6).
86
3.2.2 Complexity of Finding a Local minimum of a Quadratic
Function Over a Polytope
We now address the original question posed by Pardalos and Vavasis concerning the com-
plexity of finding a local minimum of a quadratic program with a compact feasible set. Note
again that if the feasible set is compact, the existence of a local minimum is guaranteed.
In fact, there will always be a local minimum that has rational entries with polynomial
bitsize [109].
Theorem 3.2.6. If there is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a point within Euclidean
distance cn (for any constant c ≥ 0) of a local minimum of an n-variate quadratic function
over a polytope, then P = NP .
Proof. Fix any constant c ≥ 0. We show that if an algorithm could take as input a quadratic
program with a bounded feasible set and in polynomial time return a point within distance
cn of any local minimum, then this algorithm would solve the the STABLESET problem in
polynomial time.
Let a graph G on n vertices with adjacency matrix A and a positive integer r ≤ n be
given. Let k = r−0.5, qA,k be the quadratic form defined in (3.4), and consider the quadratic
program3
min
x∈Rn
qA,k(x)
subject to x ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
xi ≤ 3cn
√
n.
(3.7)
Note that the feasible set of this problem is bounded. Moreover, the number of bits required
to write down this quadratic program is polynomial in n. This is because the scalar 3cn
√
n
takes 2+ndlog2(c+1)e+ 12dlog2(n+1)e bits to write down, and the remaining O(n2) numbers
3Without loss of generality, we suppose that c is rational. If c is irrational, one can e.g. replace it in (3.7)
with dce.
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in the problem data are bounded in magnitude by n, so they each take O(log2(n)) bits to
write down.
We will show that if α(G) < k, the origin is the unique local minimum of (3.7), and that if
α(G) ≥ k (equivalently α(G) > k), any local minimum x¯ of (3.7) satisfies ∑ni=1 x¯i = 3cn√n.
Since the (Euclidean) distance from the origin to the hyperplane {x ∈ Rn|∑ni=1 xi = 3cn√n}
is 3cn, there is no point that is within distance cn of both the origin and this hyperplane.
Thus, the graph G has no stable set of size r (or equivalently α(G) < k) if and only if the
Euclidean norm of all points within distance cn of any local minimum of (3.7) is less than or
equal to cn.
To see why α(G) < k implies that the origin is the unique local minimum of (3.7), recall
from the second claim of Corollary 3.2.3 that the quartic form pA,k defined in (3.5) must be
positive definite. Thus, for any nonzero vector x ≥ 0, we have qA,k(x) > 0. This implies that
the origin is a local minimum of (3.7). Moreover, since qA,k is homogeneous, we have that
no other feasible point can be a local minimum. Indeed, for any nonzero vector x ≥ 0 and
any nonnegative scalar  < 1, qA,k(x) < qA,k(x).
To see why when α(G) > k, the last constraint of (3.7) must be tight at all local minima,
recall from the proof of Theorem 3.2.5 that when α(G) > k, the optimization problem in
(3.6) has no local minimum. Therefore, for any vector x that is feasible to (3.7) and satisfies∑n
i=1 xi < 3c
n
√
n, there exists a sequence {yi} ⊆ Rn with yi → x, and satisfying
yi ≥ 0,
n∑
i=1
yi < 3c
n
√
n, qA,k(yi) < qA,k(x),∀i.
As the points yi are feasible to (3.7), any vector x satisfying
∑n
i=1 xi < 3c
n
√
n cannot
be a local minimum of (3.7). Thus, if α(G) > k, any local minimum x¯ of (3.7) satisfies∑n
i=1 x¯i = 3c
n
√
n.
By replacing the quantity 3cn
√
n in the proof of Theorem 3.2.6 with 3nc+0.5 and 2n
respectively, we get the following two corollaries.
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Corollary 3.2.7. If there is a pseudo-polynomial time algorithm that finds a point within
Euclidean distance nc (for any constant c ≥ 0) of a local minimum of an n-variate quadratic
function over a polytope, then P = NP .
Corollary 3.2.8. If there is a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a point within Euclidean
distance 
√
n (for any constant  ∈ [0, 1)) of a local minimum of a restricted set of quadratic
programs over n variables whose numerical data are integers bounded in magnitude by 2n,
then P = NP .
In [87], Pardalos and Vavasis also propose two follow-up questions about quadratic pro-
grams with compact feasible sets. The first is about the complexity of finding a “KKT
point”. As is, our proof does not have any implications for this question since the origin is
always a KKT point of the quadratic programs that arise from our reductions. The second
question asks whether finding a local minimum is easier in the special case where the prob-
lem only has one local minimum (which is thus also the global minimum). Related to this
question, we can prove the following claim.
Theorem 3.2.9. If there is a polynomial-time algorithm which decides whether a quadratic
program with a bounded feasible set has a unique local minimum, and if so returns this
minimum4, then P=NP.
Proof. Suppose there was such an algorithm (call it Algorithm U). We show that Algo-
rithm U would solve the STABLESET problem in polynomial time. Let a graph G on n
vertices with adjacency matrix A and a positive integer r ≤ n be given, and input the
quadratic program (3.7), with k = r − 0.5, into Algorithm U. Observe from the proof of
Theorem 3.2.6 that there are three possibilities for this quadratic program: (i) the origin is
the unique local minimum, (ii) there is a unique local minimum and it is on the hyperplane
{x ∈ Rn|∑ni=1 xi = 3cn√n}, and (iii) there are multiple local minima and they are all on
the hyperplane {x ∈ Rn|∑ni=1 xi = 3cn√n}. Case (i) indicates that α(G) < k, and the
4This unique local (and therefore global) minimum is guaranteed to have rational entries with polynomial
bitsize; see [109].
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output of Algorithm U in this case would be the origin. Cases (ii) and (iii) both indicate
that α(G) > k. The output of Algorithm U is a point away from the origin in case (ii), and
the declaration that the local minimum is not unique in case (iii). Thus Algorithm U would
reveal which case we are in, and that would allow us to decide if G has a stable set of size r
in polynomial time.
To conclude, we have established intractability of several problems related to local minima
of quadratic programs. We hope our results motivate more research on identifying classes of
quadratic programs where local minima can be found more efficiently than global minima.
One interesting example is the case of the concave knapsack problem, where More´ and
Vavasis [72] show that a local minimum can be found in polynomial time even though,
unless P=NP, a global minimum cannot.
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Chapter 4
On Attainment of the Optimal Value
in Polynomial Optimization
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we again consider problems of the form
inf
x
p(x)
subject to qi(x) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(4.1)
where p, qi are polynomial functions, and address the problem of testing whether the optimal
value is attained, provided that the optimal value p∗ is finite. More formally, does there exist
a feasible point x∗ such that p(x∗) = p∗? Such a point x∗ will be termed an optimal solution.
For this chapter, we will refer to sets of the type {x ∈ Rn | qi(x) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} as
closed basic semialgebraic sets.
Existence of optimal solutions is a fundamental question in optimization and its study
has a long history, dating back to the nineteenth century with the extreme value theorem of
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Bolzano and Weierstrass.1 The question of testing attainment of the optimal value for POPs
has appeared in the literature explicitly. For example, Nie, Demmel, and Sturmfels describe
an algorithm for globally solving an unconstrained POP which requires as an assumption
that the optimal value be attained [84]. This leads them to make the following remark in
their conclusion section:
“This assumption is non-trivial, and we do not address the (important and diffi-
cult) question of how to verify that a given polynomial f(x) has this property.”
Prior literature on existence of optimal solutions to POPs has focused on identifying
cases where existence is always guaranteed. The best-known result here is the case of linear
programming (i.e., when the degrees of p and qi are one). In this case, the optimal value of
the problem is always attained. This result was extended by Frank and Wolfe to the case
where p is quadratic and the polynomials qi are linear [38]. Consequently, results concerning
attainment of the optimal value are sometimes referred to as “Frank-Wolfe type” theorems
in the literature [17, 68]. Andronov et al. showed that the same statement holds again when
p is cubic (and the polynomials qi are linear) [10].
Our results in this chapter show that in all other cases, it is strongly NP-hard to de-
termine whether a polynomial optimization problem attains its optimal value. This implies
that unless P=NP, there is no polynomial-time (or even pseudo-polynomial time) algorithm
for checking this property. Nevertheless, it follows from the Tarski-Seidenberg quantifier
elimination theory [100, 105] that this problem is decidable, i.e., can be solved in finite time.
There are also probabilistic algorithms that test for attainment of the optimal value of a
POP [43, 44], but their complexities are exponential in the number of variables.
In this chapter, we also study the complexity of testing several well-known sufficient con-
ditions for attainment of the optimal value (see Section 4.1.1 below). One sufficient condition
that we do not consider but that is worth noting is for the polynomials p,−q1, . . . ,−qm to
1To remove possible confusion, we emphasize that our focus in this chapter is not on the complexity of
testing feasibility or unboundedness of problem (4.1), which have already been studied extensively. On the
contrary, all optimization problems that we consider are by construction feasible and bounded below.
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all be convex (see [17] for a proof, [68] for the special case where p and qi are quadratics, and
[20] for other extensions). The reason we exclude this sufficient condition from our study is
that the complexity of checking convexity of polynomials has already been analyzed in [3].
4.1.1 Organization and Contributions of the Chapter
As mentioned before, this chapter concerns itself with the complexity of testing attainment
of the optimal value of a polynomial optimization problem. More specifically, we show in
Section 4.2 that it is strongly NP-hard to test attainment when the objective function has
degree 4, even in absence of any constraints (Theorem 4.2.1), and when the constraints are
of degree 2, even when the objective is linear (Theorem 4.2.2).
In Section 4.3, we show that several well-known sufficient conditions for attainment of
the optimal value in a POP are also strongly NP-hard to test. These include coercivity of
the objective function (Theorem 4.3.1), closedness of a bounded feasible set (Theorem 4.3.2
and Remark 4.3.1), boundedness of a closed feasible set (Corollary 4.3.3), a robust analogue
of compactness known as stable compactness (Corollary 4.3.5), and an algebraic certificate
of compactness known as the Archimedean property (Theorem 4.3.8). The latter property is
of independent interest to the convergence of the Lasserre hierarchy, as discussed in Section
4.3.2.
In Section 4.4, we give semidefinite programming (SDP) based hierarchies for testing
compactness of the feasible set and coercivity of the objective function of a POP (Proposi-
tions 4.4.1 and 4.4.2). The hierarchy for compactness comes from a straightforward appli-
cation of Stengle’s Positivstellensatz (cf. Theorem 4.3.7), but the one for coercivity requires
us to develop a new characterization of coercive polynomials (Theorem 4.4.3). We end the
chapter in Section 4.5 with a summary and some brief concluding remarks.
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4.2 NP-hardness of Testing Attainment of the Optimal
Value
In this section, we show that testing attainment of the optimal value of a polynomial opti-
mization problem is NP-hard. Throughout this chapter, when we study complexity questions
around problem (4.1), we fix the degrees of all polynomials involved and think of the number
of variables and the coefficients of these polynomials as input. Since we are working in the
Turing model of computation, all the coefficients are rational numbers and the input size can
be taken to be the total number of bits needed to represent the numerators and denominators
of these coefficients.
Our proofs of hardness are based on reductions from ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT which is
known to be NP-hard [99]. Recall that in ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT, we are given a 3SAT
instance (i.e., a collection of clauses, where each clause consists of exactly three literals, and
each literal is either a variable or its negation) and we are asked to decide whether there
exists a {0, 1} assignment to the variables that makes the expression true with the additional
property that each clause has exactly one true literal.
Theorem 4.2.1. Testing whether a degree-4 polynomial attains its unconstrained infimum
is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Consider a ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT instance φ with n variables x1, . . . , xn, and k
clauses. Let sφ(x) : Rn → R be defined as
sφ(x) =
k∑
i=1
(φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)
2 +
n∑
i=1
(1− x2i )2, (4.2)
where φit = xj if the t-th literal in the i-th clause is xj, and φit = −xj if it is ¬xj (i.e., the
negation of xj). Now, let
pφ(x, y, z, λ) := λ
2sφ(x) + (1− λ)2(y2 + (yz − 1)2), (4.3)
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where y, z, λ ∈ R. We show that pφ achieves its infimum if and only if φ is satisfiable. Note
that the reduction is polynomial in length and the coefficients of pφ are at most a constant
multiple of n+ k in absolute value.
If φ has a satisfying assignment, then for any y and z, letting λ = 1, xi = 1 if the variable
is true in that assignment and xi = −1 if it is false, results in a zero of pφ. As pφ is a sum
of squares and hence nonnegative, we have shown that it achieves its infimum.
Now suppose that φ is not satisfiable. We will show that pφ is positive everywhere but
gets arbitrarily close to zero. To see the latter claim, simply set λ = 0, z = 1
y
, and let y → 0.
To see the former claim, suppose for the sake of contradiction that pφ has a zero. Since
y2 + (yz−1)2 is always positive, we must have λ = 1 in order for the second term to be zero.
Then, in order for the whole expression to be zero, we must also have that sφ(x) must vanish
at some x. But any zero of sφ must have each x ∈ {−1, 1}n, due to the second term of sφ.
However, because the instance φ is not satisfiable, for any such x, there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k}
such that φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1 6= 0, as there must be a clause where not exactly one literal is
set to one. This means that sφ is positive everywhere, which is a contradiction.
We have thus shown that testing attainment of the optimal value is NP-hard for uncon-
strained POPs where the objective is a polynomial of degree 6. In the interest of minimality,
we now extend the proof to apply to an objective function of degree 4. To do this, we first
introduce n+ 1 new variables χ1, . . . , χn and w. We replace every occurrence of the product
λxi in λ
2sφ with the variable χi. For example, the term λ
2x1x2 would become χ1χ2. Let
sˆφ(x, χ, λ) denote this transformation on λ
2sφ(x). Note that sˆφ(x, χ, λ) is now a quartic
polynomial. Now consider the quartic polynomial (whose coefficients are again at most a
constant multiple of n+ k in absolute value)
pˆφ(x, y, z, λ, χ, w) = sˆφ(x, χ, λ) + (1−λ)2(y2 + (w−1)2) + (w− yz)2 +
n∑
i=1
(χi−λixi)2. (4.4)
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Observe that pˆφ is a sum of squares as sˆφ can be verified to be a sum of squares by bringing
λ inside every squared term of sφ. Hence, pˆφ is nonnegative. Furthermore, its infimum is
still zero, as the choice of variables λ = 0, w = 1, χ = 0, x arbitrary, z = 1
y
, and letting y → 0
will result in arbitrarily small values of pˆφ. Now it remains to show that this polynomial
will have a zero if and only if pφ in (4.3) has a zero. Observe that if (x, y, z, λ) is a zero of
pφ, then (x, y, z, λ, λx, yz) is a zero of pˆφ. Conversely, if (x, y, z, λ, χ, w) is a zero of pˆφ, then
(x, y, z, λ) is a zero of pφ.
Remark 4.2.1. Because we use the ideas behind this reduction repeatedly in the remainder
of this chapter, we refer to the quartic polynomial defined in (4.2) as sφ throughout. The
same convention for φit relating the literals of φ to the variables x will be assumed as well.
We next show that testing attainment of the optimal value of a POP is NP-hard when the
objective function is linear and the constraints are quadratic. Together with the previously-
known Frank-Wolfe type theorems which we reviewed in the introduction, Theorems 4.2.1
and 4.2.2 characterize the complexity of testing attainment of the optimal value in polynomial
optimization problems of any given degree. Indeed, our reductions can trivially be extended
to the case where the constraints or the objective have higher degrees. For example to
increase the degree of the constraints to some positive integer d, one can introduce a new
variable γ along with the trivial constraint γd = 0. To increase the degree of the objective
from four to a higher degree 2d, one can again introduce a new variable γ and add the term
γ2d to the objective function.
Theorem 4.2.2. Testing whether a degree-1 polynomial attains its infimum on a feasible set
defined by degree-2 inequalities is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Consider a ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT instance φ with n variables and k clauses. Define
the following POP, with x, χ ∈ Rn and λ, y, z, w, γ, ζ, ψ ∈ R:
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min
x,χ,λ,y,z,w,γ,ζ,ψ
γ (4.5)
subject to γ ≥ λ
n∑
i=1
χi + (1− λ)(ψ + ζ) (4.6)
1− x2i = 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (4.7)
χi = (φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)
2, ∀i ∈ {1, ..., k}, (4.8)
ψ = y2, (4.9)
yz = w, (4.10)
ζ = (w − 1)2, (4.11)
λ(1− λ) = 0. (4.12)
We show that the infimum of this POP is attained if and only if φ is satisfiable. Note
first that the objective value is always nonnegative because of (4.6) and in view of (4.8),
(4.9), (4.11), and (4.12). Observe that if φ has a satisfying assignment, then letting xi = 1
if the variable is true in that assignment and xi = −1 if it is false, along with λ = 1, y and z
arbitrary, ψ = y2, w = yz, and ζ = (w − 1)2, results in a feasible solution with an objective
value of 0.
If φ is not satisfiable, the objective value can be made arbitrarily close to zero by taking
an arbitrary x ∈ {−1, 1}n, χi accordingly to satisfy (4.8), λ = 0, ψ = y2, z = 1y , w = 1, ζ = 0,
and letting y → 0. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a feasible solution
to the POP with γ = 0. As argued before, because of the constraints (4.8), (4.9), (4.11), and
(4.12), λ
∑n
i=1 χi + (1− λ)(ψ+ ζ) is always nonnegative, and so for γ to be exactly zero, we
need to have
λ
n∑
i=1
χi + (1− λ)(ψ + ζ) = 0.
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From (4.12), either λ = 0 or λ = 1. If λ = 1, then we must have χi = 0,∀i = 1, . . . , n, which
is not possible as φ is not satisfiable. If λ = 0, then we must have ψ+ ζ = y2 +(yz−1)2 = 0,
which cannot happen as this would require y = 0 and yz = 1 concurrently.
4.3 NP-hardness of Testing Sufficient Conditions for
Attainment
Arguably, the two best-known sufficient conditions under which problem (4.1) attains its
optimal value are compactness of the feasible set and coercivity of the objective function.
In this section, we show that both of these properties are NP-hard to test for POPs of low
degree. We also prove that certain stronger conditions, namely the Archimedean property of
the quadratic module associated with the constraints and stable compactness of the feasible
set, are NP-hard to test.
4.3.1 Coercivity of the Objective Function
A function p : Rn → R is coercive if for every sequence {xk} such that ‖xk‖ → ∞, we have
p(xk) → ∞. It is well known that a continuous coercive function achieves its infimum on a
closed set (see, e.g., Appendix A.2 of [19]). This is because all sublevel sets of continuous
coercive functions are compact.
Theorem 4.3.1. Testing whether a degree-4 polynomial is coercive is strongly NP-hard.
Proof. Consider a ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT instance φ with n variables and k clauses, and the
associated quartic polynomial sφ(x) as in (4.2). Let sφh : Rn+1 → R be the homogenization
of this polynomial:
sφh(x0, x) := x
4
0sφ
(
x
x0
)
=
k∑
i=1
x20(φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + x0)
2 +
n∑
i=1
(x20 − x2i )2. (4.13)
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By construction, sφh is a homogeneous polynomial of degree 4. We show that sφh is coercive
if and only if φ is not satisfiable.
Suppose first that the instance φ has a satisfying assignment xˆ ∈ {−1, 1}n. Then it is
easy to see that sφh(1, xˆ) = 0. As sφh is homogeneous, sφh(α, αxˆ) = 0 for all α, showing that
sφh is not coercive.
Now suppose that φ is not satisfiable. We show that sφh is positive definite (i.e.,
sφh(x0, x) > 0 for all (x0, x) 6= (0, 0)). This would then imply that sφh is coercive as
sφh(x0, x) = ||(x0, x)T ||4 · sφh
(
(x0, x)
||(x0, x)T ||
)
≥ µ||(x0, x)T ||4,
where µ > 0 is defined as the minimum of sφh on the unit sphere:
µ = min
(x0,x)∈Sn
sφh(x0, x).
Suppose that sφh was not positive definite. Then there exists a point (xˆ0, xˆ) 6= (0, 0) such
that sφh(xˆ0, xˆ) = 0. First observe xˆ0 cannot be zero due to the (x0 − xi)2 terms in (4.13).
As xˆ0 6= 0, then, by homogeneity, the point (1, xˆxˆ0 ) is a zero of sφh as well. This however
implies that sφ(xˆ) = 0, which we have previously argued (cf. the proof of Theorem 4.2.1) is
equivalent to satisfiability of φ, hence a contradiction.
We remark that the above hardness result is minimal in the degree as odd-degree poly-
nomials are never coercive and a quadratic polynomial xTQx+bTx+c is coercive if and only
if the matrix Q is positive definite, a property that can be checked in polynomial time (e.g.,
by checking positivity of the leading principal minors of Q).
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4.3.2 Closedness and Boundedness of the Feasible Set
The well-known Bolzano-Weierstrass extreme value theorem states that the infimum of a
continuous function on a compact (i.e., closed and bounded) set is attained. In this section,
we show that testing closedness or boundedness of a basic semialgebraic set defined by
degree-2 inequalities is NP-hard. Once again, these hardness results are minimal in degree
since these properties can be tested in polynomial time for sets defined by affine inequalities,
as we describe next.
To check boundedness of a set P := {x ∈ Rn | aTi x ≥ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m} defined by affine
inequalities, one can first check that P is nonempty, and if it is, for each i minimize and
maximize xi over P . Note that P is unbounded if and only if at least one of these 2n
linear programs is unbounded, which can be certified e.g. by detecting infeasibility of the
corresponding dual problem. Thus, boundedness of P can be tested by solving 2n+ 1 linear
programming feasibility problems, which can be done in polynomial time.
To check closedness of a set P := {x ∈ Rn | aTi x ≥ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m, cTj x > dj, j = 1, . . . , r},
one can for each j minimize cTj x over {x ∈ Rn | aTi x ≥ bi, i = 1, . . . ,m} and declare that P is
closed if and only if all of the respective optimal values are greater than dj. Thus, closedness
of P can be tested by solving r linear programs, which can be done in polynomial time.
Theorem 4.3.2. Given a set of quadratic polynomials qi, i = 1, . . . ,m, tj, j = 1, . . . , r, it is
strongly NP-hard to test whether the basic semialgebraic set
{x ∈ Rn| qi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, tj(x) > 0, j = 1, . . . , r}
is closed2.
2Note that m is not fixed in this statement or in Corollaries 4.3.3 and 4.3.5 below.
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Proof. Consider a ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT instance φ with n variables and k clauses. Let φij
be as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 and consider the set
Sφ =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rn+1| (φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)y = 0, i = 1, . . . , k, 1− x2j = 0, j = 1, . . . , n, y < 1
}
.
(4.14)
We show that Sφ is closed if and only if the instance φ is not satisfiable. To see this, first
note that we can rewrite Sφ as
Sφ =
{
{−1, 1}n × {0}
}
∪
{
{x ∈ Rn| sφ(x) = 0} × {y ∈ R| y < 1}
}
,
where sφ is as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1. If φ is not satisfiable, then Sφ = {−1, 1}n×{0},
which is closed. If φ is satisfiable, then {x ∈ Rn| sφ(x) = 0} is nonempty and
{x ∈ Rn| sφ(x) = 0} × {y ∈ R| y < 1}
is not closed and not a subset of {−1, 1}n × {0}. This implies that Sφ is not closed.
Remark 4.3.1. We note that the problem of testing closedness of a basic semialgebraic set
remains NP-hard even if one has a promise that the set is bounded. Indeed, one can add
the constraint y ≥ −1 to the set Sφ in (4.14) to make it bounded and this does not change
the previous proof.
Corollary 4.3.3. Given a set of quadratic polynomials qi, i = 1, . . . ,m, it is strongly NP-
hard to test whether the set
{x ∈ Rn| qi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m}
is bounded.
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Proof. Consider a ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT instance φ with n variables and k clauses. Let φij
be as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 and consider the set
S =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rn+1| (φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)y = 0, i = 1, . . . , k, 1− x2j = 0, j = 1, . . . , n
}
.
This set is bounded if and only if φ is not satisfiable. One can see this by following the
proof of Theorem 4.3.2 and observing that y will be unbounded in the satisfiable case, and
only 0 otherwise.
Note that it follows immediately from either of the results above that testing compactness
of a basic semialgebraic set is NP-hard. We end this subsection by establishing the same
hardness result for a sufficient condition for compactness that has featured in the literature
on polynomial optimization (see, e.g., [69], [84, Section 7]).
Definition 4.3.4. A closed basic semialgebraic set S = {x ∈ Rn| qi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m} is
stably compact if there exists  > 0 such that the set {x ∈ Rn| δi(x)+qi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m}
is compact for any set of polynomials δi having degree at most that of qi and coefficients at
most  in absolute value.
Intuitively, a closed basic semialgebraic set is stably compact if it remains compact under
small perturbations of the coefficients of its defining polynomials. A stably compact set is
clearly compact, though the converse is not true as shown by the set
S =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2| (x1 − x2)4 + (x1 + x2)2 ≤ 1
}
.
Indeed, this set is contained inside the unit disk, but for  > 0, the set
S =
{
(x1, x2) ∈ R2| (x1 − x2)4 − x41 + (x1 + x2)2 ≤ 1
}
is unbounded as its defining polynomial tends to −∞ along the line x1 = x2.
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Section 5 of [69] shows that the set S in Definition 4.3.4 is stably compact if and only if
the function
q(x) = max
i,j
{−qij(x)}
is positive on the unit sphere. Here, qij(x) is a homogenenous polynomial that contains all
terms of degree j in qi(x). Perhaps because of this characterization, the same section in [69]
remarks that “stable compactness is easier to check than compactness”, though as far as
polynomial-time checkability is concerned, we show that the situation is no better.
Corollary 4.3.5. Given a set of quadratic polynomials qi, i = 1, . . . ,m, it is strongly NP-
hard to test whether the set
{x ∈ Rn| qi(x) = 0, i = 1, . . . ,m}
is stably compact.
Proof. Consider a ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT instance φ with n variables and k clauses. Let φij
be as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 and consider the set
Tφ =
{
(x0, x) ∈ Rn+1| (φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + x0)2 = 0, i = 1, . . . , k, x20 − x2j = 0, j = 1, . . . , n
}
.
We show that the function
qφ(x0, x) = max
i=1,...,k,j=1,...,n
{−(φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + x0)2, (φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + x0)2, x20 − x2j , x2j − x20}
is positive on the unit sphere if and only if the instance φ is not satisfiable. Suppose first
that φ is not satisfiable and assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a point (x0, x)
on the sphere such that qφ(x0, x) = 0. This implies that φi1 +φi2 +φi3 +x0 = 0,∀i = 1, . . . , k
and x20 = x
2
j ,∀j = 1, . . . , n. Hence, x0 6= 0 and xx0 is a satisfying assignment to φ, which is
a contradiction. Suppose now that φ has a satisfying assignment xˆ ∈ {−1, 1}n. Then it is
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easy to check that
qφ
(
(1, xˆ)
||(1, xˆ)T ||
)
= 0.
The Archimedean Property
An algebraic notion closely related to compactness is the so-called Archimedean property.
This notion has frequently appeared in recent literature at the interface of algebraic geometry
and polynomial optimization. The Archimedean property is the assumption needed for
the statement of Putinar’s Positivstellensatz [92] and convergence of the Lasserre hierarchy
[61]. In this subsection, we recall the definition of the Archimedean property and study the
complexity of checking it. To our knowledge, the only previous result in this direction is
that testing the Archimedean property is decidable [111, Section 3.3].
Recall that the quadratic module associated with a set of polynomials q1, . . . , qm is the
set of polynomials that can be written as
σ0(x) +
m∑
i=1
σi(x)qi(x),
where σ0, . . . , σm are sum of squares polynomials.
Definition 4.3.6. A quadratic module Q is Archimedean if there exists a scalar R > 0 such
that R−∑ni=1 x2i ∈ Q.
Several equivalent characterizations of this property can be found in [63, Theorem 3.17].
Note that a set {x ∈ Rn| qi(x) ≥ 0} for which the quadratic module associated with the
polynomials {qi} is Archimedean is compact. However, the converse is not true. For example,
for n > 1, the sets
{
x ∈ Rn| x1 − 1
2
≥ 0, . . . , xn − 1
2
≥ 0, 1−
n∏
i=1
xi ≥ 0
}
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are compact but not Archimedean; see [63], [91] for a proof of the latter claim. Hence,
hardness of testing the Archimedean property does not follow from hardness of testing com-
pactness.
As mentioned previously, the Archimedean property has received recent attention in the
optimization community due to its connection to the Lasserre hierarchy. Indeed, under
the assumption that the quadratic module associated with the defining polynomials of the
feasible set of (4.1) is Archimedean, the Lasserre hierarchy [61] produces a sequence of
SDP-based lower bounds that converge to the optimal value of the POP. Moreover, Nie has
shown [82] that under the Archimedean assumption, convergence happens in a finite number
of rounds generically. One way to ensure the Archimedean property—assuming that we know
that our feasible set is contained in a ball of radius R— is to add the redundant constraint
R2 ≥ ∑ni=1 x2i to the constraints of (4.1). This approach however increases the size of the
SDP that needs to be solved at each level of the hierarchy. Moreover, such a scalar R may
not be readily available for some applications.
Our proof of NP-hardness of testing the Archimedean property will be based on showing
that the specific sets that arise from the proof of Corollary 4.3.3 are compact if and only if
their corresponding quadratic modules are Archimedean. Our proof technique will use the
Stengle’s Positivstellensatz, which we recall next.
Theorem 4.3.7 (Stengle’s Positivstellensatz [103]). A basic semialgebraic set
S := {x ∈ Rn| qi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m, rj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , k}
is empty if and only if there exist sos polynomials σc1,...,cm and polynomials ti such that
−1 =
k∑
j=1
tjrj +
∑
c1,...,cm∈{0,1}m
σc1,...,cm(x)Π
m
i=1qi(x)
ci .
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Remark 4.3.2. Note that if only equality constraints are considered, the second term on the
right hand side is a single sos polynomial σ0,...,0. In the next theorem, we only need this
special case, which is also known as the Real Nullstellensatz [59].
Theorem 4.3.8. Given a set of quadratic polynomials q1, . . . , qm, it is strongly NP-hard to
test whether their quadratic module has the Archimedean property.
Proof. Consider a ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT instance φ with n variables and k clauses. Let φij
be as in the proof of Theorem 4.2.1 and consider the set of quadratic polynomials
{
(φi1 + φi2 + φi3)y,−(φi1 + φi2 + φi3)y, i = 1, . . . , k; 1− x2j , x2j − 1, j = 1, . . . , n
}
.
We show that the quadratic module associated with these polynomials is Archimedean
if and only if φ is not satisfiable. First observe that if φ is satisfiable, then the quadratic
module cannot be Archimedean as the set
S =
{
(x, y) ∈ Rn+1| (φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)y = 0, i = 1, . . . , k, 1− x2j = 0, j = 1, . . . , n
}
is not compact (see the proof of Corollary 4.3.3).
Now suppose that the instance φ is not satisfiable. We need to show that for some scalar
R > 0 and some sos polynomials σ0, σ1, . . . , σk, σˆ1, . . . , σˆk,τ1, . . . , τn,τˆ1, . . . , τˆn, we have
R−
n∑
i=1
x2i − y2 = σ0(x, y) +
k∑
i=1
σi(x, y)(φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)y
+
k∑
i=1
σˆi(x, y)(−φi1 − φi2 − φi3 − 1)y +
n∑
j=1
τj(x, y)(1− x2j) +
n∑
j=1
τˆj(x, y)(x
2
j − 1).
Since any polynomial can be written as the difference of two sos polynomials (see, e.g., [4,
Lemma 1]), this is equivalent to existence of a scalar R > 0, an sos polynomial σ0, and some
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polynomials v1, . . . , vk, t1, . . . , tn such that
R−
n∑
i=1
x2i − y2 = σ0(x, y) +
k∑
i=1
vi(x, y)(φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)y +
n∑
j=1
tj(x, y)(1− x2j). (4.15)
First, note that
n−
n∑
i=1
x2i =
n∑
i=1
(1− x2i ). (4.16)
Secondly, as φ is not satisfiable, we know that the set
{x ∈ Rn| 1− x2j = 0, j = 1, . . . , n, φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1 = 0, i = 1, . . . , k}
is empty. From Stengle’s Positivstellensatz, it follows that there exist an sos polynomial σ˜0
and some polynomials v˜1, . . . , v˜k, t˜1, . . . , t˜n such that
−1 = σ˜0(x) +
k∑
i=1
v˜i(x)(φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1) +
n∑
j=1
t˜j(x)(1− x2j).
Multiplying this identity on either side by y2, we obtain:
−y2 = y2σ˜0(x) +
k∑
i=1
v˜i(x)y · (φi1 + φi2 + φi3 + 1)y +
n∑
j=1
t˜j(x)y
2(1− x2j). (4.17)
Note that if we sum (4.16) and (4.17) and take R = n, σ0(x, y) = y
2σ˜0(x), vi(x, y) = yv˜i(x)
for all i = 1, . . . , k, and tj(x, y) = y
2 · t˜j(x) + 1 for all j = 1, . . . , n, we recover (4.15).
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4.4 Algorithms for Testing Attainment of the Optimal
Value
In this section, we give a hierarchy of sufficient conditions for compactness of a closed basic
semialgebraic set, and a hierarchy of sufficient conditions for coercivity of a polynomial.
These hierarchies are amenable to semidefinite programming (SDP) as they all involve, in
one way or another, a search over the set of sum of squares polynomials. The connection
between SDP and sos polynomials is well known: recall that a polynomial σ of degree
2d is sos if and only if there exists a symmetric positive semidefinite matrix Q such that
σ(x) = z(x)TQz(x) for all x, where z(x) here is the standard vector of monomials of degree
up to d in the variables x (see, e.g. [88]).
The hierarchies that we present are such that if the property in question (i.e., compactness
or coercivity) is satisfied on an input instance, then some level of the SDP hierarchy will be
feasible and provide a certificate that the property is satisfied. The test for compactness is a
straightforward application of Stengle’s Positivstellensatz, but the test for coercivity requires
a new characterization of this property, which we give in Theorem 4.4.3.
4.4.1 Compactness of the Feasible Set
Consider a closed basic semialgebraic set
S := {x ∈ Rn| qi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m},
where the polynomials qi have integer coefficients
3 and are of degree at most d. A result of
Basu and Roy [16, Theorem 3] implies that if S is bounded, then it must be contained in a
3If some of the coefficients of the polynomials qi are rational (but not integer), we can make them integers
by clearing denominators without changing the set S.
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ball of radius
R∗ :=
√
n
(
(2d+ 1)(2d)n−1 + 1
)
2(2d+1)(2d)
n−1(2nd+2)(2τ+bit((2d+1)(2d)n−1)+(n+1)bit(d+1)+bit(m)),
(4.18)
where τ is the largest bitsize of any coefficient of any qi, and bit(η) denotes the bitsize of η.
With this result in mind, the following proposition is an immediate consequence of Sten-
gle’s Positivstellensatz (c.f. Theorem 4.3.7) after noting that the set S is bounded if and
only if the set
{x ∈ Rn| qi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m,
n∑
i=1
x2i ≥ R∗ + 1}
is empty.
Proposition 4.4.1. Consider a closed basic semialgebraic set S := {x ∈ Rn| qi(x) ≥ 0,
i = 1, . . . ,m}, where the polynomials qi have integer coefficients and are of degree at most d.
Let R∗ be as in (4.18) and let q0(x) =
∑n
i=1 x
2
i − R∗ − 1. Then the set S is compact if and
only if there exist sos polynomials σh0,...,hm such that
−1 =
∑
h0,...,hm∈{0,1}m+1
σh0,...,hm(x)Π
m
i=0qi(x)
hi .
This proposition naturally yields the following semidefinite programming-based hierarchy
indexed by a nonnegative integer r:
min
σh0,...,hm
0
subject to − 1 =
∑
h0,...,hm∈{0,1}m+1
σh0,...,hm(x)Π
m
i=0qi(x)
hi ,
σh0,...,hm is sos and has degree ≤ 2r.
(4.19)
Note that for a fixed level r, one is solving a semidefinite program whose size is polynomial
in the description of S. If for some r the SDP is feasible, then we have an algebraic certificate
of compactness of the set S. Conversely, as Proposition 4.4.1 implies, if S is compact, then
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the above SDP will be feasible for some level r∗. One can upper bound r∗ by a function
of n,m, and d only using the main theorem of [66]. This bound is however very large and
mainly of theoretical interest.
4.4.2 Coercivity of the Objective Function
It is well known that the infimum of a continuous coercive function over a closed set is
attained. This property has been widely studied, even in the case of polynomial functions;
see e.g. [14, 13, 53]. A simple sufficient condition for coercivity of a polynomial p is for
its terms of highest order to form a positive definite (homogeneous) polynomial; see, e.g.,
[53, Lemma 4.1]. One can give a hierarchy of SDPs to check for this condition as is done
in [53, Section 4.2]. However, this condition is sufficient but not necessary for coercivity.
For example, the polynomial x41 + x
2
2 is coercive, but its top homogeneous component is
not positive definite. Theorem 4.4.3 below gives a necessary and sufficient condition for a
polynomial to be coercive which lends itself again to an SDP hierarchy. To start, we need
the following proposition, whose proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proposition 4.4.2. A function f : Rn → R is coercive if and only if the sets
Sγ := {x ∈ Rn| f(x) ≤ γ}
are bounded for all γ ∈ R.
A polynomial p is said to be s-coercive if p(x)/‖x‖s is coercive. The order of coercivity
of p is the supremum over s ≥ 0 for which p is s-coercive. It is known that the order of
coercivity of a coercive polynomial is always positive [13, 42].
Theorem 4.4.3. A polynomial p is coercive if and only if there exist an even integer c > 0
and a scalar k ≥ 0 such that for all γ ∈ R, the γ-sublevel set of p is contained within a ball
of radius γc + k.
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Proof. The “if” direction follows immediately from the fact that each γ-sublevel set is
bounded. For the converse, suppose that p is coercive and denote its order of coercivity
by q > 0. Then, from Observation 2 of [13], we get that there exists a scalar M ≥ 0 such
that
‖x‖ ≥M ⇒ p(x) ≥ ‖x‖q, (4.20)
or equivalently ‖x‖ ≤ p(x) 1q . Now consider the function Rp : R→ R which is defined as
Rp(γ) := max
p(x)≤γ
‖x‖,
i.e. the radius of the γ-sublevel set of p. We note two relevant properties of this function.
• The function Rp(γ) is nondecreasing. This is because the γ-sublevel set of p is a subset
of the (γ + )-sublevel set of p for any  > 0.
• Let m = inf{γ| Rp(γ) ≥M}. We claim that
m ≥M q. (4.21)
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that we had m < M q. By the definition of m,
there exists γ¯ ∈ (m,M q) such that Rp(γ¯) ≥ M . This means that there exists x¯ ∈ Rn
such that p(x¯) ≤ γ¯ < M q and ‖x¯‖ ≥M . From (4.20) we then have p(x¯) ≥ ‖x¯‖q ≥M q,
which is a contradiction.
We now claim that Rp(γ) ≤ γ
1
q for all γ > m. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that
there exists γ0 > m such that Rp(γ0) > γ
1
q
0 . This means that there exists x0 ∈ Rn such that
‖x0‖ > γ
1
q
0 but p(x0) ≤ γ0.
Consider first the case where p(x0) ≥ m. Since γ0 > m, we have
‖x0‖ > γ1/q0 > m1/q ≥M,
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where the last inequality follows from (4.21). It follows from (4.20) that p(x0) ≥ ‖x0‖q > γ0
which is a contradiction.
Now consider the case where p(x0) < m. By definition of m, we have Rp(p(x0)) < M ,
and so ‖x0‖ < M . Furthermore, since
γ0 > m
(4.21)
≥ M q,
we have M < γ
1/q
0 , which gives ‖x0‖ < M < γ1/q0 . This contradicts our previous assumption
that ‖x0‖ > γ1/q0 .
If we let c be the smallest even integer greater than 1/q, we have shown that
Rp(γ) ≤ γ1/q ≤ γc
on the set γ > m. Finally, if we let k = Rp(m), by monotonicity of Rp, we get that
Rp(γ) ≤ γc + k, for all γ.
Remark 4.4.1. One can easily show now that for any coercive polynomial p, there exist an
integer c′ > 0 and a scalar k′ ≥ 0 (possibly differing from the scalars c and k given in the
proof of Theorem 4.4.3) such that
R2p(γ) < γ
2c′ + k′.
For the following hierarchy it will be easier to work with this form.
In view of the above remark, observe that coercivity of a polynomial p is equivalent to
existence of an integer c′ > 0 and a scalar k′ ≥ 0 such that the set
{
(γ, x) ∈ Rn+1| p(x) ≤ γ,
n∑
i=1
x2i ≥ γ2c
′
+ k′
}
(4.22)
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is empty. This formulation naturally leads to the following SDP hierarchy indexed by a
positive integer r.
Proposition 4.4.4. A polynomial p of degree d is coercive if and only if for some integer
r ≥ 1, the following SDP is feasible:
min
σ0,...,σ3
0
subject to −1 =σ0(x, γ) + σ1(x, γ)(γ − p(x)) + σ2(x, γ)
(
n∑
i=1
x2i − γ2r − 2r
)
+ σ3(x, γ)(γ − p(x))
(
n∑
i=1
x2i − γ2r − 2r
)
,
σ0 is sos and of degree ≤ 4r,
σ1 is sos and of degree ≤ max{4r − d, 0},
σ2 is sos and of degree ≤ 2r,
σ3 is sos and of degree ≤ max{2r − d, 0}.
(4.23)
Proof. If the SDP in (4.23) is feasible for some r, then the set
{
(γ, x) ∈ Rn+1| p(x) ≤ γ,
n∑
i=1
x2i ≥ γ2r + 2r
}
(4.24)
must be empty. Indeed, if this was not the case, a feasible (γ, x) pair would make the right
hand side of the equality constraint of (4.23) nonnegative, while the left hand side is negative.
As the set in (4.24) is empty, then for all γ, the γ-sublevel set of p is contained within a ball
of radius
√
γ2r + 2r and thus p is coercive.
To show the converse, suppose that p is coercive. Then we know from Theorem 4.4.3
and Remark 4.4.1 that there exist an integer c′ > 0 and a scalar k′ ≥ 0 such that the set in
(4.22) is empty. From Stengle’s Positivstellensatz (c.f. Theorem 4.3.7), there exist an even
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nonnegative integer rˆ and sos polynomials σ′0, . . . , σ
′
3 of degree at most rˆ such that
−1 =σ′0(x, γ) + σ′1(x, γ)(γ − p(x)) + σ′2(x, γ)
(
n∑
i=1
x2i − γ2c
′ − k′
)
+ σ′3(x, γ)(γ − p(x))
(
n∑
i=1
x2i − γ2c
′ − k′
)
.
(4.25)
Let r∗ = dmax{c′, log2(k′ + 1), rˆ+d2 }e. We show that the SDP in (4.23) is feasible for r = r∗
by showing that the polynomials
σ0(x, γ) = σ
′
0(x, γ) + σ
′
2(x, y)(γ
2r∗ − γ2c′ + 2r∗ − k′),
σ1(x, γ) = σ
′
1(x, γ) + σ
′
3(x, γ)(γ
2r∗ − γ2c′ + 2r∗ − k′),
σ2(x, γ) = σ
′
2(x, γ),
σ3(x, γ) = σ
′
3(x, γ)
are a feasible solution to the problem. First, note that
4r∗ − d ≥ 2r∗ − d ≥ rˆ ≥ 0,
and so σ0 is of degree at most rˆ+2r
∗ ≤ 4r∗, σ1 is of degree at most rˆ + 2r∗ ≤ max{4r∗ − d, 0},
σ2 is of degree at most rˆ ≤ 2r∗, and σ3 is of degree at most rˆ ≤ max{2r∗−d, 0}. Furthermore,
these polynomials are sums of squares. To see this, note that γ2r
∗−γ2c′+2r∗−k′ is nonnegative
as r∗ ≥ c′ and 2r∗ ≥ k′ + 1. As any nonnegative univariate polynomial is a sum of squares
(see, e.g., [21]), it follows that γ2r
∗ − γ2c′ + 2r∗ − k′ is a sum of squares. Combining this with
the facts that σ′0, . . . , σ
′
3 are sums of squares, and products and sums of sos polynomials are
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sos again, we get that σ0, . . . , σ3 are sos. Finally, the identity
−1 =
(
σ′0(x, γ) + σ
′
2(x, y)(γ
2r∗ − γ2c′ + 2r∗ − k′)
)
+
(
σ′1(x, γ) + σ
′
3(x, γ)(γ
2r∗ − γ2c′ + 2r∗ − k′))(γ − p(x)
)
+ σ′2(x, γ)(
n∑
i=1
x2i − γ2r
∗ − 2r∗) + σ′3(x, γ)(γ − p(x))(
n∑
i=1
x2i − γ2r
∗ − 2r∗)
holds by a simple rewriting of (4.25).
As an illustration, we revisit the simple example p(x) = x41 +x
2
2, whose top homogeneous
component is not positive definite. The hierarchy in Proposition 4.4.4 with r = 1 gives an
automated algebraic proof of coercivity of p in terms of the following identity:
− 1 =
(
2
3
(x21 −
1
2
)2 +
2
3
(γ − 1
2
)2
)
+
2
3
(γ − x41 − x22) +
2
3
(x21 + x
2
2 − γ2 − 2). (4.26)
Note that this is a certificate that the γ-sublevel set of p is contained in a ball of radius√
γ2 + 2.
Remark 4.4.2. From a theoretical perspective, our developments so far show that coercivity
of multivariate polynomials is a decidable property as it can be checked by solving a finite
number of SDP feasibility problems (each of which can be done in finite time [90]). Indeed,
given a polynomial p, one can think of running two programs in parallel. The first one solves
the SDPs in Proposition 4.4.4 for increasing values of r. The second uses Proposition 4.4.1
and its degree bound to test whether the β-sublevel set p is compact, starting from β = 1, and
doubling β in each iteration. On every input polynomial p whose coercivity is in question,
either the first program halts with a yes answer or the second program halts with a no answer.
We stress that this remark is of theoretical interest only, as the value of our contribution
is really in providing proofs of coercivity, not proofs of non-coercivity. Moreover, coercivity
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can alternatively be decided in finite time by applying the quantifier elimination theory of
Tarski and Seidenberg [105, 100] to the characterization in Proposition 4.4.2.
4.5 Summary and Conclusions
We studied the complexity of checking existence of optimal solutions in mathematical pro-
grams (given as minimization problems) that are feasible and lower bounded. We showed
that unless P=NP, this decision problem does not have a polynomial time (or even pseudo-
polynomial time) algorithm when the constraints and the objective function are defined by
polynomials of low degree. More precisely, this claim holds if the constraints are defined by
quadratic polynomials (and the objective has degree as low as one) or if the objective function
is a quartic polynomial (even in absence of any constraints). For polynomial optimization
problems with linear constraints and objective function of degrees 1,2, or 3, previous re-
sults imply that feasibility and lower boundedness always guarantee existence of an optimal
solution.
We also showed, again for low-degree polynomial optimization problems, that several
well-known sufficient conditions for existence of optimal solutions are NP-hard to check.
These were coercivity of the objective function, closedness of the feasible set (even when
bounded), boundedness of the feasible set (even when closed), an algebraic certificate of
compactness known as the Archimedean property, and a robust analogue of compactness
known as stable compactness.
Our negative results should by no means deter researchers from studying algorithms that
can efficiently check existence of optimal solutions—or, for that matter, any of the other
properties mentioned above such as compactness and coercivity—on special instances. On
the contrary, our results shed light on the intricacies that can arise when studying these
properties and calibrate the expectations of an algorithm designer. Hopefully, they will
even motivate further research in identifying problem structures (e.g., based on the Newton
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polytope of the objective and/or constraints) for which checking these properties becomes
more tractable, or efficient algorithms that can test useful sufficient conditions that imply
these properties.
In the latter direction, we argued that sum of squares techniques could be a natural tool
for certifying compactness of basic semialgebraic sets via semidefinite programming. By
deriving a new characterization of coercive polynomials, we showed that the same statement
also applies to the task of certifying coercivity. This final contribution motivates a problem
that we leave for our future research. While coercivity (i.e., boundedness of all sublevel sets)
of a polynomial objective function guarantees existence of optimal solutions to a feasible
POP, the same guarantee can be made from the weaker requirement that some sublevel
set of the objective be bounded and have a non-empty intersection with the feasible set. It
is not difficult to show that this property is also NP-hard to check. However, it would be
useful to derive a hierarchy of sufficient conditions for it, where each level can be efficiently
tested (perhaps again via SDP), and such that if the property was satisfied, then a level of
the hierarchy would hold.
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Chapter 5
Semidefinite Programming
Relaxations for Nash Equilibria in
Bimatrix Games
5.1 Introduction
A bimatrix game is a game between two players (referred to in this chapter as players A
and B) defined by a pair of m × n payoff matrices A and B. Let 4m and 4n denote the
m-dimensional and n-dimensional simplices
4m = {x ∈ Rm| xi ≥ 0,∀i,
m∑
i=1
xi = 1},4n = {y ∈ Rn| yi ≥ 0,∀i,
n∑
i=1
yi = 1}.
These form the strategy spaces of player A and player B respectively. For a strategy pair
(x, y) ∈ 4m ×4n, the payoff received by player A (resp. player B) is xTAy (resp. xTBy).
In particular, if the players pick vertices i and j of their respective simplices (also called
pure strategies), their payoffs will be Ai,j and Bi,j. One of the prevailing solution concepts
for bimatrix games is the notion of Nash equilibrium. At such an equilibrium, the players
are playing mutual best responses, i.e., a payoff maximizing strategy against the opposing
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player’s strategy. In our notation, a Nash equilibrium for the game (A,B) is a pair of
strategies (x∗, y∗) ∈ 4m ×4n such that
x∗TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗,∀x ∈ 4m,
and
x∗TBy∗ ≥ x∗TBy, ∀y ∈ 4n.1
Nash [77] proved that for any bimatrix game, such pairs of strategies exist (in fact his
result more generally applies to games with a finite number of players and a finite number of
pure strategies). While existence of these equilibria is guaranteed, finding them is believed
to be a computationally intractable problem. More precisely, a result of [31] implies that
computing Nash equilibria is PPAD-complete (see [31] for a definition) even when the number
of players is 3. This result was later improved by [24] who showed the same hardness result
for bimatrix games.
These results motivate the notion of an approximate Nash equilibrium, a solution concept
in which players receive payoffs “close” to their best response payoffs. More precisely, a pair
of strategies (x∗, y∗) ∈ 4m ×4n is an (additive) -Nash equilibrium for the game (A,B) if
x∗TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗ − ,∀x ∈ 4m,
and
x∗TBy∗ ≥ x∗TBy − ,∀y ∈ 4n.2
Note that when  = 0, (x∗, y∗) form an exact Nash equilibrium, and hence it is of interest to
find -Nash equilibria with  small. Unfortunately, approximation of Nash equilibria has also
proved to be computationally difficult. [25] have shown that, unless PPAD ⊆ P, there cannot
1In this chapter we assume that all entries of A and B are between 0 and 1, and argue at the beginning
of Section 5.2 why this is without loss of generality for the purpose of computing Nash equilibria.
2There are also other important notions of approximate Nash equilibria, such as -well-supported Nash
equilibria [37] and relative approximate Nash equilibria [30] which are not considered in this chapter.
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be a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for computing Nash equilibria in bimatrix
games. There have, however, been a series of constant factor approximation algorithms for
this problem ([33, 32, 58, 107]), with the current best producing a .3393 approximation via
an algorithm by [107].
We remark that there are exponential-time algorithms for computing Nash equilibria,
such as the Lemke-Howson algorithm ([64, 98]). There are also certain subclasses of the
problem which can be solved in polynomial time, the most notable example being the case
of zero-sum games (i.e. when B = −A). This problem was shown to be solvable via linear
programming by [29], and later shown to be polynomially equivalent to linear programming
by [1]. Aside from computation of Nash equilibria, there are a number of related decision
questions which are of economic interest but unfortunately NP-hard. Examples include
deciding whether a player’s payoff exceeds a certain threshold in some Nash equilibrium,
deciding whether a game has a unique Nash equilibrium, or testing whether there exists a
Nash equilibrium where a particular set of strategies is not played ([40, 27]).
Our focus in this chapter is on understanding the power of semidefinite programming3
(SDP) for finding approximate Nash equilibria in bimatrix games or providing certificates
for related decision questions. The goal is not to develop a competitive solver, but rather to
analyze the algorithmic power of SDP when applied to basic problems around computation
of Nash equilibria. Semidefinite programming relaxations have been analyzed in depth in
areas such as combinatorial optimization ([41], [67]) and systems theory ([23]), but not to
such an extent in game theory. To our knowledge, the appearance of SDP in the game
theory literature includes the work of [102] for exchangeable equilibria in symmetric games,
of [89] on zero-sum polynomial games, of [101] for zero-sum stochastic games, and of [60] for
semialgebraic min-max problems in static and dynamic games.
3The unfamiliar reader is referred to [108] for the theory of SDPs and a description of polynomial-time
algorithms for them based on interior point methods.
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5.1.1 Organization and Contributions of the chapter
In Section 5.2, we formulate the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a bimatrix game as
a nonconvex quadratically constrained quadratic program and pose a natural SDP relaxation
for it. In Section 5.3, we show that our SDP is exact when the game is strictly competitive
(see Definition 5.3.3). In Section 5.4, we design two continuous but nonconvex objective
functions for our SDP whose global minima coincide with rank-1 solutions. We provide a
heuristic based on iterative linearization for minimizing both objective functions. We show
empirically that these approaches produce  very close to zero (on average in the order of
10−3). In Section 5.5, we establish a number of bounds on the quality of the approximate
Nash equilibria that can be read off of feasible solutions to our SDP. In Theorems 5.5.5,
5.5.6, and 5.5.8, we show that when the SDP returns solutions which are “close” to rank-1,
the resulting strategies have have small . We then present an improved analysis in the
rank-2 case which shows how one can recover a 5
11
-Nash equilibrium from the SDP solution
(Theorem 5.5.10). We further prove that for symmetric games (i.e., when B = AT ), a 1
3
-Nash
equilibrium can be recovered in the rank-2 case (Theorem 5.5.17). We do not currently know
of a polynomial-time algorithm for finding rank-2 solutions to our SDP. If such an algorithm
were found, it would, together with our analysis, improve the best known approximation
bound for symmetric games. In Section 5.6, we show how our SDP formulation can be used
to provide certificates for certain (NP-hard) questions of economic interest about Nash equi-
libria in symmetric games. These are the problems of testing whether the maximum welfare
achievable under any symmetric Nash equilibrium exceeds some threshold, and whether a
set of strategies is played in every symmetric Nash equilibrium. In Section 5.7, we show that
the SDP analyzed in this chapter dominates the first level of the Lasserre hierarchy (Propo-
sition 5.7.1). Some directions for future research are discussed in Section 5.8. The four
appendices of the chapter add some numerical and technical details.
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5.1.2 Notation
We establish some notation that will be used throughout the chapter. The symbol 4k
denotes the k-dimensional simplex. For a matrix A, the notation Ai, refers to its i-th
row, and A,j refers to its j-th column. The notation ei refers to the elementary vector
(0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0)T with the 1 being in position i, 0m refers to the m-dimensional vector of
zero’s, 1m refers to the m-dimensional vector of one’s, and Jm×n refers to the m× n matrix
of one’s. The notation A  0 (resp A ≥ 0) denotes that a matrix A is positive semidefinite
(resp. elementwise nonnegative), Sk×k denotes the set of symmetric k × k matrices, and
Tr(A) denotes the trace of a matrix A, i.e., the sum of its diagonal elements. For two
matrices A and B, A  B denotes that A − B is positive semidefinite and A ⊗ B denotes
their Kronecker product. Finally, for a vector v, diag(v) denotes the diagonal matrix with v
on its diagonal. For a square matrix M , diag(M) denotes the vector containing its diagonal
entries.
5.2 The Formulation of our SDP Relaxation
In this section we present an SDP relaxation for the problem of finding Nash equilibria in
bimatrix games. This is done after a straightforward reformulation of the problem as a
nonconvex quadratically constrained quadratic program. We also assume that all entries of
the payoff matrices A and B are between 0 and 1. This can be done without loss of generality
because Nash equilibria are invariant under certain affine transformations in the payoffs. In
particular, the games (A,B) and (cA+ dJm×n, eB + fJm×n) have the same Nash equilibria
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for any scalars c, d, e, and f , with c and e positive. This is because
x∗TAy ≥ xTAy
⇔ c(x∗TAy∗) + d ≥ c(xTAy∗) + d
⇔ c(x∗TAy∗) + d(x∗TJm×ny∗) ≥ c(xTAy∗) + d(xTJm×ny∗)
⇔ x∗T (cA+ dJm×n)y∗ ≥ xT (cA+ dJm×n)y
Identical reasoning applies for player B.
5.2.1 Nash Equilibria as Solutions to Quadratic Programs
Recall the definition of a Nash equilibrium from Section 5.1. An equivalent characterization
is that a strategy pair (x∗, y∗) ∈ 4m ×4n is a Nash equilibrium for the game (A,B) if and
only if
x∗TAy∗ ≥ eTi Ay∗,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
x∗TBy∗ ≥ x∗TBei,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(5.1)
The equivalence can be seen by noting that because the payoff from playing any mixed
strategy is a convex combination of payoffs from playing pure strategies, there is always a
pure strategy best response to the other player’s strategy.
We now treat the Nash problem as the following quadratic programming (QP) feasibility
problem:
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min
x∈Rm,y∈Rn
0
subject to xTAy ≥ eTi Ay,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
xTBy ≥ xTBej,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
yi ≥ 0,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
m∑
i=1
xi = 1,
n∑
i=1
yi = 1.
(5.2)
Similarly, a pair of strategies x∗ ∈ 4m and y∗ ∈ 4n form an -Nash equilibrium for the
game (A,B) if and only if
x∗TAy∗ ≥ eTi Ay∗ − ,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
x∗TBy∗ ≥ x∗TBei − ,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Observe that any pair of simplex vectors (x, y) is an -Nash equilibrium for the game (A,B)
for any  that satisfies
 ≥ max{max
i
eTi Ay − xTAy,max
i
xTBei − xTBy}.
We use the following notation throughout the chapter:
· A(x, y) := max
i
eTi Ay − xTAy,
· B(x, y) := max
i
xTBei − xTBy,
· (x, y) := max{A(x, y), B(x, y)},
and the function parameters are later omitted if they are clear from the context.
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5.2.2 SDP Relaxation
The QP formulation in (5.2) lends itself to a natural SDP relaxation. We define a matrix
M :=
X P
Z Y
 ,
and an augmented matrix
M′ :=

X P x
Z Y y
x y 1
 ,
with X ∈ Sm×m, Z ∈ Rn×m, Y ∈ Sn×n, x ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rn and P = ZT .
The SDP relaxation can then be expressed as
min
M′∈Sm+n+1,m+n+1
0 (SDP1)
subject to Tr(AZ) ≥ eTi Ay,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (5.3)
Tr(BZ) ≥ xTBej,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (5.4)
m∑
i=1
xi = 1, (5.5)
n∑
i=1
yi = 1, (5.6)
M′ ≥ 0, (5.7)
M′m+n+1,m+n+1 = 1, (5.8)
M′  0. (5.9)
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We refer to the constraints (5.3) and (5.4) as the relaxed Nash constraints and the
constraints (5.5) and (5.6) as the unity constraints. This SDP is motivated by the following
observation.
Proposition 5.2.1. Let M′ be any rank-1 feasible solution to SDP1. Then the vectors x
and y from its last column constitute a Nash equilibrium for the game (A,B).
Proof. We know that x and y are in the simplex from the constraints (5.5), (5.6), and (5.7).
If the matrix M′ is rank-1, then it takes the form

xxT xyT x
yxT yyT y
xT yT 1
 =

x
y
1


x
y
1

T
. (5.10)
Then, from the relaxed Nash constraints we have that
eTi Ay ≤ Tr(AZ) = Tr(AyxT ) = Tr(xTAy) = xTAy,
xTAei ≤ Tr(BZ) = Tr(ByxT ) = Tr(xTBy) = xTBy.
The claim now follows from the characterization given in (5.1).
Remark 5.2.1. Because a Nash equilibrium always exists, there will always be a matrix of
the form (5.10) which is feasible to SDP1. Thus we can disregard any concerns about SDP1
being feasible, even when we add valid inequalities to it in Section 5.2.3.
Remark 5.2.2. It is intuitive to note that the submatrix P = ZT of the matrixM′ corresponds
to a probability distribution over the strategies, and that seeking a rank-1 solution to our
SDP can be interpreted as making P a product distribution.
The following theorem shows that SDP1 is a weak relaxation and stresses the necessity
of additional valid constraints.
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Theorem 5.2.2. Consider a bimatrix game with payoff matrices bounded in [0, 1]. Then for
any two vectors x ∈ 4m and y ∈ 4n, there exists a feasible solution M′ to SDP1 with

x
y
1

as its last column.
Proof. Consider any x, y, γ > 0, and the matrix

x
y
1


x
y
1

T
+
γJm+n,m+n 0m+n
0Tm+n 0
 .
This matrix is the sum of two nonnegative psd matrices and is hence nonnegative and psd. By
assumption x and y are in the simplex, and so constraints (5.5)− (5.9) of SDP1 are satisfied.
To check that constraints (5.3) and (5.4) hold, note that since A and B are nonnegative, as
long as the matrices A and B are not the zero matrices, the quantities Tr(AZ) and Tr(BZ)
will become arbitrarily large as γ increases. Since eTi Ay and x
TBei are bounded by 1 by
assumption, we will have that constraints (5.3) and (5.4) hold for γ large enough. In the
case where A or B is the zero matrix, the Nash constraints are trivially satisfied for the
respective player.
5.2.3 Valid Inequalities
In this subsection, we introduce a number of valid inequalities to improve upon the SDP
relaxation in SDP1. These inequalities are justified by being valid if the matrix returned
by the SDP is rank-1. The terminology we introduce here to refer to these constraints is
used throughout the chapter. Constraints (5.11) and (5.12) will be referred to as the row
inequalities, and (5.13) and (5.14) will be referred to as the correlated equilibrium inequalities.
Proposition 5.2.3. Any rank-1 solution M′ to SDP1 must satisfy the following:
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m∑
j=1
Xi,j =
n∑
j=1
Pi,j = xi,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (5.11)
n∑
j=1
Yi,j =
m∑
j=1
Zi,j = yi,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5.12)
n∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j ≥
n∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j,∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (5.13)
m∑
j=1
Bj,iPj,i ≥
m∑
j=1
Bj,kPj,i,∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5.14)
Proof. Recall from (5.10) that if M′ is rank-1, it is of the form

xxT xyT x
yxT yyT y
xT yT 1
 =

x
y
1


x
y
1

T
.
To show (5.11), observe that
m∑
j=1
Xi,j =
m∑
j=1
xixj = xi,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
An identical argument works for the remaining matrices P,Z, and Y . To show (5.13) and
(5.14), observe that a pair (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
∀i, xi > 0⇒ eTi Ay = xTAy = max
i
eTi Ay,
∀i, yi > 0⇒ xTBei = xTBy = max
i
xTBei.
This is because the Nash conditions require that xTAy, a convex combination of eTi Ay, be
at least eTi Ay for all i. Indeed, if xi > 0 but e
T
i Ay < x
TAy, the convex combination must be
less than max
i
xTAy.
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For each i such that xi = 0 or yi = 0, inequalities (5.13) and (5.14) reduce to 0 ≥ 0, so
we only need to consider strategies played with positive probability. Observe that if M′ is
rank-1, then
n∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j = xi
n∑
j=1
Ai,jyj = xie
T
i Ay ≥ xieTkAy =
n∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j, ∀i, k
m∑
j=1
Bj,iPj,i = yi
m∑
j=1
Bj,ixj = yix
TBei ≥ yixTBek =
m∑
j=1
Bj,iPj,k,∀i, k.
Remark 5.2.3. There are two ways to interpret the inequalities in (5.13) and (5.14): the
first is as a relaxation of the constraint xi(e
T
i Ay − eTj Ay) ≥ 0, ∀i, j, which must hold since
any strategy played with positive probability must give the best response payoff. The other
interpretation is to have the distribution over outcomes defined by P be a correlated equilib-
rium [11]. This can be imposed by a set of linear constraints on the entries of P as explained
next.
Suppose the players have access to a public randomization device which prescribes a
pure strategy to each of them (unknown to the other player). The distribution over the
assignments can be given by a matrix P , where Pi,j is the probability that strategy i is
assigned to player A and strategy j is assigned to player B. This distribution is a correlated
equilibrium if both players have no incentive to deviate from the strategy prescribed, that
is, if the prescribed pure strategies a and b satisfy
n∑
j=1
Ai,jProb(b = j|a = i) ≥
n∑
j=1
Ak,jProb(b = j|a = i),
m∑
i=1
Bi,jProb(a = i|b = j) ≥
m∑
i=1
Bi,kProb(a = i|b = j).
If we interpret the P submatrix in our SDP as the distribution over the assignments by
the public device, then because of our row constraints, Prob(b = j|a = i) = Pi,j
xi
whenever
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xi 6= 0 (otherwise the above inequalities are trivial). Similarly, P (a = i|b = j) = Pi,jyj for
nonzero yj. Observe now that the above two inequalities imply (5.13) and (5.14). Finally,
note that every Nash equilibrium generates a correlated equilibrium, since if P is a product
distribution given by xyT , then Prob(b = j|a = i) = yj and P (a = i|b = j) = xi.
Implied Inequalities
In addition to those explicitly mentioned in the previous section, there are other natural
valid inequalities which are omitted because they are implied by the ones we have already
proposed. We give two examples of such inequalities in the next proposition. We refer to
the constraints in (5.15) below as the distribution constraints. The constraints in (5.16) are
the familiar McCormick inequalities [70] for box-constrained quadratic programming.
Proposition 5.2.4. Let z :=
x
y
. Any rank-1 solution M′ to SDP1 must satisfy the
following:
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Xi,j =
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Zi,j =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Yi,j = 1. (5.15)
Mi,j ≤ zi, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m+ n},
Mi,j + 1 ≥ zi + zj, ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m+ n}.
(5.16)
Proof. The distribution constraints follow immediately from the row constraints (5.11) and
(5.12), along with the unity constraints (5.5) and (5.6).
The first McCormick inequality is immediate as a consequence of (5.11) and (5.12), as all
entries of M are nonnegative. To see why the second inequality holds, consider whichever
submatrix X, Y, P , or Z that contains Mi,j. Suppose that this submatrix is, e.g., P . Then,
since P is nonnegative,
0 ≤
m∑
k=1,k 6=i
n∑
l=1,l 6=j
Pk,l
(5.11)
=
m∑
k=1,k 6=i
(xk − Pk,j) (5.12)= (1− xi)− (yj − Pi,j) = Pi,j + 1− xi − yj.
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The same argument holds for the other submatrices, and this concludes the proof.
5.2.4 Simplifying our SDP
We observe that the row constraints (5.11) and (5.12) along with the correlated equilibrium
constraints (5.13) and (5.14) imply the relaxed Nash constraints (5.3) and (5.4). Indeed, if
we fix an index k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then
Tr(AZ) =
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j
(5.13)
≥
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j ≥
n∑
j=1
Ak,j(
m∑
i=1
Pi,j)
(5.12),P=ZT
≥
n∑
j=1
Ak,jyj = e
T
kAy.
The proof for player B proceeds identically. Then, after collecting the valid inequalities and
removing the relaxed Nash constraints, we arrive at an SDP given by
min
M′∈S(m+n+1)×(m+n+1)
0 (SDP1’)
subject to (5.5)− (5.9), (5.11)− (5.14).
We make the observation that the last row and column of M′ can be removed from this
SDP, that is, there is a one-to-one correspondence between solutions to SDP1’ and those to
the following SDP (where M :=
X P
Z Y
 , with P = ZT ):
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min
M∈S(m+n)×(m+n)
0 (SDP2)
subject to M 0, (5.17)
M≥ 0, (5.18)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Pi,j = 1, (5.19)
m∑
j=1
Xi,j =
n∑
j=1
Pi,j,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (5.20)
n∑
j=1
Yi,j =
m∑
j=1
Zi,j,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (5.21)
n∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j ≥
n∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j,∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (5.22)
m∑
j=1
Bj,iPj,i ≥
m∑
j=1
Bj,kPj,i,∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5.23)
Indeed, it is readily verified that the submatrix M from any feasible solution M′ to
SDP1’ is feasible to SDP2. Conversely, let M be any feasible matrix to SDP2. Consider an
eigendecomposition M = ∑ki=1 λivivTi and let
x
y
 :=M1m+n2 . Then the matrix
M′ :=

M
x
y
[
xT yT
]
1
 =
k∑
i=1
λi
 vi
1Tm+nvi/2

 vi
1Tm+nvi/2

T
(5.24)
is easily seen to be feasible to SDP1’.
Given any feasible solution M to SDP2, observe that the submatrix P is a correlated
equilibrium. We take our candidate approximate Nash equilibrium to be the pair x = P1n
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and y = P T1m. If the correlated equilibrium P is rank-1, then the pair (x, y) so defined
constitutes an exact Nash equilibrium. In Section 5.4, we will add certain objective functions
to SDP2 with the interpretation of searching for low-rank correlated equilibria.
5.3 Exactness for Strictly Competitive Games
In this section, we show that SDP1 recovers a Nash equilibrium for any zero-sum game, and
that SDP2 recovers a Nash equilibrium for any strictly competitive game (see Definition 5.3.3
below). Both these notions represent games where the two players are in direct competition,
but strictly competitive games are more general, and for example, allow both players to
have nonnegative payoff matrices. These classes of games are solvable in polynomial time
via linear programming. Nonetheless, it is reassuring to know that our SDPs recover these
important special cases.
Definition 5.3.1. A zero-sum game is a game in which the payoff matrices satisfy A = −B.
Theorem 5.3.2. For a zero-sum game, the vectors x and y from the last column of any
feasible solution M′ to SDP1 constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Recall that the relaxed Nash constraints (5.3) and (5.4) read
Tr(AZ) ≥ eTi Ay,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
Tr(BZ) ≥ xTBej,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Since B = −A, the latter statement is equivalent to
Tr(AZ) ≤ xTAej,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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In conjunction these imply
eTi Ay ≤ Tr(AZ) ≤ xTAej,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5.25)
We claim that any pair x ∈ 4m and y ∈ 4n which satisfies the above condition is a Nash
equilibrium. To see that xTAy ≥ eTi Ay,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, observe that xTAy is a convex
combination of xTAej, which are at least e
T
i Ay by (5.25). To see that x
TBy ≥ xTBej ⇔
xTAy ≤ xTAej,∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, observe that xTAy is a convex combination of eTi Ay, which
are at most xTAej by (5.25).
Definition 5.3.3. A game (A,B) is strictly competitive if for all x, x′ ∈ 4m, y, y′ ∈ 4n,
xTAy − x′TAy′ and x′TBy′ − xTBy have the same sign.
The interpretation of this definition is that if one player benefits from changing from
one outcome to another, the other player must suffer. Adler, Daskalakis, and Papadimitriou
show in [2] that the following much simpler characterization is equivalent.
Theorem 5.3.4 (Theorem 1 of [2]). A game is strictly competitive if and only if there exist
scalars c, d, e, and f, with c > 0, e > 0, such that cA+ dJm×n = −eB + fJm×n.
One can easily show that there exist strictly competitive games for which not all feasible
solutions to SDP1 have Nash equilibria as their last columns (see Theorem 5.2.2). However,
we show that this is the case for SDP2.
Theorem 5.3.5. For a strictly competitive game, the vectors x := P1n and y := P
T1m from
any feasible solution M to SDP2 constitute a Nash equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 5.3.5 we need the following lemma, which shows that feasibility of a
matrix M in SDP2 is invariant under certain transformations of A and B.
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Lemma 5.3.6. Let c, d, e, and f be any set of scalars with c > 0 and e > 0. If a matrix M
is feasible to SDP2 with input payoff matrices A and B, then it is also feasible to SDP2 with
input matrices cA+ dJm×n and eB + fJm×n.
Proof. It suffices to check that constraints (5.22) and (5.23) of SDP2 still hold, as only the
correlated equilibrium constraints use the matrices A and B. We only show that constraint
(5.22) still holds because the argument for constraint (5.23) is identical.
Note from the definition of x that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, xi =
∑n
j=1(Jm×n)i,jPi,j. To
check that the correlated equilibrium constraints hold, observe that for scalars c > 0, d, and
for all i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
n∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j ≥
n∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j
⇔ c
n∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j + d
n∑
j=1
Pi,j ≥ c
n∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j + d
n∑
j=1
Pi,j
⇔ c
n∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j + d
n∑
j=1
(Jm×n)i,jPi,j ≥ c
n∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j + d
n∑
j=1
(Jm×n)k,jPi,j
⇔
n∑
j=1
(cAi,j + dJm×n)k,jPi,j ≥
n∑
j=1
(cAi,j + dJm×n)k,jPi,j.
Proof. Proof (of Theorem 5.3.5). Let A and B be the payoff matrices of the given
strictly competitive game and let M be a feasible solution to SDP2. Since the game is
strictly competitive, we know from Theorem 5.3.4 that cA + dJm×n = −eB + fJm×n for
some scalars c > 0, e > 0, d, f . Consider a new game with input matrices A˜ = cA + dJm×n
and B˜ = eB − fJm×n. By Lemma 5.3.6, M is still feasible to SDP2 with input matrices A˜
and B˜. By the arguments in Section 5.2.4, the matrix M′ :=

M
x
y
[
xT yT
]
1
 is feasible
to SDP1’, and hence also to SDP1. Now notice that since A˜ = −B˜, Theorem 5.3.2 implies
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that the vectors x and y in the last column form a Nash equilibrium to the game (A˜, B˜).
Finally recall from the arguments at the beginning of Section 5.2 that Nash equilibria are
invariant to scaling and shifting of the payoff matrices, and hence (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium
to the game (A,B).
5.4 Algorithms for Lowering Rank
In this section, we present heuristics which aim to find low-rank solutions to SDP2 and
present some empirical results. Recall that our SDP2 in Section 5.2.4 did not have an
objective function. Hence, we can encourage low-rank solutions by choosing certain objective
functions, in particular the trace of the matrixM, which is a general heuristic for minimizing
the rank of symmetric matrices [96, 36]. This simple objective function is already guaranteed
to produce a rank-1 solution in the case of strictly competitive games (see Proposition 5.4.1
below). For general games, however, one can design better objective functions in an iterative
fashion (see Section 5.4.1).
Notational Remark: For the remainder of this section, we will use the shorthand x := P1n
and y := P T1m, where P is the upper right submatrix of a feasible solution M to SDP2.
Proposition 5.4.1. For a strictly competitive game, any optimal solution to SDP2 with
Tr(M) as the objective function must be rank-1.
Proof. Let
M :=
X P
P T Y

be a feasible solution to SDP2. In the case of strictly competitive games, from Theo-
rem 5.3.5 we know that that (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium. Then because the matrix M
is psd, from (5.24) and an application of the Schur complement (see, e.g. [22, Sect. A.5.5])
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to

M
x
y
[
xT yT
]
1
, we have that M 
x
y

x
y

T
. Hence, M =
xxT xyT
yxT yyT
 + P for
some psd matrix P and the Nash equilibrium (x, y). Given this expression, the objective
function Tr(M) is then xTx + yTy + Tr(P). As (x, y) is a Nash equilibrium, the choice of
P = 0 results in a feasible solution. Since the zero matrix has the minimum possible trace
among all psd matrices, the solution will be the rank-1 matrix
x
y

x
y

T
.
Remark 5.4.1. If the row constraints and the nonnegativity constraints on X and Y are
removed from SDP2, then this SDP with Tr(M) as the objective function can be interpreted
as searching for a minimum-rank correlated equilibrium P via the nuclear norm relaxation;
see [96, Section 2].
5.4.1 Linearization Algorithms
The algorithms we present in this section for minimzing the rank of the matrixM in SDP2
are based on iterative linearization of certain nonconvex objective functions. Motivated
by the next proposition, we design two continuous (nonconvex) objective functions that, if
minimized exactly, would guarantee rank-1 solutions. We will then linearize these functions
iteratively.
Proposition 5.4.2. Let the matrices X and Y and vectors x := P1n and y := P
T1m be
taken from a feasible solution to SDP2. Then the matrixM is rank-1 if and only if Xi,i = x2i
and Yi,i = y
2
i for all i.
Proof. Note that ifM is rank-1, then it can be written as zzT for some z ∈ Rm+n. The i-th
diagonal entry in the X submatrix will then be equal to
z2i
(5.15)
=
1
4
z2i (1
T
m+nzz
T1m+n) = (
1
2
Mi,1m+n)2 (5.11)= (Pi,1n)2 = x2i ,
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where the second equality holds because Mi,—the i-th row of M—is zizT . An analogous
statement holds for the diagonal entries of Y , and hence the condition is necessary.
To show sufficiency, let z :=
x
y
. Since M is psd, we have that Mi,j ≤ √Mi,iMj,j,
which impliesMi,j ≤ zizj by the assumption of the proposition. Recall from the distribution
constraint (5.15) that
∑m+n
i=1
∑m+n
j=1 Mi,j = 4. Further, the same constraint along with the
definitions of x and y imply that
∑m+n
i=1 zi = 2, which means that
∑m+n
i=1
∑m+n
j=1 zizj = 4.
Hence in order to have the equality
4 =
m+n∑
i=1
m+n∑
j=1
Mi,j ≤
m+n∑
i=1
m+n∑
j=1
zizj = 4,
we must have Mi,j = zizj for each i and j. Consequently M is rank-1.
We focus now on two nonconvex objectives that as a consequence of the above proposition
would return rank-1 solutions:
Proposition 5.4.3. All optimal solutions to SDP2 with the objective function
∑m+n
i=1
√Mi,i
or Tr(M)− xTx− yTy are rank-1.
Proof. We show that each of these objectives has a specific lower bound which is achieved if
and only if the matrix is rank-1.
Observe that since M
x
y

x
y

T
, we have
√
Xi,i ≥ xi and
√
Yi,i ≥ yi, and hence
m+n∑
i=1
√Mi,i ≥ m∑
i=1
xi +
n∑
i=1
yi = 2.
Further note that
Tr(M)−
x
y

T x
y
 ≥
x
y

T x
y
−
x
y

T x
y
 = 0.
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We can see that the lower bounds are achieved if and only if Xi,i = x
2
i and Yi,i = y
2
i for
all i, which by Proposition 5.4.2 happens if and only if M is rank-1.
We refer to our two objective functions in Proposition 5.4.3 as the “square root objec-
tive” and the “diagonal gap objective” respectively. While these are both nonconvex, we
will attempt to iteratively minimize them by linearizing them through a first order Taylor
expansion. For example, at iteration k of the algorithm,
m+n∑
i=1
√
M(k)i,i '
m+n∑
i=1
√
M(k−1)i,i +
1
2
√
M(k−1)i,i
(M(k)i,i −M(k−1)i,i ).
Note that for the purposes of minimization, this reduces to minimizing
∑m+n
i=1
1√
M(k−1)i,i
M(k)i,i .
In similar fashion, for the second objective function, at iteration k we can make the
approximation
Tr(M)−
x
y

(k)T x
y

(k)
' Tr(M)−
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k−1)T
−2
x
y

(k−1)T
(
x
y

(k)
−
x
y

(k−1)
).
Once again, for the purposes of minimization this reduces to minimizing Tr(M) −
2
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k)
. This approach then leads to the following two algorithms.4
4An algorithm similar to Algorithm 4 is used in [52].
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Algorithm 3 Square Root Minimization Algorithm
1: Let x(0) = 1m, y
(0) = 1n, k = 1.
2: while !convergence do
3: Solve SDP2 with
∑m
i=1
1√
x
(k−1)
i
Xi,i +
∑n
i=1
1√
y
(k−1)
i
Yi,i as the objective, and letM∗ be
an optimal solution.
4: Let x(k) = diag(X∗), y(k) = diag(Y ∗).
5: Let k = k + 1.
6: end while
Algorithm 4 Diagonal Gap Minimization Algorithm
1: Let x(0) = 0m, y
(0) = 0n, k = 1.
2: while !convergence do
3: Solve SDP2 with Tr(X) + Tr(Y ) − 2
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k)
as the objective, and let M∗
be an optimal solution.
4: Let x(k) = P ∗1n, y(k) = P ∗T1m.
5: Let k = k + 1.
6: end while
Remark 5.4.2. Note that the first iteration of both algorithms uses the nuclear norm (i.e.
trace) of M as the objective.
The square root algorithm has the following property.
Theorem 5.4.4. Let M(1),M(2), . . . be the sequence of optimal matrices obtained from the
square root algorithm. Then the sequence
{
m+n∑
i=1
√
M(k)i,i } (5.26)
is nonincreasing and is lower bounded by two. If it reaches two at some iteration t, then the
matrix M(t) is rank-1.
140
Proof. Observe that for any k > 1,
m+n∑
i=1
√
M(k)i,i ≤
1
2
m+n∑
i=1
(
M(k)i,i√
M(k−1)i,i
+
√
M(k−1)i,i ) ≤
1
2
m+n∑
i=1
(
M(k−1)i,i√
M(k−1)i,i
+
√
M(k−1)i,i ) =
m+n∑
i=1
√
M(k−1)i,i ,
where the first inequality follows from the arithmetic-mean-geometric-mean inequality, and
the second follows from that M(k)i,i is chosen to minimize
∑m+n
i=1
M(k)i,i√
M(k−1)i,i
and hence achieves
a no larger value than the feasible solution M(k−1). This shows that the sequence is nonin-
creasing.
The proof of Proposition 5.4.3 already shows that the sequence is lower bounded by
two, and Proposition 5.4.3 itself shows that reaching two is sufficient to have the matrix be
rank-1.
The diagonal gap algorithm has the following property.
Theorem 5.4.5. Let M(1),M(2), . . . be the sequence of optimal matrices obtained from the
diagonal gap algorithm. Then the sequence
{Tr(M(k))−
x
y

(k)T x
y

(k)
} (5.27)
is nonincreasing and is lower bounded by zero. If it reaches zero at some iteration t, then
the matrix M(t) is rank-1.
Proof. Observe that
Tr(M(k))−
x
y

(k)T x
y

(k)
≤Tr(M(k))−
x
y

(k)T x
y

(k)
+

x
y

(k)
−
x
y

(k−1)
T 
x
y

(k)
−
x
y

(k−1)
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= Tr(M(k))− 2
x
y

(k)T x
y

(k−1)
+
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k−1)
≤ Tr(M(k−1))− 2
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k−1)
+
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k−1)
= Tr(M(k−1))−
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k−1)
,
where the second inequality follows from that M(k) is chosen to minimize
Tr(M(k−1))− 2
x
y

(k−1)T x
y

(k−1)
and hence achieves a no larger value than the feasible solutionM(k−1). This shows that the
sequence is nonincreasing.
The proof of Proposition 5.4.3 already shows that the sequence is lower bounded by
zero, and Proposition 5.4.3 itself shows that reaching zero is sufficient to have the matrix be
rank-1.
We also invite the reader to also see Theorem 5.5.6 in the next section which relates the
objective value of the diagonal gap minimization algorithm and the quality of approximate
Nash equilibria that the algorithm produces.
5.4.2 Numerical Experiments
We tested Algorithms 3 and 4 on games coming from 100 randomly generated payoff matrices
with entries bounded in [0, 1] of varying sizes. Below is a table of statistics for 20 × 20
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matrices; the data for the rest of the sizes can be found in Appendix A.1.5 We can see that
our algorithms return approximate Nash equilibria with fairly low  (recall the definition
from Section 5.2.1). We ran 20 iterations of each algorithm on each game. Using the SDP
solver of [73], each iteration takes on average under 4 seconds to solve on a standard personal
machine with a 3.4 GHz processor and 16 GB of memory.
Table 5.1: Statistics on  for 20× 20 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0198 0.0046 0.0039 0.0034
Diagonal Gap 0.0159 0.0032 0.0024 0.0032
The histograms below show the effect of increasing the number of iterations on lowering 
on 20×20 games. For both algorithms, there was a clear improvement of the  by increasing
the number of iterations.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of  over numbers of iterations for the square root algorithm (left)
and the diagonal gap algorithm (right).
5The code and instance data that produced these results is publicly available at
https://github.com/jeffreyzhang92/SDP Nash. The function nash.m computes an approximate
Nash equilibrium using one of our two algorithms as specified by the user.
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5.5 Bounds on  for General Games
Since the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium to an arbitrary bimatrix game is PPAD-
complete, it is unlikely that one can find rank-1 solutions to this SDP in polynomial time.
In Section 5.4, we designed objective functions (such as variations of the nuclear norm) that
empirically do very well in finding low-rank solutions to SDP2. Nevertheless, it is of interest
to know if the solution returned by SDP2 is not rank-1, whether one can recover an -Nash
equilibrium from it and have a guarantee on . Our goal in this section is to study this
question.
Notational Remark: Recall our notation for the matrix
M :=
X P
Z Y
 .
Throughout this section, any matrices X,Z, P = ZT and Y are assumed to be taken from a
feasible solution to SDP2. Furthermore, x and y will be P1n and P
T1m respectively.
The ultimate results of this section are the theorems in Sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3. To work
towards them, we need a number of preliminary lemmas which we present in Section 5.5.1.
5.5.1 Lemmas Towards Bounds on 
We first observe the following connection between the approximate payoffs Tr(AZ) and
Tr(BZ), and (x, y), as defined in Section 5.2.1.
Lemma 5.5.1. Consider any feasible solution to SDP2. Then
(x, y) ≤ max{Tr(AZ)− xTAy,Tr(BZ)− xTBy}.
Proof. Recall from the argument at the beginning of Section 5.2.4 that constraints (5.13)
and (5.14) imply Tr(AZ) ≥ eTi Ay and Tr(BZ) ≥ xTBei for all i. Hence, we have
A ≤ Tr(AZ)− xTAy and B ≤ Tr(BZ)− xTBy.
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We thus are interested in the difference of the two matrices P = ZT and xyT . These
two matrices can be interpreted as two different probability distributions over the strategy
outcomes. The matrix P is the probability distribution from the SDP which generates
the approximate payoffs Tr(AZ) and Tr(BZ), while xyT is the product distribution that
would have resulted if the matrix had been rank-1. We will see that the difference of these
distributions is key in studying the  which results from SDP2. Hence, we first take steps to
represent this difference.
Lemma 5.5.2. Consider any feasible matrix M to SDP2 with an eigendecomposition
M =
k∑
i=1
λiviv
T
i =:
k∑
i=1
λi
ai
bi

ai
bi

T
, (5.28)
so that the eigenvectors vi ∈ Rm+n are partitioned into vectors ai ∈ Rm and bi ∈ Rn. Then
for all i,
∑m
j=1(ai)j =
∑n
j=1(bi)j.
Proof. We know from (5.19), (5.20), and (5.21) that
k∑
i=1
λi1
T
maia
T
i 1m
(5.19),(5.20)
= 1, (5.29)
k∑
i=1
λi1
T
maib
T
i 1n
(5.19)
= 1, (5.30)
k∑
i=1
λi1
T
nbia
T
i 1m
(5.19)
= 1, (5.31)
k∑
i=1
λi1
T
nbib
T
i 1n
(5.19),(5.21)
= 1. (5.32)
Then by subtracting terms we have
(5.29)− (5.30) =
k∑
i=1
λi1
T
mai(a
T
i 1m − bTi 1n) = 0, (5.33)
(5.31)− (5.32) =
k∑
i=1
λi1
T
nbi(a
T
i 1m − bTi 1n) = 0. (5.34)
145
By subtracting again these imply
(5.33)− (5.34) =
k∑
i=1
λi(1
T
mai − 1Tnbi)2 = 0. (5.35)
As all λi are nonnegative due to positive semidefiniteness ofM, the only way for this equality
to hold is to have 1Tmai = 1
T
nbi,∀i. This is equivalent to the statement of the claim.
From Lemma 5.5.2, we can let si :=
∑m
j=1(ai)j =
∑n
j=1(bi)j, and furthermore we assume
without loss of generality that each si is nonnegative. Note that from the definition of x we
have
xi =
m∑
j=1
Pij =
k∑
l=1
m∑
j=1
λl(al)i(bl)j =
k∑
j=1
λjsj(al)i. (5.36)
Hence,
x =
k∑
i=1
λisiai. (5.37)
Similarly,
y =
k∑
i=1
λisibi. (5.38)
Finally note from the distribution constraint (5.15) that this implies
k∑
i=1
λis
2
i = 1. (5.39)
Lemma 5.5.3. Let
M =
k∑
i=1
λi
ai
bi

ai
bi

T
,
be a feasible solution to SDP2, such that the eigenvectors of M are partitioned into ai and
bi with
∑m
j=1(ai)j =
∑n
j=1(bi)j = si,∀i. Then
P − xyT =
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(sjai − siaj)(sjbi − sibj)T .
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Proof. Using equations (5.37) and (5.38) we can write
P − xyT =
k∑
i=1
λiaib
T
i − (
k∑
i=1
λisiai)(
k∑
j=1
λjsjbj)
T
=
k∑
i=1
λiai(bi − si
k∑
j=1
λjsjbj)
T
(5.39)
=
k∑
i=1
λiai(
k∑
j=1
λjs
2
jbi − si
k∑
j=1
λjsjbj)
T
=
k∑
i=1
k∑
j=1
λiλjaisj(sjbi − sibj)T
=
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(sjai − siaj)(sjbi − sibj)T ,
where the last line follows from observing that terms where i and j are switched can be
combined.
We can relate  and P − xyT with the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5.4. Let the matrix P and the vectors x := P1n and y := P
T1m come from any
feasible solution to SDP2. Then
 ≤ ‖P − xy
T‖1
2
,
where ‖ · ‖1 here denotes the entrywise L-1 norm, i.e., the sum of the absolute values of the
entries of the matrix.
Proof. Let D := P − xyT . From Lemma 5.5.1,
A ≤ Tr(AZ)− xTAy = Tr(A(Z − yxT )).
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If we then hold D fixed and restrict that A has entries bounded in [0,1], the quantity Tr(ADT )
is maximized when
Ai,j =

1 Di,j ≥ 0
0 Di,j < 0
.
The resulting quantity Tr(ADT ) will then be the sum of all nonnegative elements of D. Since
the sum of all elements in D is zero, this quantity will be equal to 1
2
‖D‖1.
The proof for B is identical, and the result follows from that  is the maximum of A and
B.
5.5.2 Bounds on 
We provide a number of bounds on (x, y)for x := P1n and y := P
T1m coming from any
feasible solution to SDP2. Our first two theorems roughly state that solutions which are
“close” to rank-1 provide small .
Theorem 5.5.5. Consider any feasible solution M to SDP2. Suppose M is rank-k and its
eigenvalues are λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ ... ≥ λk > 0. Then x and y constitute an -NE to the game (A,B)
with  ≤ m+n
2
∑k
i=2 λi.
Proof. By the Perron Frobenius theorem (see e.g. [71, Chapter 8.3]), the eigenvector corre-
sponding to λ1 can be assumed to be nonnegative, and hence
s1 = ‖a1‖1 = ‖b1‖1. (5.40)
We further note that for all i, since
ai
bi
 is a vector of length m + n with 2-norm equal to
1, we must have ∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
ai
bi

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ √m+ n. (5.41)
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Since si is the sum of the elements of ai and bi, we know that
si ≤ min{‖ai‖1, ‖bi‖1} ≤
√
m+ n
2
. (5.42)
This then gives us
s2i ≤ ‖ai‖1‖bi‖1 ≤
m+ n
4
, (5.43)
with the first inequality following from (5.42) and the second from (5.41). Finally note that
a consequence of the nonnegativity of ‖ · ‖1 and (5.41) is that for all i, j,
‖ai‖1‖bj‖1 + ‖bi‖1‖aj‖1 ≤ (‖ai‖1 + ‖bi‖1)(‖aj‖1 + ‖bj‖1) =
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
ai
bi

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
aj
bj

∥∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
(5.41)
≤ m+ n.
(5.44)
Now we let D := P − xyT and upper bound 1
2
‖D‖1 using Lemma 5.5.3.
1
2
‖D‖1 = 1
2
‖
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(sjai − siaj)(sjbi − sibj)T‖1
≤ 1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
‖λiλj(sjai − siaj)(sjbi − sibj)T‖1
≤ 1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj‖sjai − siaj‖1‖sjbi − sibj‖1
≤ 1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(sj‖ai‖1 + si‖aj‖1)(sj‖bi‖1 + si‖bj‖1) (5.45)
(5.40),(5.43)
≤ 1
2
k∑
j=2
λ1s
2
1λj(sj + ‖aj‖1)(sj + ‖bj‖1)
+
1
2
k∑
i=2
k∑
j>i
λiλj(s
2
j
m+ n
4
+ s2i
m+ n
4
+ sisj‖ai‖1‖bj‖1 + sisj‖aj‖1‖bi‖1)
(5.41),(5.44),(5.42)
≤ m+ n
2
λ1s
2
1
k∑
i=2
λi
+
1
2
k∑
i=2
k∑
j>i
λiλj
m+ n
4
(s2i + s
2
j) + λiλjsisj(m+ n)
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AMGM6≤ m+ n
2
λ1s
2
1
k∑
i=2
λi +
m+ n
2
k∑
i=2
k∑
j>i
λiλj(
s2i + s
2
j
4
+
s2i + s
2
j
2
)
=
m+ n
2
λ1s
2
1
k∑
i=2
λi +
3(m+ n)
8
k∑
i=2
k∑
j>i
λiλj(s
2
i + s
2
j)
=
m+ n
2
λ1s
2
1
k∑
i=2
λi +
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
i=2
λis
2
i
k∑
j>i
λj +
k∑
i=2
λi
k∑
j>i
λjs
2
j)
=
m+ n
2
λ1s
2
1
k∑
i=2
λi +
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
j=2
λj
k∑
2≤i<j
λis
2
i +
k∑
i=2
λi
k∑
j>i
λjs
2
j)
≤ m+ n
2
λ1s
2
1
k∑
i=2
λi +
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
j=2
λjs
2
j)
k∑
i=2
λi
(5.39)
=
m+ n
2
λ1s
2
1
k∑
i=2
λi +
3(m+ n)
8
(1− λ1s21)
k∑
i=2
λi
=
m+ n
8
(3 + λ1s
2
1)
k∑
i=2
λi
(5.39)
≤ m+ n
2
k∑
i=2
λi.
The following theorem quantifies how making the objective of the diagonal gap algorithm
from Section 5.4 small makes  small. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.5.5.
Theorem 5.5.6. Let M be a feasible solution to SDP2. Then, x and y constitute an -NE
to the game (A,B) with  ≤ 3(m+n)
8
(Tr(M)− xTx− yTy).
Proof. LetM be rank-k with eigenvalues λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λk > 0 and eigenvectors v1, . . . , vk
partitioned as in Lemma 5.5.2 so that vi =
ai
bi
 with∑mj=1(ai)j = ∑nj=1(bi)j for i = 1, . . . , k.
Let si :=
∑m
j=1(ai)j. Then we have Tr(M) =
∑k
i=1 λi, and
xTx+ yTy
(5.37),(5.38)
= (
k∑
i=1
λisivi)
T (
k∑
i=1
λisivi) =
k∑
i=1
λ2i s
2
i . (5.46)
6AMGM is used to denote the arithmetic-mean-geometric-mean inequality.
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We now get the following chain of inequalities (the first one follows from Lemma 5.5.4 and
inequality (5.45)):
 ≤ 1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(sj‖ai‖1 + si‖aj‖1)(sj‖bi‖1 + si‖bj‖1)
(5.40),(5.43)
≤ 1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(s
2
j
m+ n
4
+ s2i
m+ n
4
+ sisj‖ai‖1‖bj‖1 + sisj‖aj‖1‖bi‖1)
(5.44)
≤ 1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj
m+ n
4
(s2i + s
2
j) + λiλjsisj(m+ n)
AMGM≤ m+ n
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(
s2i + s
2
j
4
+
s2i + s
2
j
2
)
=
3(m+ n)
8
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
λiλj(s
2
i + s
2
j)
=
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
i=1
λis
2
i
k∑
j>i
λj +
k∑
i=1
λi
k∑
j>i
λjs
2
j)
=
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
j=1
λj
k∑
1≤i<j
λis
2
i +
k∑
i=1
λi
k∑
j>i
λjs
2
j)
=
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
i=1
λi
∑
j 6=i
λjs
2
j)
(5.39)
=
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
i=1
λi(1− λis2i ))
=
3(m+ n)
8
(
k∑
i=1
λi −
k∑
i=1
λ2i s
2
i )
(5.46)
=
3(m+ n)
8
(Tr(M)− xTx− yTy).
We now give a bound on  which is dependent on the nonnegative rank of the matrix
returned by SDP2. Our analysis will also be useful for the next subsection. To begin, we
first recall the definition of the nonnegative rank.
Definition 5.5.7. The nonnegative rank of a (nonnegative) m×n matrix M is the smallest
k for which there exist a nonnegative m × k matrix U and a nonnegative n × k matrix V
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such that M = UV T . Such a decomposition is called a nonnegative matrix factorization of
M .
Theorem 5.5.8. Consider the matrix P from any feasible solution to SDP2. Suppose its
nonnegative rank is k. Then x := P1n and y := P
T1m constitute an -NE to the game (A,B)
with  ≤ 1− 1
k
.
Proof. Since P has nonnegative rank k and its entries sum up to 1, we can write
P =
∑k
i=1 σiaib
T
i , where ai ∈ 4m, bi ∈ 4n, and
∑k
i=1 σi = 1. From Lemma 5.5.4 and
inequality (5.45) (keeping in mind that si = 1, ∀ i) we have
 ≤ 1
2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
σiσj(‖ai‖1 + ‖aj‖1)(‖bi‖1 + ‖bj‖1)
≤ 2
k∑
i=1
k∑
j>i
σiσj
= 2(
1
2
(
k∑
i=1
σi
k∑
j=1
σj −
k∑
i=1
σ2i ))
= 1−
k∑
i=1
σ2i
≤ 1− 1
k
,
where the last line follows from the fact that ‖v‖22 ≥ 1k for any vector v ∈ 4k.
5.5.3 Bounds on  in the Rank-2 Case
We now provide a number of bounds on (x, y) with x := P1n and y := P
T1m which hold
for rank-2 feasible solutionsM to SDP2 (note that P will have rank at most 2 in this case).
This is motivated by our ability to show stronger (constant) bounds in this case, and the
fact that we often recover rank-2 (or rank-1) solutions with our algorithms in Section 5.4.
Furthermore, our analysis will use the special property that a rank-2 nonnegative matrix
will have nonnegative rank also equal to two, and that a nonnegative factorization of it can
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be computed in polynomial time (see, e.g., Section 4 of [26]). We begin with the following
observation, which follows from Theorem 5.5.8 when k = 2.
Corollary 5.5.9. If the matrix P from a feasible solution to SDP2 is rank-2, then x and y
constitute a 1
2
−NE.
We now show how this pair of strategies can be refined.
Theorem 5.5.10. If the matrix P from a feasible solution to SDP2 is rank-2, then either x
and y constitute a 5
11
-NE, or a 5
11
-NE can be recovered from P in polynomial time.
Proof. We consider 3 cases, depending on whether A(x, y) and B(x, y) are greater than or
less than .4. If A ≤ .4, B ≤ .4, then (x, y) is already a .4-Nash equilibrium. Now consider
the case when A ≥ .4, B ≥ .4. Since A ≤ Tr(A(P − xyT )T ) and B ≤ Tr(B(P − xyT )T )
as seen in the proof of Lemma 5.5.1, we have, reusing the notation in the proof of Theorem
5.5.8,
σ1σ2(a1 − a2)TA(b1 − b2) ≥ .4, σ1σ2(a1 − a2)TB(b1 − b2) ≥ .4.
Since A, a1, a2, b1, and b2 are all nonnegative and σ1σ2 ≤ 14 ,
aT1Ab1 + a
T
2Ab2 ≥ (a1 − a2)TA(b1 − b2) ≥ 1.6,
and the same inequalities hold for for player B. In particular, since A and B have
entries bounded in [0,1] and a1, a2, b1, and b2 are simplex vectors, all the quantities
aT1Ab1, a
T
2Ab2, a
T
1Bb1, and a
T
2Bb2 are at most 1, and consequently at least .6. Hence (a1, a2)
and (a2, b2) are both .4-Nash equilibria.
Now suppose that (x, y) is a .4-NE for one player (without loss of generality player A)
but not for the other (without loss of generality player B). Then A ≤ .4, and B ≥ .4. Let
y∗ be a best response for player B to x, and let p = 1
1+B−A . Consider the strategy profile
(x˜, y˜) := (x, py + (1 − p)y∗). This can be interpreted as the outcome (x, y) occurring with
probability p, and the outcome (x, y∗) happening with probability 1 − p. In the first case,
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player A will have A(x, y) = A and player B will have B(x, y) = B. In the second outcome,
player A will have A(x, y
∗) at most 1, while player B will have B(x, y∗) = 0. Then under this
strategy profile, both players have the same upper bound for , which equals Bp =
B
1+B−A .
To find the worst case for this value, let B = .5 (note from Theorem 5.5.9 that B ≤ 12) and
A = .4, and this will return  =
5
11
.
We now show a stronger result in the case of symmetric games.
Definition 5.5.11. A symmetric game is a game in which the payoff matrices A and B
satisfy B = AT .
Definition 5.5.12. A Nash equilibrium strategy (x, y) is said to be symmetric if x = y.
Theorem 5.5.13 (see Theorem 2 in [77]). Every symmetric bimatrix game has a symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
For the proof of Theorem 5.5.17 below we modify SDP2 so that we are seeking a symmetric
solution. We also need a more specialized notion of the nonnegative rank.
Definition 5.5.14. A matrix M is completely positive (CP) if it admits a decomposition
M = UUT for some nonnegative matrix U .
Definition 5.5.15. The CP-rank of an n×n CP matrix M is the smallest k for which there
exists a nonnegative n× k matrix U such that M = UUT .
Theorem 5.5.16 (see e.g. Theorem 2.1 in [18]). A rank-2, nonnegative, and positive semidef-
inite matrix is CP and has CP-rank 2.
It is also known (see e.g., Section 4 in [55]) that the CP factorization of a rank-2 CP
matrix can be found to arbitrary accuracy in polynomial time.
Theorem 5.5.17. Suppose the constraint P  0 is added to SDP2. Then if in a feasible
solution to this new SDP the matrix P is rank-2, either x and y constitute a symmetric
1
3
-NE, or a symmetric 1
3
-NE can be recovered from P in polynomial time.
154
Proof. If (x, y) is already a symmetric 1
3
-NE, then the claim is established. Now suppose
that (x, y) does not constitute a 1
3
-Nash equilibrium. Similarly as in the proof of Theorem
5.5.8, we can decompose P into
∑2
i=1 σiaia
T
i , where
∑2
i=1 σi = 1 and each ai is a vector on
the unit simplex. Then we have
σ1σ2(a1 − a2)TA(a1 − a2) ≥ 1
3
.
Since A, a1, and a2 are all nonnegative, and σ1σ2 ≤ 14 , we get
aT1Aa1 + a
T
2Aa2 ≥ (a1 − a2)TA(a1 − a2) ≥
4
3
.
In particular, at least one of aT1Aa1 and a
T
2Aa2 is at least
2
3
. Since the maximum possible
payoff is 1, at least one of (a1, a1) and (a2, a2) is a (symmetric)
1
3
-Nash equilibrium.
Remark 5.5.1. For symmetric games, instead of the construction stated in Theorem 5.5.17,
one can simply optimize over a smaller m × m matrix (note m = n). This is the relaxed
version of exchangeable equilibria [102], with the completely positive constraint relaxed to a
psd constraint.
Remark 5.5.2. The statements of Corollary 5.5.9, and Theorem 5.5.10, and Theorem
5.5.17 hold for any rank-2 correlated equilibrium. Indeed, given any rank-2 (equivalently,
nonnegative-rank-2) correlated equilibrium P , one can complete it to a (rank-2) feasible
solution to SDP2 as follows. Let P =
∑2
i=1 σiaib
T
i , where ai ∈ 4m, bi ∈ 4n, and σ1 +σ2 = 1.
It is easy to check that
M :=
2∑
i=1
σi
ai
bi

ai
bi

T
is feasible to SDP2.
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5.6 Bounding Payoffs and Strategy Exclusion in Sym-
metric Games
In addition to finding -additive Nash equilibria, our SDP approach can be used to answer
certain questions of economic interest about Nash equilibria without actually computing
them. For instance, economists often would like to know the maximum welfare (sum of
the two players’ payoffs) achievable under any Nash equilibrium, or whether there exists a
Nash equilibrium in which a given subset of strategies (corresponding, e.g., to undesirable
behavior) is not played. Both these questions are NP-hard for bimatrix games [40], even when
the game is symmetric and only symmetric equilibria are considered [28]. In this section,
we consider these two problems in the symmetric setting and compare the performance of
our SDP approach to an LP approach which searches over symmetric correlated equilibria.
For general equilibria, it turns out that for these two specific questions, our SDP approach
is equivalent to an LP that searches over correlated equilibria.
5.6.1 Bounding Payoffs
When designing policies that are subject to game theoretic behavior by agents, economists
would often like to find one with a good socially optimal outcome, which usually corresponds
to an equilibrium giving the maximum welfare. Hence, given a game, it is of interest to
know the highest achievable welfare under any Nash equilibrium. For symmetric games,
symmetric equilibria are of particular interest as they reflect the notion that identical agents
should behave similarly given identical options.
Note that the maximum welfare of a symmetric game under any symmetric Nash equi-
librium is equal to the optimal value of the following quadratic program:
max
x∈4m
2xTAx
subject to xTAx ≥ eTi Ax, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(5.47)
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One can find an upper bound on this number by solving an LP which searches over symmetric
correlated equilibria:
max
P∈Sm,m
Tr(AP T ) (LP1)
subject to
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
Pi,j = 1 (5.48)
m∑
j=1
Ai,jPi,j ≥
m∑
j=1
Ak,jPi,j,∀i, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (5.49)
P ≥ 0. (5.50)
A potentially better upper bound on the maximum welfare can be obtained from a version
of SDP2 adapted to this specific problem:
max
P∈Sm,m
Tr(AP T ) (SDP3)
subject to (5.48), (5.49), (5.50)
P  0.
To test the quality of these upper bounds, we tested this LP and SDP on a random sample
of one hundred 5×5 and 10×10 games7. The resulting upper bounds are in Figure 5.2, which
shows that the bound returned by SDP3 was exact in a large number of the experiments.8
7The matrix A in each game was randomly generated with diagonal entries uniform and independent in
[0,.5] and off-diagonal entries uniform and independent in [0,1].
8The computation of the exact maximum payoffs was done with the lrsnash software [12], which computes
all extreme Nash equilibria. For a definition of extreme Nash equilibria and for understanding why it is
sufficient for us to compare against extreme Nash equilibria (both in Section 5.6.1 and in Section 5.6.2), see
Appendix A.3. The computation of the SDP upper bound has been implemented in the file nashbound.m,
which is publicly available at https://github.com/jeffreyzhang92/SDP Nash along with the instance data.
This file more generally computes an SDP-based lower bound on the minimum of an input quadratic function
over the set of Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game. The file also takes as an argument whether one wishes
to only consider symmetric equilibria when the game is symmetric.
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Figure 5.2: The quality of the upper bound on the maximum welfare obtained by LP1
and SDP3 on 100 5× 5 games (left) and 100 10× 10 games (right).
5.6.2 Strategy Exclusion
The strategy exclusion problem asks, given a subset of strategies S = (Sx,Sy), with
Sx ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} and Sy ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, is there a Nash equilibrium in which no strategy in S
is played with positive probability. We will call a set S “persistent” if the answer to this
question is negative, i.e. at least one strategy in S is played with positive probability in
every Nash equilibrium. One application of the strategy exclusion problem is to understand
whether certain strategies can be discouraged in the design of a game, such as reckless
behavior in a game of chicken or defecting in a game of prisoner’s dilemma. In these
particular examples these strategy sets are persistent and cannot be discouraged.
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As in the previous subsection, we consider the strategy exclusion problem for symmetric
strategies in symmetric games (such as the aforementioned games of chicken and prisoner’s
dilemma). A quadratic program which addresses this problem is as follows:
min
x∈4m
∑
i∈Sx
xi
subject to xTAx ≥ eTi Ax, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(5.51)
Observe that by design, S is persistent if and only if this quadratic program has a positive
optimal value. As in the previous subsection, an LP relaxation of this problem which searches
over symmetric correlated equilibria is given by
min
P∈Sm,m
∑
i∈Sx
m∑
j=1
Pij (LP2)
subject to (5.48), (5.49), (5.50).
The SDP relaxation that we propose for the strategy exclusion problem is the following:
min
P∈Sm,m
∑
i∈Sx
m∑
j=1
Pij (SDP4)
subject to (5.48), (5.49), (5.50)
P  0.
Our approach would be to declare that the strategy set Sx is persistent if and only if SDP4
has a positive optimal value.
Note that since the optimal value of SDP4 is a lower bound for that of (5.51), SDP4
carries over the property that if a set S is not persistent, then the SDP for sure returns
zero. Thus, when using SDP4 on a set which is not persistent, our algorithm will always
be correct. However, this is not necessarily the case for a persistent set. While we can be
certain that a set is persistent if SDP4 returns a positive optimal value (again, because the
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optimal value of SDP4 is a lower bound for that of (5.51)), there is still the possibility that
for a persistent set SDP4 will have optimal value zero. The same arguments hold for the
optimal value of LP2.
To test the performance of LP2 and SDP4, we generated 100 random games of size
5 × 5 and 10 × 10 and computed all their symmetric extreme Nash equilibria9. We then,
for every strategy set S of cardinality one and two, checked whether that set of strategies
was persistent, first by checking among the extreme Nash equilibria, then through LP2 and
SDP4. The results are presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. As can be seen, SDP4 was quite
effective for the strategy exclusion problem.
Table 5.2: Performance of LP2 and SDP4 on 5× 5 games
|S| 1 2
Number of total sets 500 1000
Number of persistent sets 245 748
Persistent sets certified (LP2) 177 (72.2%) 661 (88.7%)
Persistent sets certified (SDP4) 245 (100%) 748 (100%)
Table 5.3: Performance of LP2 and SDP4 on 10× 10 games
|S| 1 2
Number of total sets 1000 4500
Number of persistent sets 326 2383
Persistent sets certified (LP2) 39 (12.0%) 630 (26.4%)
Persistent sets certified (SDP4) 318 (97.5%) 2368 (99.4%)
5.7 Connection to the Sum of Squares/Lasserre Hier-
archy
In this section, we clarify the connection of the SDPs we have proposed in this chapter to
those arising in the sum of squares/Lasserre hierarchy. We start by briefly reviewing this
hierarchy.
9The exact computation of the exact Nash equilibria was done again with the lrsnash software [12], which
computes extreme Nash equilibria. To understand why this suffices for our purposes see Appendix A.3.
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5.7.1 Sum of Squares/Lasserre Hierarchy
The sum of squares/Lasserre hierarchy10 gives a recipe for constructing a sequence of SDPs
whose optimal values converge to the optimal value of a given polynomial optimization
problem. Recall that for a POP of the form
min
x∈Rn
p(x)
subject to qi(x) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
(5.52)
where p, qi are polynomial functions, k-th level of the Lasserre hierarchy is given by
γksos :=max
γ,σi
γ
subject to p(x)− γ = σ0(x) +
m∑
i=1
σi(x)qi(x),
σi is sos, ∀i ∈ {0, . . . ,m},
σ0, giσi have degree at most 2k, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
(5.53)
Recall that any fixed level of this hierarchy gives an SDP of size polynomial in n and
that, if the quadratic module generated by {x ∈ Rn|gi(x) ≥ 0} is Archimedean (see, e.g. [63]
for definition), then lim
k→∞
γksos = p
∗, where p∗ is the optimal value of the pop in (5.52). The
latter statement is a consequence of Putinar’s positivstellensatz (see, e.g. [92], [61]).
5.7.2 The Lasserre Hierarchy and SDP1
One can show, e.g. via the arguments in [62], that the feasible sets of the SDPs dual to
the SDPs underlying the hierarchy we summarized above produce an arbitrarily tight outer
approximation to the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria of any game. The downside
of this approach, however, is that the higher levels of the hierarchy can get expensive very
10The unfamiliar reader is referred to [61, 88, 63] for an introduction to this hierarchy and the related
theory of moment relaxations.
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quickly. This is why the approach we took in this chapter was instead to improve the first
level of the hierarchy. The next proposition formalizes this connection.
Proposition 5.7.1. Consider the problem of minimizing any quadratic objective function
over the set of Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game. Then, SDP1 (and hence SDP2) gives a
lower bound on this problem which is no worse than that produced by the first level of the
Lasserre hierarchy.
Proof. To prove this proposition we show that the first level of the Lasserre hierarchy is dual
to a weakened version of SDP1.
Explicit parametrization of first level of the Lasserre hierarchy. Consider the
formulation of the Lasserre hierarchy in (5.53) with k = 1. Suppose we are minimizing a
quadratic function
f(x, y) =

x
y
1

T
C

x
y
1

over the set of Nash equilibria as described by the linear and quadratic constraints in (5.2).
If we apply the first level of the Lasserre hierarchy to this particular pop, we get
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max
Q,α,χ,β,ψ,η
γ
subject to

x
y
1

T
C

x
y
1
− γ =

x
y
1

T
Q

x
y
1
+
m∑
i=1
αi(x
TAy − eTi Ay)
+
n∑
i=1
βi(x
TBy − xTBei)
+
m∑
i=1
χixi +
n∑
i=1
ψiyi
+ η1(
m∑
i=1
xi − 1) + η2(
n∑
i=1
yi − 1),
Q  0,
α, χ, β, ψ ≥ 0,
(5.54)
where Q ∈ Sm+n+1×m+n+1, α, χ ∈ Rm, β, ψ ∈ Rn, η ∈ R2.
By matching coefficients of the two quadratic functions on the left and right hand sides
of (5.54), this SDP can be written as
max
γ,α,β,χ,ψ,η
γ
subject to H  0,
α, β, χ, ψ ≥ 0,
(5.55)
where
H := 1
2

0 (−∑mi=1 αi)A+ (−∑mi=1 βi)B ∑ni=1 βiB,i − χ− η11m
(−∑mi=1 αi)A+ (−∑ni=1 βi)B 0 ∑mi=1 αiATi, − ψ − η21n∑n
i=1 βiB
T
,i − χT − η11Tm
∑m
i=1 αiAi, − ψT − η21Tn 2η1 + 2η2 − 2γ
+C.
(5.56)
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Dual of a weakened version of SDP1. With this formulation in mind, let us consider
a weakened version of SDP1 with only the relaxed Nash constraints, unity constraints, and
nonnegativity constraints on x and y in the last column (i.e., the nonegativity constraint is
not applied to the entire matrix). Let the objective be Tr(CM′). To write this new SDP in
standard form, let
Ai := 1
2

0 A 0
AT 0 −ATi,
0 −Ai, 0
 ,Bi := 12

0 B −B,i
BT 0 0
−BT,i 0 0
 ,
S1 := 1
2

0 0 1m
0 0 0
1Tm 0 −2
 ,S2 := 12

0 0 0
0 0 1n
0 1Tn −2
 .
Let Ni be the matrix with all zeros except a 12 at entry (i,m+ n+ 1) and (m+ n+ 1, i) (or
a 1 if i = m+ n+ 1).
Then this SDP can be written as
min
M′
Tr(CM′) (SDP0)
subject to M′  0, (5.57)
Tr(NiM′) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m+ n}, (5.58)
Tr(AiM′) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, (5.59)
Tr(BiM′) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (5.60)
Tr(S1M′) = 0, (5.61)
Tr(S2M′) = 0, (5.62)
Tr(Nm+n+1) = 1. (5.63)
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We now create dual variables for each constraint; we choose αi and βi for the relaxed
Nash constraints (5.59) and (5.60), η1 and η2 for the unity constraints (5.61) and (5.62), χ
for the nonnegativity of x (5.58), ψ for the nonnegativity of y (5.58), and γ for the final
constraint on the corner (5.63). These variables are chosen to coincide with those used in the
parametrization of the first level of the Lasserre hierarchy, as can be seen more clearly below.
We then write the dual of the above SDP as
max
α,β,λ,γ
γ
subject to
m∑
i=1
αiAi +
n∑
i=1
βiBi +
2∑
i=1
ηiSi +
m∑
i=1
Ni+nχi +
n∑
i=1
Niψi + γNm+n+1  C,
α, β, χ, ψ ≥ 0.
which can be rewritten as
max
α,β,χ,ψ,γ
γ
subject to G  0,
α, β, χ, ψ ≥ 0,
(5.64)
where
G := 1
2

0 (−∑mi=1 αi)A+ (−∑mi=1 βi)B ∑ni=1 βiB,i − χ− η11m
(−∑mi=1 αi)A+ (−∑ni=1 βi)B 0 ∑mi=1 αiATi, − ψ − η21n∑n
i=1 βiB
T
,i − χT − η11Tm
∑m
i=1 αiAi, − ψT − η21Tn 2η1 + 2η2 − 2γ
+C.
We can now see that the matrix G coincides with the matrix H in the SDP (5.55). Then
we have
(5.54)opt = (5.55)opt = (5.64)opt ≤ SDP0opt ≤ SDP1opt,
where the first inequality follows from weak duality, and the second follows from that the
constraints of SDP0 are a subset of the constraints of SDP1.
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Remark 5.7.1. The Lasserre hierarchy can be viewed in each step as a pair of primal-dual
SDPs: the sum of squares formulation which we have just presented, and a moment formu-
lation which is dual to the sos formulation [61]. All our SDPs in this chapter can be viewed
more directly as an improvement upon the moment formulation.
Remark 5.7.2. One can see, either by inspection or as an implication of the proof of Theo-
rem 5.2.2, that in the case where the objective function corresponds to maximizing player
A’s and/or B’s payoffs11, SDPs (5.55) and (5.64) are infeasible. This means that for such
problems the first level of the Lasserre hierarchy gives an upper bound of +∞ on the max-
imum payoff. On the other hand, the additional valid inequalities in SDP2 guarantee that
the resulting bound is always finite.
5.8 Future Work
Our work leaves many avenues of further research. Are there other interesting subclasses of
games (besides strictly competitive games) for which our SDP is guaranteed to recover an
exact Nash equilibrium? Can the guarantees on  in Section 5.5 be improved in the rank-2
case (or the general case) by improving our analysis? Is there a polynomial time algorithm
that is guaranteed to find a rank-2 solution to SDP2? Such an algorithm, together with
our analysis, would improve the best known approximation bound for symmetric games (see
Theorem 5.5.17). Can this bound be extended to general games? We show in Appendix A.4
that some natural approaches based on symmetrization of games do not immediately lead to
a positive answer to this question. Can SDPs in a higher level of the Lasserre hierarchy be
used to achieve better  guarantees? What are systematic ways of adding valid inequalities
11This would be the case, for example, in the maximum social welfare problem of Section 5.6.1, where the
matrix of the quadratic form in the objective function is given by
C =
 0 −A−B 0−A−B 0 0
0 0 0
 .
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to these higher-order SDPs by exploiting the structure of the Nash equilibrium problem?
For example, since any strategy played with positive probability must give the same payoff,
one can add a relaxed version of the cubic constraints
xixj(e
T
i Ay − eTj Ay) = 0,∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
to the SDP underlying the second level of the Lasserre hierarchy. What are other valid
inequalities for the second level? Finally, our algorithms were specifically designed for two-
player one-shot games. This leaves open the design and analysis of semidefinite relaxations
for repeated games or games with more than two players.
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Appendix A
Appendices for Nash Equilibria
A.1 Statistics on  from Algorithms in Section 5.4
Below are statistics for the  recovered in 100 random games of varying sizes using the
algorithms of Section 5.4.
Table A.1: Statistics on  for 5× 5 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0702 0.0040 0.0004 0.0099
Diagonal Gap 0.0448 0.0027 0 0.0061
Table A.2: Statistics on  for 10× 5 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0327 0.0044 0.0021 0.0064
Diagonal Gap 0.0267 0.0033 0.0006 0.0053
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Table A.3: Statistics on  for 10× 10 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0373 0.0058 0.0039 0.0065
Diagonal Gap 0.0266 0.0043 0.0026 0.0051
Table A.4: Statistics on  for 15× 10 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0206 0.0050 0.0034 0.0045
Diagonal Gap 0.0212 0.0038 0.0025 0.0039
Table A.5: Statistics on  for 15× 15 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0169 0.0051 0.0042 0.0039
Diagonal Gap 0.0159 0.0038 0.0029 0.0034
Table A.6: Statistics on  for 20× 15 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0152 0.0046 0.0035 0.0036
Diagonal Gap 0.0119 0.0032 0.0022 0.0027
Table A.7: Statistics on  for 20× 20 games after 20 iterations.
Algorithm Max Mean Median StDev
Square Root 0.0198 0.0046 0.0039 0.0034
Diagonal Gap 0.0159 0.0032 0.0024 0.0032
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A.2 Comparison with an SDP Approach from [60]
In this section, at the request of a referee, we compare the first level of the SDP hierarchy
given in [60, Section 4] to SDP2 using Tr(M) as the objective function on 100 randomly
generated games for each size given in the tables below. The first level of the hierarchy in
[60] optimizes over a matrix which is slightly bigger than the one in SDP2, though it has a
number of constraints linear in the size of the game considered, as opposed to the quadratic
number in SDP2. We remark that the approach in [60] is applicable more generally to many
other problems, including several in game theory.
The scalar  reported in Table A.8 is computed using the strategies (x, y) extracted from
the first row of the optimal matrix M1 as described in Section 4.1 of [60]. The scalar 
reported in Table A.9 is computed using x = P1n and y = P
T1m from the optimal solution
to SDP2 with Tr(M) as the objective function.
Table A.8: Statistics on  for first level of the hierarchy in [60].
5× 5 10× 5 10× 10 15× 10 15× 15 20× 15 20× 20
Max 0.3357 0.3304 0.2557 0.2189 0.1987 0.1837 0.1828
Mean 0.1883 0.1889 0.1513 0.1446 0.1262 0.1217 0.1087
Median 0.1803 0.1865 0.1452 0.1418 0.1271 0.1208 0.1070
Table A.9: Statistics on  for SDP2 with Tr(M) as the objective function.
5× 5 10× 5 10× 10 15× 10 15× 15 20× 15 20× 20
Max 0.1581 0.1589 0.115 0.1335 0.0878 0.082 0.0619
Mean 0.0219 0.0332 0.0405 0.04 0.0366 0.0356 0.0298
Median 0.0046 0.0233 0.036 0.0346 0.0345 0.0325 0.0293
We also ran the second level of the hierarchy in [60] on the same 100 5× 5 games. The
maximum  observed was .3362, while the mean was .1880 and the median was .1800. The
size of the variable matrix that needs to be positive semidefinite for this level is 78× 78.
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A.3 Lemmas for Extreme Nash Equilibria
The results reported in Section 5.6 were found using the lrsnash [12] software which com-
putes extreme Nash equilibria (see definition below). In particular the true maximum welfare
and the persistent strategy sets were found in relation to extreme symmetric Nash equilibria
only. We show in this appendix why this is sufficient for the claims we made about all sym-
metric Nash equilibria. We prove a more general statement below about general games and
general Nash equilibria since this could be of potential independent interest. The proof for
symmetric games is identical once the strategies considered are restricted to be symmetric.
Definition A.3.1. An extreme Nash equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium which cannot be
expressed as a convex combination of other Nash equilibria.
Lemma A.3.2. All Nash equilibria are convex combinations of extreme Nash equilibria.
Proof. It suffices to show that any extreme point of the convex hull of the set of Nash
equilibria must be an extreme Nash equilibrium, as any point in a compact convex set can
be written as a convex combination of its extreme points. Note that this convex hull contains
three types of points: extreme Nash equilibria, Nash equilibria which are not extreme, and
convex combinations of Nash equilibria which are not Nash equilibria. The claim then follows
because any extreme point of the convex hull cannot be of the second or third type, as they
can be written as convex combinations of other points in the hull.
The next lemma shows that checking extreme Nash equilibria are sufficient for the max-
imum welfare problem.
Lemma A.3.3. For any bimatrix game, there exists an extreme Nash equilibrium giving the
maximum welfare among all Nash equilibria.
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Proof. Consider any Nash equilibrium (x˜, y˜), and let it be written as
x˜
y˜
 = ∑ri=1 λi
xi
yi

for some set of extreme Nash equilibria
x1
y1
 , . . . ,
xr
yr
 and λ ∈ 4r. Observe that for any
i, j,
xiTAyj ≤ xjTAyj, xiTByj ≤ xiTByi, (A.1)
from the definition of a Nash equilibrium. Now note that
x˜T (A+B)y˜ = (
r∑
i=1
λix
i)T (A+B)(
r∑
i=1
λiy
i)
=
r∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
λiλjx
iT (A+B)yj
=
r∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
λiλjx
iTAyj +
r∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
λiλjx
iTByj
(A.1)
≤
r∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
λiλjx
jTAyj +
r∑
i=1
r∑
j=1
λiλjx
iTByi
=
r∑
i=1
λix
iTAyi +
r∑
i=1
λix
iTByi
=
r∑
i=1
λix
iT (A+B)yi.
In particular, since each (xi, yi) is an extreme Nash equilibrium, this tells us for any Nash
equilibrium (x˜, y˜) there must be an extreme Nash equilibrium which has at least as much
welfare.
Similarly for the results for persistent sets in Section 5.6.2, there is no loss in restricting
attention to extreme Nash equilibria.
Lemma A.3.4. For a given strategy set S, if every extreme Nash equilibrium plays at least
one strategy in S with positive probability, then every Nash equilibrium plays at least one
strategy in S with positive probability.
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Proof. Let S be a persistent set of strategies. Since all Nash equilibria are composed of
nonnegative entries, and every extreme Nash equilibrium has positive probability on some
entry in S, any convex combination of extreme Nash equilibria must have positive probability
on some entry in S.
A.4 A Note on Reductions from General Games to
Symmetric Games
An anonymous referee asked us if our guarantees for symmetric games transfer over to general
games by symmetrization. Indeed, there are reductions in the literature that take a general
game, construct a symmetric game from it, and relate the Nash equilibria of the original
game to symmetric Nash equilibria of its symmetrized version. In this Appendix, we review
two well-known reductions of this type, which are shown in [45] and [54], and show that the
quality of approximate Nash equilibria can differ greatly between the two games. We hope
that our examples can be of independent interest.
A.4.1 The Reduction of [45]
Consider a game (A,B) with A,B > 0 and a Nash equilibrium (x∗, y∗) of it with payoffs
pA := x
∗TAy∗ and pB := x∗TBy∗. Then the symmetric game (SAB, STAB) with
SAB :=
 0 A
BT 0

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admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both players play
 pApA+pBx∗
pB
pA+pB
y∗
. In the reverse
direction, any symmetric equilibrium

x
y
 ,
x
y

 of (SAB, STAB) yields a Nash equilibrium
( x
1Tmx
, y
1Tny
) to the original game (A,B).
To demonstrate that high-quality approximate Nash equilibria in the symmetrized game
can map to low-quality approximate Nash equilibria in the original game, consider the game
given by (A,B) =

 0
1 1
 ,
2 0
0 1

 for some  > 0. The symmetric strategy


1
1+
0

1+
0

,

1
1+
0

1+
0


is an 1−
1+
-NE for (SAB, S
T
AB), but the strategy pair

1
0
 ,
1
0

 is a (1− )-NE for (A,B).
A.4.2 The Reduction of [54]
Consider a game (A,B) with A > 0, B < 0 and a Nash equilibrium (x∗, y∗) of it with payoffs
pA := x
∗TAy∗ and pB := x∗TBy∗. Then the symmetric game (SAB, STAB) with
SAB :=

0m×m A −1m
BT 0n×n 1n
1Tm −1Tn 0

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admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which both players play

x∗
2−pB
y∗
2+pA
1− 1
2−pB − 12+pA
 .
In the reverse direction, any symmetric equilibrium


x
y
z
 ,

x
y
z

 of (SAB, STAB) yields a
Nash equilibrium ( x
1Tmx
, y
1Tny
) to the original game (A,B). This reduction has some advantages
over the previous one (see [54, Section 1]).
To demonstrate that high-quality approximate Nash equilibria in the new symmetrized
game can again map to low-quality approximate Nash equilibria in the original game, consider
the game given by (A,B) =

0 0
0 1
 ,
−1 −1
0 0

. Let  ∈ (0, 12). The symmetric strategy



0
1− 
0
0

,


0
1− 
0
0


is an 
2
(1− )-NE1 for (SAB, STAB), but the strategy pair

1
0
 ,
1
0

 is a 1-NE for (A,B).
1Note that approximation factor is halved since the range of the entries of the payoff matrix in the
symmetrized game is [−1, 1].
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